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ABSTRACT 
 
INTIMATE EXEGESIS:  
READING AND FEELING IN EARLY MODERN DEVOTIONAL LITERATURE 
 
Bronwyn V. Wallace 
Margreta de Grazia 
 
“Intimate Exegesis” proposes that early modern devotional literature offers feeling, and 
particularly bad feeling, as a productive matrix for interpretation. In this body of work, 
feeling – haptic, sensory, affective – generates an intimacy between reader and text in a 
reading practice that is also a means of coping with the tremendous gap between life in the 
fallen world and divine perfection. In an unlikely union that I argue involves a powerful 
shared approach to affect, embodiment, and interpretation, I bring patristic theology 
together with feminist and queer theory to address how Robert Southwell, Anne Lock, 
Aemilia Lanyer, and Katherine Philips develop sophisticated interpretive practices out of 
mourning, recalcitrance, despair, nostalgia, and failure, all grounded in the peculiar passions 
of embodied femininity. In their work, difficult or even destructive feeling is not an obstacle 
to reading and devotion, but rather enables the reader’s identification with and even desire 
for the text she reads. While recent debates in early modern studies have pitted historicism 
against queer temporality, devotional practice suggests that to read historically is – has always 
been – to read anachronically. The negative affects that Southwell, Lock, Lanyer, and Philips 
introduce to their scenes of leverage the properties of form and rhetoric to approach distant 
pasts, imagine radical futures, and above all to slow down the time of reading and the time of 
worldly politics, to stand still, to refuse to move on.
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We might want the gir ls to read the books  
that enable them to be overwhelmed by grie f .  
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I. Introduction : Intimate Exegesis 
 
This dissertation began as a study of desire and presence and became a study of mourning, 
recalcitrance, despair, nostalgia, and failure. That’s a joke about graduate school, see? Either 
you get it or you don’t. But it’s also no joke at all.  
I began with two basic questions: one, how is it that devotional literature activates its 
erotic dimensions in the reader? What is happening when a text makes us feel the desire it 
describes? And two, what might be gained from coordinating the exegetical protocols of 
patristic theology with contemporary studies in queer affect, given their shared interests in 
the relation between the reader’s embodiment and the text she reads?  
These questions, especially to the degree that they call on problems of relation across 
time – between my primary texts and their objects in salvational history; between the 
modern reader and early modern ways of reading and feeling – drew me to work in queer 
temporality, much of which promises materially close communion across the historical gulf 
that divides us from our objects of study. The field is dense with the metaphorics of touch: 
for Elizabeth Freeman, the “close” in the “close-reading” that sutures gaps in historical time 
is characterized by “a grasp, a clutch, a refusal to let go.”1 For Carolyn Dinshaw, the affective 
and often erotic charge of intimacy with the past is a “touch across time.”2 Meanwhile, 
patristic theology routes interpretation through the dialectical system of spirit and body: for 
example, in his figure of scripture as “treasure in earthen vessels” (2 Cor. 4:1-7), Saint Paul 
                                                
1 Time Binds: Queer Temporalities, Queer Histories (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), 
xx. 
2 Getting Medieval: Sexualities and Communities, Pre- and Postmodern (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1999), 21. 
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conflates the capacity of the gospel as text to express divinity in human terms and the 
capacity of the base material of humanity to exceed itself in preaching that gospel – that is, 
for Paul here as elsewhere, the body and spirit of scripture and of human being are so nearly 
analogous as to be almost identical. The shared set of concerns between these two 
apparently disparate bodies of work appeared at first to offer a means of accounting for how 
devotional texts generate presence: that is, intimacy with divinity. I began this project with an 
optimism conditioned by Dinshaw’s: the intense appeal of the idea that one might reach 
across time and make contact, that touch or even close adjacency might be achieved. In Getting 
Medieval, Dinshaw envisions the possibility of a literary history that could be conceived as 
community, through the “touch across time” that conditions our encounters with the texts 
that shape us. In How Soon is Now?, she calls it love.3 
In the work of Robert Southwell, which has always been at the center of my thinking 
and has provoked many of my most central questions, the animation of such love in reading 
is a primary concern. His prefaces to Mary Magdalen’s Funeral Tears call on the power of 
poetry to orient emotion, to “to draw [the] floud of affections into the right chanel,” in an 
affective interchange between text and reader.4 He imagines himself writing directly to his 
readership, a pastoral role in which reading becomes relationship. One of this project’s 
earliest readings thus centered itself in an epistolary mode, in a letter of 1580 in which, as a 
young man of about nineteen, Southwell wrote from the Jesuit College at Rome to his close 
“spiritual friend” John Deckers, in reply to a letter from Deckers expressing his doubt of his 
                                                
3 Getting Medieval: Sexualities and Communities, Pre- and Postmodern (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1999); How Soon is Now?: Medieval Texts, Amateur Readers, and the 
Queerness of Time (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012).  
4 Mary Magdalen’s Funeral Tears (London: John Wolfe for Gabriel Cawood, 1591), A3v. 
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vocation in the Society of Jesus.5 To comfort and affirm his friend, Southwell details with 
loving nostalgia the early days of their friendship in the English College at Douai, drawing 
out of an extended dilation on the past a recollection in the present of their mutual devotion 
to each other, to God, and to the Society. He recounts their early courtship – two young 
neophytes drawn together by their mentors and confessors, Southwell struggling with his 
vocation and Deckers confirmed in his own; the nervous anticipation of desiring spiritual 
friendship and the instantaneous joy of discovering it in the other. In the midst of his 
account, Southwell interjects a burst of present affection for his friend, staking a claim on 
their common past to affirm them both in the present:  
If you only knew, dear John, what an esteem I then formed in my mind of your 
devotion, piety, inward communication with God, I feel sure you would derive 
thence a fresh incentive to serve God more fervently: if you knew, too, what ardent 
affection for you that esteem excited in me, you would easily understand my present 
feelings toward you.  
 
A tremendous amount of faith in communication is staked on those ifs. In this syntactic 
balancing act, Southwell’s “esteem” for Deckers’ spiritual security and his “ardent affection” 
for him personally are coextensive; so likewise are the renewed conviction to which 
Southwell exhorts his friend and the “understanding” of “feeling” he hopes to elicit in him. 
Southwell dwells in this suspension, on the “unwonted light” that “shone on my mind 
previously clouded in darkness,” on the small miracle that the hope alone of “winning your 
consent” to an intimate friendship “seemed to heal all the wounds of my preceding conflict.” 
The dilation of this recollection of anticipation is itself remarkable: “But why linger on the 
hope thus raised in me, why rest in the sight rather than relish the taste of the honey 
                                                
5 In Publications of the Catholic Record Society, vol. 5, Latin original pp. 295-98, English trans. by 
J.H. Pollen, S.J. pp. 298-300. 
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presented me?” Why, indeed? To prolong the arousal of desire, as though to cherish its 
suspense, to experience again, to give to Deckers to experience again, that sudden fervent 
hope and longing. Dwelling in the past anticipation of intimacy secures the present intimacy 
of the letter: rhetorical dilation brings the past into the present epistolary scene of shared 
desire.  But Southwell does move on at last, as the richly sensual – and densely scriptural –
 figure of honey tasted prepares a scene in which the two young men meet for the first time 
before the chapel of the College:  
There we met and disclosed to each other the desires and secrets of our heart, and 
were both kindled with enthusiasm as we conversed about God and the Institute of 
the Society. No friend was then so dear to John as Robert, none so dear to Robert as 
John; no delight in this world seemed greater than to enter the Society. Not a day 
passed, not an opportunity was lost. Whatever free time we could steal for 
conversation together seemed all too short. From that time our fervour in prayer 
began to increase; private chastisements of the flesh to afford delight; the unsparing 
use of the hairshirt and discipline to please exceedingly.  
 
The pleasure of devotion becomes extreme when shared. The erotic urgency of the past 
moment Southwell here relates is also the erotic urgency of the letter itself, and the payoff of 
the retelling of this story is in its value as memory to the present: “Let us now recall those 
experiences, my dear John, and strive to perform more fervently now the exercises we then 
practised, when we were as yet exiles sighing for our country, and imitators of the members 
of the Society” (my emphasis). Confirmation in vocation here is understood as an erotic 
intimacy, confirmed in an epistolary exchange that unites the friends across a long distance 
and as a function of memory that secures present to past. The exercise in memory that 
Southwell recommends to Deckers, calling perhaps on their shared training in Jesuit 
meditation, demands his investment in the present experience of Southwell’s account, whose 
prose is crafted to evoke and amplify the “fervour” they developed together in a past 
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experience. Paradoxically, the mimetic account of past experience is posed against the 
imitative nature of that experience itself – it’s now that Southwell and Deckers can perform 
the original of the “exercises” they merely copied as young men. In this strange temporality, 
the eroticism of the letter secures mutual practice in the present. For Southwell, textualizing 
his recollection gives the former practice present urgency, grants it the capacity to move and 
affirm in the present; the letter’s promise is that the effect on Deckers will be immediate and 
transformative. 
In a provocatively-titled recent book, The Renaissance Rediscovery of Intimacy, Kathy 
Eden argues that Renaissance stylists from Petrarch to Montaigne took up a relatively 
narrow category of ancient rhetoric – the intimate style of epistolary writing – as the 
foundation for all writing, weaving an insistence on the centrality of intimacy into the very 
fabric of the humanist rhetorical tradition. Eden posits, first, the “inseparability of rhetoric 
and hermeneutics,” that “how a culture writes is inextricably linked to how it reads,” an 
insight she borrows from Gadamer.6 That intimacy between reading and writing, 
hermeneutics and rhetoric, generates the further intimacy between reader and writer in what 
Gadamer calls the “miracle” of interpretation, the “transformation of something alien and 
dead into total contemporaneity (Zugleichsein) and familiarity [i.e., intimacy] (Vertrautsein).”7 
But Eden lets Gadamer’s sacramental language drop in her pursuit of a largely secular 
project predicated on the classical rhetorical tradition and its inheritance – its rediscovery – 
by Renaissance humanism. Any time the Renaissance rediscovers something, a periodizing 
gesture occurs that elides any tradition emerging from late antiquity or the Middle Ages; one 
                                                
6 Eden, The Renaissance Rediscovery of Intimacy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 4. 
7 This is Gadamer; the parenthetical glossing of the translation and the bracketed 
interpolation are Eden’s. Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 
2nd ed. (New York, 1989), 163; cited in Eden 6. 
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of the things that cannot be adequately addressed by such a gesture is the sustained 
development of Christian theology throughout that period. Eden’s periodization and her 
secularism, in other words, are of a piece.  That loss was one thing my project initially set out 
to recover: the rhetoric of intimacy by which Southwell proceeds in his letter to Deckers 
depends entirely on its emergence from and orientation toward divinity: “As then Jesus 
Christ laid the foundation of our fellowship (and on this point I have not the slightest 
doubt), and the desire we both shared of serving Him, was the force that consolidated our 
union in its progress, why should not the result we both longed for also consummate our 
friendship?”8 Gadamer’s miracle here appears as the rhetorical-ritual “consummation” of 
friendship, the erotic relay secured by desire and devotional purpose. As Brian Cummings 
has argued, in the affective modes of epistolarity, “subjectivity is not so much asserted as 
shared,” that in the “relationship of feeling” motivated in letter-writing and -reading, 
“emotions […] form the attunement which enables us to recognise our selves as our selves, 
and to recognise another as like us and thus able to respond to us and understand us.”9 This 
argument emerges from a reading of Donne, who describes his own letter-writing as “a kind 
of exstasie, and a departure and secession and suspension of the soul, which doth then 
communicate it self to two bodies.”10 In Donne’s characteristic articulation of the 
interanimation of two bodies, as in the shared devotion which Southwell’s letter to Deckers 
enacts, emerges a powerful account of the intimate phenomena of writing and reading.  
                                                
8 Pollen, 298.   
9 “Donne’s Passions: Emotion, Agency, and Language,” in Passions and Subjectivity in Early 
Modern Culture, eds. Brian Cummings and Freya Sierhuis (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2013), 56, 58, 
71. 
10 “To Sir H.G.,” in Letters to severall persons of honour written by John Donne … 
published by John Donne, Dr. of the civill law (London: J. Flesher for Richard Marriot, 
1651), 70. Quoted in Cummings, 65.  
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Yet these accounts, like Southwell’s epistolary rhetoric, require an extraordinary, 
almost an outrageous, faith in the success of such ecstatic communion. This project 
originated with a deep desire to experience that kind of faith – after all, the register of 
intimacy in devotion and rhetoric is enormously appealing, not to mention the sweetness of 
these boys (Southwell was nineteen in 1580) in their shared agonies and ecstasies of faith. 
The fantasy of Southwell's letter to Deckers is the easy accessibility of its rhetorical 
performance of the consummation of that profoundly erotic devotional intimacy; it presents 
the seductive possibility that any intimate reading might be so successful. When I began this 
project, I wanted to find this letter’s exquisite satisfaction in more properly literary texts, too 
– and of course, they do sometimes do this, not least in Southwell’s own Mary Magdalen’s 
Funeral Tears. But as I read, I found claims to the capacity of language to register divine 
presence increasingly hollow, and began to be much more curious about what obstacles 
emerge in the course of devotional feeling and its movement into language. Early drafts of 
descriptions of this project are full of the language of desire and presence and touch – I 
wanted to account for how a more or less sacramental erotics emerges in the practice of 
reading devotional literature; how the movement of desire in reading manifests divine 
presence. Perhaps what I wanted was to be John Deckers receiving Southwell’s letter; 
wanted my own faith to be consummated in someone else’s rhetorical performance. I 
wanted to experience Dinshaw’s touch across time, and to locate in my texts how they 
generated such a plenitude of presence. 
But all of my primary texts are works in which touch, both literally as physical 
contact and figuratively as a stand-in for presence, is proscribed or inaccessible. Robert 
Southwell’s Mary Magdalen’s Funeral Tears (1591) centers on an absence, dilating the few 
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verses of the gospel of John in which Mary Magdalen stands disconsolate before the empty 
tomb of Christ – the first confrontation in Christian history with the absence of Christ from 
the world. In Mary, Southwell makes a study of the defeat of the senses in John 20, a text 
whose climactic noli me tangere expressly renders touch problematic. Anne Lock’s sonnet 
sequence on Psalm 51, A Meditation of a Penitent Sinner (1560) confronts the limits of the flesh 
in an excoriating poetics that flays the body to lay the soul vulnerable before god, but even 
as it “groapes about” for grace, it never lays hold of anything sensible, placing that 
attainment of intimacy with god beyond the scope of both body and text. Aemilia Lanyer 
opens Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum (1611) with a set of dedicatory poems whose richly haptic 
figures stake radical claims to the material intimacy of devotional reading at the same time as 
they seek to call into being a reading community of women. But her book ends with the 
dissolution of those figures into ephemeral trace, the failure of intimacy between women 
registering as a failure of figure to generate meaning. A similar failure conditions the 
anxieties about embodiment that structure the neoplatonic conceits of Katherine Philips’ 
friendship poems (1667), which identify touch not as the threshold of the intimacy of 
presence, but as the unattainable horizon of figurative meaning.  
 
(FEELING BACKWARD) 
 
I modeled my early thinking on work like that of Richard Rambuss, whose Closet Devotions 
understands “devotion […] as a form of desire.”11 The eroticism that Rambuss recognizes as 
encouraged by an incarnational theology that requires meditation on the exquisite, agonized 
body of its god made flesh, I thought, might reveal itself to be as much an interpretive 
                                                
11 Closet Devotions (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 1. 
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method as a specular mode of adoration. In other words, where Rambuss addresses a poetics 
of devotional eroticism, I was equally interested in the hermeneutics of eroticism: how does 
desire read? My past tense notwithstanding, this interest remains at the heart of the project: 
the desire for an absent god or for an experience of his presence that necessarily structures 
Christian devotion. But as my work progressed, I became increasingly interested in the other 
feelings that attend on that desire, often difficult feelings that would appear dissonant in 
Rambuss’s world of exuberantly excessive, orgasmic plenitude.  
For Rambuss, the incarnational body of Christ is strangely unproblematic: the 
material body is a threshold of erotic experience, often ecstasy, and the body of Christ is a 
representable object to be adored. In perhaps the most striking claim of Closet Devotions, 
“envisioning Christ in his Passion as a highly fertile somatic field […] evokes no discourse so 
much as contemporary pornography’s fetishistic explorations of the erotic body and its 
paroxysms” (34). Christ’s “excitingly vulnerable male body,” as “an iconic male body 
rendered visible and open to desire” (34) makes possible, for example, Crashaw’s 
orgasmically liquifacient poetics. As an incarnational theology, Christianity makes its god 
available in representable flesh – an amenity Rambuss takes advantage of in order to gesture 
to the “heightened devotional expressivity” (17) that provides him with the “intensities” and 
“perversities” (5) where he locates queerness. In order to throw out a robust challenge to the 
contemporary American Christian right wing, Rambuss insists on centering “the ecstatic, the 
excessive, the transgressive, the erotic” (6) – but at the same time, risks reducing desire to its 
extremes and to the enactment of embodied sexual deviance, to the exclusion of any other 
mode of longing or intimacy.  
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In other words, in Rambuss’s analysis, the ostensible availability of the body of 
Christ to representation is the ground of a celebratory gay male perversion. But what 
happens in the absence of that body? What becomes of the problems posed to semiotics and 
cognition by the exceptional embodiment of the Son of God, both flesh and divinity, 
departed from the world yet always present in it, and bound eventually to return? How to 
cope with the intervening time? In Rambuss’s reading of John Donne’s “Good Friday 1613. 
Riding Westward,” for example, “despite Donne’s renunciatory efforts … the poem remains 
an unnerving confrontation” with the “shattering sight” of the very image it purports to 
abjure:  
Could I behold those hands which span the Poles,  
And tune all spheares at once peirc’d with those holes? 
Could I behold that endlesse height which is  
Zenith to us, and our Antipodes, 
Humbled below us? or that blood which is 
The seat of all our Soules, if not of his, 
Made durt of dust, or that flesh which was worne 
By God, for his apparell, rag’d, and torne?12 
 
Rambuss is of course correct that the fear the poem expresses of confrontation with “That 
spectacle of too much weight for me” paradoxically requires some expression of that 
spectacle, a kind of reluctant incarnational periphrasis. The refrain of “Could I,” however, 
also signals a genuine problem of perception: can I truly behold something so exceptional 
and so, ultimately, lost? (What would it mean to be able to see something that is both zenith 
and antipodes, and also humbled, little enough to see?) Meanwhile, the spatial disorientation 
indicated in the poem’s title also gestures to a historical disorientation: how to cope with an 
event that is both very long past and always present? The poem seems to be asking Carolyn 
                                                
12 The Divine Poems, ed. Helen Gardner, 2nd edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 31. 
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Dinshaw’s question: “What does it feel like to be an anachronism?”13 – but it is also reluctant 
to take on the challenge of such a feeling, or at least interested in forestalling it. “I turn my 
backe to thee, but to receive / Corrections” : the undecidable ambiguity between the gesture 
of a submissive lover offering himself to the rough and transformative ministrations of his 
divine top, and the overwhelmed turn away from, as refusal of, an unbearable sight and the 
inarticulable feeling it provokes. In this gesture, the speaker of Donne’s poem seems to turn 
away from us, too, to turn his back not only on the image of Golgotha but also on the 
reader. As Heather Love argues, such back-turned figures should be dear to queer literary 
historians. In her pursuit of queer figures and texts that “turn their backs on the future,” that 
“resist our advances,” she summons such figures as Lot’s wife, who “clings to the past and is 
ruined by it,” and the noli me tangere as an “apt motto for queer historical experience,” 
suggesting the productiveness of theological possibilities to queer literary historiography.14 If 
“our existence depends on being able to imagine these figures reaching out to us,” Love 
argues, we must nevertheless attend to the ways in which it “remains difficult to hear these 
subjects when they say to us, ‘Don’t touch me.’”15 We must try to hear them.  
Rambuss’s confidence in the capacity of poetry to represent the body of Christ and 
make it available to the desiring reader anticipates a vogue for “sacramental poetics,” in 
which scholars have read devotional poetry as performing the presence-making work of the 
sacraments, or as a replacement for that work, with a particular focus on the sacrament of 
                                                
13 “Temporalities,” in Middle English, Oxford Twenty-First Century Approaches to Literature, 
ed. Paul Strohm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 107-123. 
14 Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics of Queer History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2007), 8, 9, 40. 
15 Ibid., 40. 
 
 
 
13 
 
the eucharist as the semiotic sine qua non of post-reformation Christianity.16 “What does it 
mean,” Ryan Netzley asks in the opening gesture of his book, “to desire a god that one does 
not lack?”17 One sees what he means; God should be in some sense present to the mind of 
the believer at all times, and especially at the moment of the ritual of the Eucharist (in 
whatever doctrinal version of that sacrament). The relation of Donne’s speaker in “Good 
Friday” to his god could be characterized in those terms: the challenge of turning his face is 
not for lack of a savior to turn to. And yet for him, as for a figure like Mary Magdalene, 
blinded by her mourning as she stands by the empty tomb of Christ – and then being 
presented with the object of her love only to be deprived of him a second time – Netzley’s 
question fails to make any kind of sense at all.  As Shelly Rambo has argued, the text of John 
20 “dismantles sight, sound, and even touch as vehicles constituting Mary’s witness” so that 
Mary “points to a different kind of presence, whose form cannot be readily identified or can 
only be received through multiple experiences of misrecognitions. She encounters not simply 
the absence of Jesus, but a mixed terrain of his absence and presence. He is there but not 
there; he is present in a way that she has not known before.”18 Something must take the 
place of, or at least supplement, the bodily senses in the scene of Mary’s longing for and 
eventual apprehension of Christ. The perceptual problem of Donne’s “Good Friday,” then, 
                                                
16 See for example Regina Schwarz, Sacramental Poetics at the Dawn of Secularism (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2008); Ryan Netzley, Reading, Desire, and the Eucharist in Early 
Modern Religious Poetry (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011); Sarah Beckwith, 
Shakespeare and the Grammar of Forgiveness (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011); Sophie 
Read, Eucharist and the Poetic Imagination in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013); Kimberly Johnson, Made Flesh: Sacrament and Poetics in Post-Reformation 
England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014).  
17 Netzley, 3. 
18 Spirit and Trauma: A Theology of Remaining (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2010), 
89-90. 
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is active in the gospel text itself: even Mary who stood before Christ risen in that first 
immediate encounter, even she struggles to “behold” him – and is forbidden to touch him.  
Even Gary Kuchar’s Poetry of Religious Sorrow, which identifies Christianity as “a vast 
technology of mourning” in its opening gesture, posits that mourning as “the very medium 
by which God makes himself present to the soul.”19 The paradox is appealing, but like 
Netzley’s desire-without-lack, it vaults over the most troubling aspect of bad feeling in faith: 
the missingness of god, the sheer distance between a seventeenth-century English rider and 
the Calvary of the Passion, between disconsolate Mary Magdalen and Christ in his divinity. 
For Kuchar, “sorrow is less an emotional state than it is a language,” “a discourse,” a claim 
that depends on a conception of the emotions as discrete, stable “affective states.”20 That is, 
like Rambuss’s pornographic body of Christ, they are the stuff of representation rather than 
experience, semiotic rather than phenomenal. God’s absence from the world is the 
structuring condition of the yawning time between the resurrection and the final judgement, 
and Kuchar is right that in early modern devotional writing, it is feeling that fills that gap. My 
way of rephrasing Netzley’s question might be: how do you cope with the fact of a god who 
is at once present and absent, whom you do not and yet also irreducibly do lack? What does it 
feel like? And how does such feeling operate in reading?  
As it proceeded, this dissertation thus began to be less concerned with desire itself as 
an orientation toward communion than with the circuits of feeling that attend, structure, and 
impede it. Mary Magdalen’s mourning, the despairing recalcitrance of Anne Lock’s speaker, 
Aemilia Lanyer’s lamenting nostalgia, Philips’ simultaneous ambitions for intimacy and 
                                                
19 Kuchar, The Poetry of Religious Sorrow in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 1. 
20 Kuchar 2, 4.  
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acknowledgement of its impasses, all required letting go of the fantasy of touch, of present 
communion with these objects of the past, demanded that I make the “intimacy” of my title 
problematic in the way these texts do.  
“Feeling” became the critical term, productively capacious and gesturing 
simultaneously to the materiality of the body and to a spiritual or emotional dwelling in that 
body, capturing the circuit that runs between text and reader, as between soul and body, in 
the procedure of interpretation. As Joe Moshenska has argued, “feeling” shuttles between 
literal and figurative, sensory and spiritual or cognitive meanings, “hovering” productively at 
the boundary sites between these ostensible dichotomies.21 For Moshenska, “touch” 
produces a particular relationship to metaphor that crystallizes the semiotic debates of the 
Reformation, “shift[ing] restlessly between literal and metaphorical” (12) in its “refusal to 
specify” the degree to which touch indexes “a physical sensation akin to tactile feeling, or 
whether such externality merely provides a convenient illustration of an inward state that 
resists full explication” (7-8). While “the fact that Christ assumed a human body, a body able 
to touch and be touched, seemed to validate physical contact as a way of accessing the 
presence of the divine” (23), that immediacy becomes especially problematic with the advent 
of Reformed skepticism regarding the efficacy or possibility of such a touch, which verged 
on idolatry. But the “restlessness” of touch as a category, its easy slippage between the literal 
and the figurative, allowed, for example, Thomas Cranmer to back away, when challenged, 
from “his account of ‘sensible touching, feeling, and groping’ of Christ through the 
sacraments” by “disavow[ing] this claim as fully metaphorical” (41). For Moshenska, this 
slippery quality of touch in language carries a historical specificity that he argues disappears 
                                                
21 Feeling Pleasures: The Sense of Touch in Renaissance England (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014).  
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in premodernist critics’ casual appropriation of touch as a figure for engagement with the 
past, targeting for critique not “the desire to touch the past” but “the assumption that, in 
hoping to do so, they are aiming to recapture lost forms of action and understanding” (12). 
Where, for example, Catherine Gallagher and Stephen Greenblatt invest in a model of 
history that places the enchantment of touch in a premodernity left behind by a modern 
focus on the visual sense, for Carolyn Dinshaw, Moshenska writes that “touch is what is lost, 
but it also offers the promise of recapturing the past, vaulting momentarily across historical 
distance” (11).  
Only by appreciating [the] historically specific variety [of values of touch] can we 
properly identify the attitude most characteristic of the English Renaissance: neither 
the wholesale endorsement of an enchanted world of touch nor its rejection in 
favour of a proto-modern subjectivity founded in vision, but the employment of a 
language of touch that shifts restlessly between literal and metaphorical, and that 
thereby refuses either to reject or embrace the pleasures and vexations of the sense. 
(12) 
 
Feeling as affect provides a response to the dilemma of overinvestment in touch as the 
primary category of phenomenal experience, be it of divinity or of literary history. In 
devotional reading, I argue, feeling mediates between the letter of the text and its figurative 
resources, as it does between the material body and the perceiving mind or soul. In the 
ensouled body, two things happen at once: “feeling” as a sensory metaphor slides easily into 
“feeling” as affect, emotion, passion, especially to the degree that these are embodied 
experience; and a significant distinction emerges between what the senses can perceive and 
what can be understood or apprehended through affective feeling alone. This project locates 
itself on that semicolon: at the site where a rupture occurs between what the senses can 
achieve and the special province of affect, and especially bad affect. Its key texts revolve 
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around experiences that cannot be metaphorized as touch, because they occur around an 
absence or an impossibility.  
(REPARATIVE READING) 
 
My focus is thus not the represented object but the reading subject. Its interest is in what 
happens when a reader’s whole self is called upon by a text – and when she answers that call. 
One of this project's logical vulnerabilities is that it takes for granted the premise that the 
phenomena of feeling and experience these texts demand can occur and have occurred, 
because I know for certain that each of them has found at least one reader for whom that is 
true. This project takes seriously the idea that one of the most significant structuring features 
of a study is the potentially arbitrary fact of the disposition of the critic, and the degree of 
chance involved in what she happens to encounter in her reading, what happens to find its 
way across her desk.  
It is, in this way, ironically a “happy” project, as Sara Ahmed understands the term.22 
For Ahmed, in “the messiness of the experiential, the unfolding of bodies into worlds, and 
[…] ‘the drama of contingency,’” in “how we are touched by what comes near,” happy 
returns to its etymology in hap, happenstance, chance happenings.23 Our intimacies and our 
identities are shaped by what we encounter, by hap – which in turn enables us to consider in 
queer unhappiness, in the “unhappy queer archive … what it allows us to do.”24 Concluding the 
introduction to Queer Phenomenology, another, earlier study of the way orientation is shaped by 
phenomenal encounter, Ahmed observes the risk she takes in reading philosophy as a non-
philosopher, which echoes the risks I feel attending on my readings of theology as a non-
                                                
22 The Promise of Happiness (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010). 
23 Ibid., 22.  
24 Ibid., 89, emphasis original.  
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theologian, my bringing together of queer theory and theology, texts from disparate 
moments that have no obvious or institutionally recognized alignment with or allegiance to 
each other: “When we don’t have the resources to read certain texts, we risk getting things 
wrong by not returning them to the fullness of the intellectual histories from which they 
emerge. And yet, we read. The promise of interdisciplinary scholarship is that the failure to 
return texts to their histories will do something.”25  
We are, after all, disposed toward the texts we read in our bodies: we literally reach for 
them; we literally sit with them; we develop very literal aches from the small contortions we 
execute to look at them. We turn to them. We work by inventio, with finding our topics in 
what lies near us, or in seeking them in what lies further off. Ahmed borrows the term 
“desire lines” from architecture to account for the mutual shaping of bodies and space – 
“those marks left on the ground that show everyday comings and goings, where people 
deviate from the paths they are supposed to follow. […] Such lines are indeed traces of 
desire.”26 Our readings are conditioned by the institutional spaces that orient us, by which we 
orient ourselves: but at the same time, we work with and in what lies to hand, what we come 
upon. Deviation from the lines laid out by the tracks of the profession, following new paths 
according to new orientations, new worlds – in other words, the process of creativity that 
generates new readings and new work, new intellectual desire lines, comes with a risk and 
often at a cost. In this landscape, reading and writing can feel a lot like mourning. What 
Southwell, Lock, Lanyer, and Philips have to teach us is that this recalcitrant bad affect is not 
                                                
25 Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 22, 
my emphasis. 
26 Ibid., 19-20. 
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in contradiction with but rather a condition of desire and the always-unfolding dialectic of 
revelation. In other words: And yet, we read.  
As Anne Carson puts it, “Our subjects call us.”27 But I am as interested in the 
conditions that enable the call as what happens in its event. The event of John 20, for 
example, is Mary Magdalen’s turn when Christ calls her name – the moment of divine 
interpellation in which she recognizes him risen, and which sets her on the path to her career 
as apostola apostolorum. Distinctly phenomenal, recognizable in the terms of Ahmed’s 
conditioning “orientations,” that event is of the utmost significance, especially to Mary. But 
what made it possible? What put her in the way of Christ, to be available to his call when it 
came?  
There’s another joke that isn't one in my enduring identification with the Mary 
Magdalen of the early verses of John 20, stubbornly seeking something that isn't there, 
insisting on standing still and crying until the impossible something arrives. Living with bad 
feeling is a condition of thinking and writing; the provocation of emotion is a tool to think 
with, both when it feels endless, boring, like the “martyrdom by tedious delay” that 
Southwell accuses Christ of inflicting on Mary by deferring his arrival,28 and when it comes 
as a surprise. This project’s turning point, the moment when I first understood that its early 
optimism was misguided and impeding my readings, came in the form of a spontaneous 
emotional response to my first reading of Eve Sedgwick’s essay on reparative reading. The 
version I read, in Touching Feeling, was published in 2003, and talks frankly about the cancer 
of which Sedgwick died in 2009, in the spring of my first year at Penn. My reading in 2012 
                                                
27 Catherine Bush, “A Short Talk with Anne Carson” (Unpublished interview, 2000). 
http://catherinebush.com/articles/a-short-talk-with-anne-carson/. Accessed 08.27.15. 
28 Mary Magdalen’s Funeral Tears H5v. 
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was thus from the beginning conditioned by that loss, by the memory of Jeff Masten 
beginning his Material Text talk by saying, “Eve Sedgwick has died.” And how the air went 
out of the room.  
Toward the end of the essay, Sedgwick describes a set of relationships in illness: her 
two younger friends, who are terminally sick too, and her older friend, who is healthy. She 
will never be her older friend’s current age; her younger friends will never arrive at her 
present time. And it is from this stark fact that she develops her sense of the urgency of the 
reparative in particularly queer time and space, along those lines that do not regenerate 
according to the reproductive time of heteropatriarchy that Sedgwick associates with 
paranoia:  
It’s hard to say, even to know, how these relationships are different from those 
shared by people of different ages on a landscape whose perspectival lines converge 
on a common disappearing-point. I’m sure ours are more intensely motivated: 
whatever else we know, we know there isn’t time to bullshit. But what it means to 
identify with each other must also be very different. On this scene, an older person 
doesn’t love a younger as someone who will someday be where she is now, or vice 
versa. No one is, so to speak, passing on the family name; there’s a sense in which 
our life narratives will barely overlap. There’s another sense in which they slide up 
more intimately alongside one another than can any lives that are moving forward 
according to the regular schedule of the generations. It is one another immediately, 
one another as the present fullness of a becoming whose arc may extend no further, 
whom we each must learn best to apprehend, fulfill, and bear company.29 
 
I don’t know that I’ve ever been quite so arrested by a paragraph of critical prose – literally 
arrested, I stopped there, reading this paragraph over and over. And when I finally looked 
up, I was looking at Aemilia Lanyer. Salve Deus happened to be next to me on my desk, 
waiting for me to do something else with it. But turning from Sedgwick to Lanyer – the 
                                                
29 Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2003), 149. 
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phenomenal turn of Ahmed’s orientations, the interpellative turn of a project calling me – I 
saw suddenly the simple thing I had been missing in years of reading her book: how 
powerfully sad it is. It was a moment of arrest, of stalled reading, and it was an emotional 
response – crying in the grad lab – that made me see, all in a flash, the sharpness of Lanyer’s 
lament, what she was lamenting and how, that it was a lament at all. If not for that moment, 
if not for Eve Sedgwick’s willingness to write as herself and her having given me permission 
to be sad, and to be sad as a method of reading, this project might never have turned out as 
it has. I might still be under the spell of presence. 
I thus offer “intimacy” as an alternative to discourses of presence and touch, as a 
category that indexes closeness in feeling without overdetermining the nature of that 
closeness or that feeling, that can include what’s uncomfortable and unassimilable. I follow 
Sedgwick’s call for a “reparative” hermeneutics, in which she suggests that our queer 
intimacies with texts might resemble, if we let them, our queer intimacies with people. Her 
project in Touching Feeling is, she writes, “to explore some ways around the topos of depth or 
hiddenness” that has characterized poststructuralist criticism – to resist in our reading habits 
“the ease with which beyond and beneath turn from spatial descriptors into implicit narratives 
of, respectively, origin and telos.” Against these suspicious spatializations of critique, 
Sedgwick proposes the logic of beside, a prepositional positioning relative to texts that 
“permits a spacious agnosticism” which might allow the critic not to see through the texts 
she reads, but rather to cohabit with them. As Sedgwick observes, such cohabitation is not 
necessarily easy or comfortable, “does not […] depend on a fantasy of metonymically 
egalitarian or even pacific relations, as any child knows who’s shared a bed with siblings.”30 
                                                
30 Ibid., 8. 
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To take seriously such a critical orientation is to recognize how texts, like lives, might “slide 
up more intimately alongside one another than can any lives that are moving forward 
according to the regular schedule of the generations,” in the “present fullness of a becoming 
whose arc may extend no further.”31 This project is in part a bid for experimentation with 
the uncomfortable elements of beside, with the friction that results from that queer 
temporality in which we slide up against the objects of our study in the face of the perpetual 
imminence – and immanence – of loss. What, I ask, is the status of the reparative when its 
object is loss or failure, when it can be neither ameliorative nor, in the most straightforward 
sense, pleasurable? What happens when the reparative encounters the irreparable?  
Near the beginning of her essay, Sedgwick makes a suggestion so glancing that it 
appears to have been missed entirely in the essay’s broad reception by literary scholarship. 
Observing that Paul Ricoeur never meant “the hermeneutics of suspicion” to become 
hegemonic in criticism, she notes that “Ricoeur introduced the category […] in a context 
that also included such alternative disciplinary hermeneutics as the philological and 
theological ‘hermeneutics of recovery of meaning.’”32 If criticism in its “paranoia” has left 
philology and theology behind, Sedgwick implies, then they might have something 
productive to offer to a queer “reparative reading.” Yet she lets the suggestion pass with no 
further mention. Queer philology has begun to enjoy something like a vogue in recent 
scholarship, particularly in fields of early literature.33 As my reading of Rambuss above 
                                                
31 Ibid., 149.  
32 Ibid., 125. 
33 See Masten, “Toward a Queer Address: The Taste of Letters and Early Modern Male 
Friendship,” GLQ 10:3 (2004), 367-84; Sarah Nicolazzo takes up Masten’s method in 
“Reading Clarissa’s ‘Conditional Liking’ : A Queer Philology,” Modern Philology 112:1 (2014), 
205-25. Carolyn Dinshaw’s and Carla Freccero’s work on queer temporalities doesn’t declare 
itself philological, but each of them pursues the peculiarities of lexical and grammatical 
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indicates, devotional poetics, if not theology proper, has become the object of queer readings 
in early modern studies. But the capacity of theological hermeneutics to transform – to 
repair – our critical practice remains unexplored. If, as Ricoeur suggests, as he traces the 
inheritance by modern critical discourse of Biblical exegesis, “the contrary of suspicion […] 
is faith,”34 what might that faith resemble when it comes to critical practice? The texts I 
consider in this project respond to this question as they take up exegetical methods as means 
of dwelling with not only the text of scripture but with the feelings of loss, mourning, 
despair, nostalgia, failure, and alienation that attend creaturely life in the world.  
Sedgwick’s proposal for a reparative hermeneutics already shares something in 
common with theological models; to demonstrate how, I turn to Origen, for whom the 
coordination of the senses of the body and the senses of scripture is much more than a 
felicitously available pun. In his commentary on the Song of Songs, he observes the frequent 
recurrence of figures of the body in scripture, where “the names of the members of the body 
are applied to the members of the soul, or rather they are said of the power and desire of the 
soul.”35 For the relation between the literal and figurative senses of scripture – the 
fundamental ground of interpretation – has been understood since Paul as analogous to the 
relation between body and spirit. For Origen, the crux of understanding the bodily senses as 
represented in scripture lies in his cautious definition of the analogy of interiority and 
exteriority implied by scriptural figures:  
                                                                                                                                            
histories as necessary motors of queer literary history. See for example Dinshaw on 
“contingent” in the introduction to Getting Medieval; Freccero, Queer/Early/Modern (Duke: 
Duke University Press, 2006). 
34 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1970), 28. 
35 “Prologue to the Commentary on the Song of Songs,” in Origen, ed. and trans. Rowan A. 
Greer (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 221.  
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What we wish to show on this basis is that in the divine Scriptures by synonyms, that 
is, by similar designations and sometimes by the same words, both the members of 
the outer man and the parts and desires of the inner man are designated and that 
they are to be compared with one another not only with respect to the designations 
but also with respect to the realities themselves.36 
 
Origen’s interest here in synonym as figure – similar or even same words denoting more than 
similarity, performing a figurative operation that grounds the relation between inner and 
outer – depends in turn on a hermeneutic capacity closely related to that of typology as he 
understands it. “The simple,” he writes in his essay “On First Principles,” “may be edified 
by, so to speak, the body of the Scriptures; for that is what we call the ordinary and narrative 
meaning. But if any have begun to make some progress and can contemplate something 
more fully, they should be edified by the soul of Scripture.”37 The inner and outer senses of 
the ensouled body correspond to the inner and outer senses of the text of scripture – and in 
interpretation, we find that these parallel structures are not simple dichotomies, but 
participants in a dialectical becoming that takes place in the relationship between reader and 
text. “Our task,” Origen writes in the commentary on John,  “is to change the sensible 
gospel into the spiritual, for what is interpretation of the sensible gospel unless it is 
transforming it into the spiritual?”38 In this model, the soul’s disposition toward divinity 
operates by a language of bodily disposition, “orientation” in Ahmed’s terms: “Let us,” he 
writes, “stretch forth the hands of our soul as of our body to God, that the Lord […] may 
also give us the Word with His power, by whom we may be enabled to make clear from our 
treatise a sound understanding of the name and nature of love” (219-20).  
                                                
36 Origen, “Prologue,” 220.  
37 “On First Principles,” in Greer, op. cit., 182. 
38 Commentary on John, Book I in Origen, ed. and trans. Joseph W. Trigg (London: Routledge, 
1998), 109. 
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Origen’s concern about love here emerges from the difficult balancing act that 
attends any reading of the intensely erotic Song of Songs. Origen is careful to note those 
sites in scripture where a divine love is referred to as eros, taking as his prime examples the 
love of Wisdom exhorted by Proverbs (4:6-8) and the book of Wisdom (8:2). The important 
judgement in favor of agape is that it “is God and takes its existence in him,” and so “loves 
nothing earthly, nothing material, nothing corruptible. […] [A]ffection [agape] for God always 
strives toward God from whom it took its origin,” so that it is from this affection that our 
attention to scriptural interpretation can yield the spirit of truth.39 The sixth-century 
theologian Pseudo-Dionysius expresses frustration with this busy attempt to differentiate 
modes of love and dispenses with it in a recuperation of eros as desire or yearning that 
effectuates ecstatic intimacy with divinity: “this divine yearning [eros] brings ecstasy so that 
the lover belongs not to self but to the beloved.”40 For Pseudo-Dionysius, eros is what moves 
between God and humanity and enables human access to divinity – it is by eros that the 
“differentiation” of divinity into the world and human striving toward it may happen at all. 
Eros is in brief “a capacity to effect a unity, an alliance, and a particular commingling in the 
Beautiful and Good.”41 Such yearning is required to approach the text of scripture in any act 
of interpretation, to access what Augustine called the “intimus sensus” of the text – the 
innermost sense, and also the intimate sense.42 Augustine’s pun bridges the distance between 
the terms Sedgwick opposes: the “topos of depth or hiddenness” in the model of inner and 
                                                
39 “Prologue,” 224-8. 
40 “The Divine Names,” in The Complete Works, ed. and trans. Colm Lubhéid and Paul Rorem 
(New York: Paulist Press, 1987), 82. 
41 Ibid., 81. 
42 Homilies on the Gospel of John, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. John Gibb and James Innes, Nicene and 
Post-Nicene Fathers vol. 7 (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1994), 438. 
 
 
 
26 
 
outer senses, and the besideness of intimacy: the intimus sensus is that to which one must be 
very close in order to discover it, or which one discovers in order to become close to it.  
The mechanics of interpretation in this system is also involved with the operation of 
time. In the transformative interpretation that defines gospel, for Origen, discourses of 
futurity slide up against discourses of presence:  
A gospel is a discourse consisting of an announcement of events that, because of the 
benefits they procure, please those hearing it when they receive the announcement. 
[…] Or a gospel is a discourse that itself makes present something good for the one 
who believes or a discourse promising that the promised good is present.  
 
Announcement, presence-making, and promise operate as competing temporal models – yet 
still, Origen claims, “All of the definitions above are appropriate to the writings we entitle 
gospels,” that is, the function of gospel is to produce all of these multiple effects, including 
the tensions among them.43 It is by this means that Origen gradually expands the remit of 
“gospel” from the four texts of the evangelists first to the whole of the New Testament, and 
then to include the whole of the Old as well: by figure, it too announces, promises, makes 
present. And we can discover how through interpretation.  
(FIGURATION & FAILURE) 
 
The involvement of figuration in temporality is one of this project’s persistent concerns –
 the problem that interpretation poses of being, temporally, in at least two places at once. 
The terms of the recent debate regarding the methods of queer historiography in early 
modern literary studies turn on the problem of figure. The debate, instigated by Valerie 
Traub in her PMLA polemic “The New Unhistoricism in Queer Studies,”44 is in some ways 
quite an old one, dating at least to disputes of twenty years’ vintage between David Halperin 
                                                
43 Ibid., 110. 
44 PMLA 128:1 (2013): 28-39. Further citations parenthetically. 
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and Eve Sedgwick regarding the historicity of sexual identity categories.45 It turns on a set of 
binaries, all aligned closely with one another, the terms of each allegedly at odds: historicism 
and presentism; alterity and identity; diachrony and synchrony; chronology and temporality. 
On the side of the first terms, Traub stakes her own claim; on the other side, she places 
Carla Freccero and Madhavi Menon, as well as a number of other premodernist scholars of 
queer temporality less heavily targeted for critique, including Carolyn Dinshaw. 
Traub defends a traditional historicism against the “unhistoricist” cadre of queer 
scholars whose work she characterizes as “sustained by the play of metaphors, rather than by 
discursive or material connections” – that is, as irresponsible to history (30). One of Traub’s 
targets in her PMLA piece is the rhetorical figure metalepsis, which both Carla Freccero and 
Madhavi Menon, in different ways, explore for its resonance with queer ways of being in 
language and time. “Metalepsis,” Traub writes, aiming at Freccero and Menon, “can be 
rhetorically powerful, but it is vulnerable to critique as fuzzy logic.” As “metaleptic sleight of 
hand [that] allows the ground of critique to keep shifting,” Traub further contends, “an on-
again-off-again associational reasoning” fails to cohere into “a mode of queer argument” 
(30-1). The accusation of irresponsibility, imprecision, even fraudulence is scarcely implicit. 
This skepticism of the uses of figure as argument leads Traub to assert a set of polemical 
negatives:  
Sexuality, the diverse enactments of erotic desire and physical embodiment; 
temporality, the various manifestations of time; and history, historicism, and 
historiography, the aggregate repertoire of cognitive and affective approaches to the 
past are not intrinsically connected. Neither straight identity nor heterosexual desire is the 
                                                
45 See Halperin, One Hundred Years of Homosexuality: and Other Essays on Greek Love (New York: 
Routledge, 1990); Sedgwick’s critique in the introduction to Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1990), 45-7; Halperin’s reply in the introduction to How to Do 
the History of Homosexuality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), esp. 10-13. 
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same as linear time. Not every diachronic or chronological treatment of temporality 
needs to be normativizing, nor is every linear arc sexually “straight.” A scholar’s 
adherence to chronological time does not necessarily imply a relation to sexuality or 
normativity. Nor does a scholar’s segmentation of time into periods. (31, my 
emphasis)  
 
In one sense, well, of course not. But these negatives allow Traub to imply that Freccero’s and 
Menon’s interests in metalepsis emerge from a naïve belief in a one-to-one correspondence 
between temporal or chronographic models and ideologies of sexuality. Traub’s own 
deliberately reductive characterization of the “associational reasoning” as though it were 
taking place on literal terms renders it absurd – but at the cost of a troubling implication: 
that the practice of history, in order to make valid claims, must reject figurative language. 
It’s strange to see a literary scholar, and whatever her preferred methods one as 
sensitive to literary meaning as Traub is, weighing in against what figuration can accomplish 
for literary-historical thought. It’s strange to sense her implicit preference for the literal – as 
though history and literal language were coextensive categories, especially strange on the 
understanding that she herself cannot possibly believe such a thing. Deliberately or 
otherwise, Traub has put her finger on a much older uneasiness about metalepsis, about its 
riskiness and the ease with which it might slide into catachresis or abusio – might be a crime 
against meaning rather than a clever vehicle for it. In her critique of the “fuzzy logic” of the 
“play of metaphors,” she aligns herself with those rhetoricians of premodernity who would 
prefer to relegate metalepsis to the margins of rhetoric. But as Brian Cummings has argued, 
in a study of metalepsis from Quintilian to Erasmus and Shakespeare, it is precisely its “risk 
of failure” that provides metalepsis with both its hermeneutic interest and its “place in 
rhetorical history” : as a “borderline figure, one that sometimes goes beyond the bounds, or 
strains the understanding,” it “provokes questions about the boundaries of metaphor 
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itself.”46  Metalepsis, “haunted by an apprehension of its incompleteness” because it 
“multiplies metaphors out of each other without showing us what it is doing” and “transfers 
itself from one referent to the other without elucidation,” tests the limits of semantics but 
achieves a kind of meaning-making in and through that very boundary-pushing. Cummings 
anticipates objections like Traub’s in his observation that “a theory of semantic equivalence 
fails to register the way that [a metaleptic figure] takes risks with its own meaning, risks 
indeed that it will emerge as meaningless.”47 But this riskiness only means that when the 
figure comes off, “the sheer thrill of success is precisely this sense of sharing of something 
recondite or mysterious, the way language pulls things together which seem in principle to be 
far apart.”48 In some sense, Traub’s insistence on empiricism and the literal indexes a desire 
to know in full, whereas metalepsis acknowledges that we may know (that we may be in 
language) only in part, that meaning is always enigmatic or, in a term favored both by 
Cummings and by Saint Paul, mysterious. So what do we gain by that mystery in reading? I 
am interested less in taking a side in this debate – indeed, I think Traub’s characterization of 
diverse methods as sides in a debate is part of the problem – than in suggesting a way out of 
the bind of the binary terms that characterize it. This project suggests that early Christian 
modes of reading offer us a model of interpretation and temporality that can enrich and 
refine our own critical methods.  
Typological reading, of necessity, entails a complex and mobile relationship with 
time. In the most basic sense, by joining one moment in salvational history to another, 
interpretation sutures disparate times together. In Origen’s definition of “gospel” emerges a 
                                                
46 “Metalepsis,” in Renaissance Figures of Speech, eds. Sylvia Adamson, Gavin Alexander, and 
Katrin Ettenhuber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 223-4. 
47 Cummings, 217-18. 
48 Cummings, 221. 
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mode of reading that is also a distinctly human way of knowing, like Paul’s dark mirror: “For 
we knowe in part, and we prophecie in part. But when that which is perfect is come, then 
that which is in part shall be done away. […] For now we see through a glass, darkly; but 
then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known” (1 
Cor. 13:9-10, 12 [Geneva]). Stitching moment to moment in the temporal mechanics of 
typology is the stopgap measure we are left with until the veil of the world is lifted. In Erich 
Auerbach’s study of the deep history of “figure,” philological method reveals the inheritance 
by literary interpretation of the typological tradition.49 And it also provides a model for 
understanding that tradition. As Auerbach observes,  “in the figural system […] events are 
considered not in their unbroken relation to one another” (as in linear chronological time), 
“but torn apart, individually, each in relation to something other that is promised and not yet 
present.” Figures are “the tentative form of something eternal and timeless; they point not 
only to the concrete future, but also to something that always has been and always will be; 
they point to something which is in need of interpretation, which will indeed be fulfilled in 
the concrete future, but which is at all times present, fulfilled in God’s providence, which 
knows no difference of time.”50  
My interest in making early theological models of reading speak to contemporary 
queer ones lies not, or at least not merely or primarily, in recovering something lost, but in 
establishing a common interest between past and present that has been occluded by queer 
theory’s uncritical inheritance of secularization. Put another way, affect studies and queer 
theory already have a tradition in devotional reading, a prehistory that they have yet to 
                                                
49 “Figura,” in Scenes from the Drama of European Literature (Gloucester, MA: Paul Smith, 1973), 
11-76. 
50 Auerbach, 59. 
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acknowledge. My use of the word “prehistory” seems to imply a straightforward trajectory 
from then to now, but I will also attend to how the futures of the early texts I study here, to 
the varying degrees that they do point to futures, do not lie in our present. Whatever they 
gesture toward, it isn’t us.  
To the degree that we might be intimate with these early texts, with the theological 
tradition, it will always be an uneasy relation – sometimes metaleptically far-fetched, 
sometimes risking catachresis, falling out of meaning altogether. But these tricky figures 
might have something particular to lend to study. In De Doctrina Christiana, Augustine 
famously distinguishes between usus and fruitio as two different orientations of love: “To 
enjoy something [fruitio] is to hold fast to it in love for its own sake. To use something [usus] 
is to apply whatever it may be to the purpose of obtaining what you love.”51 Of course the 
only thing to be properly enjoyed is god; everything we say we love in the world, if we love it 
properly, we use – love it toward god. “When you enjoy a human being in God, you are 
enjoying God rather than that human being. For you enjoy the one by whom you are made 
happy, and you will one day rejoice that you have attained the one in whom you now set 
your hope of attaining him” (25). Yet in our usual modes of expression, we don’t make these 
distinctions: I say “I love you” in the same terms in which I would say “I love god.” “Yet the 
idea of enjoying someone or something is very close to that of using someone or something 
together with love. For when the object of love is present, it inevitably brings with it pleasure 
[delectationem] as well. If you go beyond this pleasure and relate it to your permanent goal, you 
are using it, and are said to enjoy it not in the literal sense but in a transferred sense [uteris ea, 
                                                
51 On Christian Teaching, trans. R.P.H. Green (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 9. 
Latin from the digital Patrologia Latina, vol. 34, De Doctrina Christiana Libri Quatuor 
(http://pld.chadwyck.com).  
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et abusive, non proprie, diceris frui].”52 Abusive, non proprie: the distinction between a figurative and 
a literal sense. To love someone properly, that is, to enjoy them in Deo, but to say that you 
love them and to take pleasure in them, is an instance of abusio—catachresis. We cannot love 
one another in a literal sense; it will always be figurative, and a precarious figure at that, one 
which risks falling out of meaning. So when I say “I love you,” “you” become figurative in 
this operation. But, I’d suggest, that doesn’t reduce you to the flimsiness of figure – rather, it 
elevates figure or fulfills it, not “merely” figurative but the very mechanism by which 
something as powerful and important as an intimate attachment can proceed. This is one 
way in which theology might offer the sustaining ground of difficult adjacency that Sedgwick 
calls for as reparative reading: after all, Augustine’s discourse on love is oriented toward a 
mode of reading: “the fulfillment and end of the law and all the divine scriptures is to love 
the thing which must be enjoyed and the thing which together with us can enjoy that 
thing.”53 
Catachresis is as slippery as metalepsis: Quintilian names it as the trope that emerges 
when, having no proper word for a thing, we use the most nearly adjacent word we can find. 
But the term itself originates in grammar as a designation of error, the improper application 
of a word to something to which it does not belong: κατά+χρῆσθαι, ab+usus, usage gone 
awry, with a subtle implication of more than semantic perversion. By Puttenham’s time, it is 
simply “the figure of abuse,” freighted with all its connotations of deceit and violence.54 But 
Augustine suggests that something as fundamental as love can only be articulated as a 
rupture in meaning, as a figure that threatens to collapse. The Christian system cherishes 
                                                
52 Green, 25-26; Patrologia I.33. 
53 Green, 26-27. 
54 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 8.2.6, 8.6.34-36; Puttenham, The Arte of English Poesie (London: 
Richard Field, 1589), Xiv. 
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such approximation, and it introduces useful friction into Dinshaw’s model of love. Reading 
may be a form or an act of love, but it will always be a risky one, and will rarely feel like 
fulfillment or presence. The challenge of intimacy is in this: accepting a kind of closeness 
that can never be complete, that will always circle around loss and doubt. In the readings 
each of my chapters performs, difficult or even destructive feeling enables the reader’s 
identification with the text she reads, creating the devotional intimacy that, however 
painfully, conditions faith.  
 My first chapter, “Desideria Dilata: Robert Southwell’s Erotic Exegesis,” establishes 
the primary interests of the project in the coordination of desire, rhetoric, and temporality in 
devotion through a reading of Southwell’s 1591 prose treatise Mary Magdalen’s Funeral Tears. 
In his own terms, Southwell dilates the text of John 20, taking Mary’s disconsolate weeping 
before the empty tomb of Christ as an opportunity to expand the time of the gospel. By 
amplifying the text’s deferral of the risen Christ’s arrival, Southwell “dwells,” as he puts it, in 
Mary’s surplus of mourning desire. Capacious, in need of contemplation and interpretation, 
Mary’s tears are configured as a textual resource. Dilation collaborates in Southwell’s work 
with its other master trope, prosopopoeia, which attempts to close the historical distance 
between Mary Magdalen and the reader by conveying her feeling as a voice to be inhabited. 
By turns voicing Mary and a narrator who is also her pastoral interlocutor, the text demands 
that the reader inhabit multiple empathetic positions—Mary’s, the narrator’s, even those of 
Christ and the angels, queerly oriented in multiple, multiply gendered, desiring positions. 
Combining the interpretive techniques of Jesuit meditation with those of a long exegetical 
tradition, Southwell brings Mary’s past into the reader’s present. This anachronic gesture, I 
argue, resembles what Elizabeth Freeman has called a “time bind,” registering a “temporal 
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drag” on the time of reading.  
 Chapter Two, “Time as a Psalm: Anne Lock’s Recalcitrant Poetics,” takes up 
recalcitrance as the major impulse of the first English sonnet sequence: Anne Lock’s largely 
overlooked Meditation of a Penitent Sinner (1560), which she appended to her translations of 
John Calvin’s sermons on spiritual illness. Another dilatory text, Lock’s sequence expands 
Psalm 51 as an occasion for coping with despair. In a sequence more interested in the 
mechanics of desire itself than in the seizure of desire’s object, Lock develops a poetics of 
inarticulate utterance in reluctant, recursive sonnets that register their refusal to move 
forward at every level of their structure. Each sonnet dwells in a single verse of the psalm, 
registering reading as an act less of progression than of distension; even the single word 
enacts recalcitrance, monosyllables repeated over and over, materializing the word into a 
kind of frictional pull that slows interpretation almost to a stop. And the sequence ends in 
the same doubtful craving with which it began. As an “oft-repeted grone” or “crye,” the 
sonnets characterize their own mode of utterance as inarticulate—a deep irony in such a 
wrought poetic form. They nevertheless call on the paradoxical capacity of disabled speech 
to enable devotional feeling, drawing on Calvin’s insistence that prayer properly proceeds in 
“unspekable grones, such as cannot be expressed.” I read Lock’s recalcitrance as both a 
participation in and a deviation from Augustine’s model of time and cognition in reading: 
despair entails a rupture in the experience of time. Finally I suggest that Lock’s poetics of 
despair offers a mode of reading consonant with Ann Cvetkovich’s approach to depression 
as a critical posture.  
 In the third chapter, “Precarious Typology: Failure and Futurity in Aemilia Lanyer’s 
Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum,” I approach figures of devotional feeling with greater ambivalence, 
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as Lanyer tests the political limits of the Christian hermeneutics of desire. In creating a 
radical vision of readerly intimacy between women, Lanyer uncovers a deep tension between 
the promise of theological models of futurity and the threat of worldly material obstacles. 
She explores this dilemma at length in the three movements of Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum 
(1611). Her dedicatory poems seek to enact a community of reading women by 
characterizing that shared reading as a ritual scene, the poet as celebrant of a textual 
eucharist. The volume’s title poem – the object of that ritual – takes up the exegetical 
hermeneutics of typology to re-imagine the Passion of Christ as a scene in a female 
salvational history, and envisions a feminist apocalypse in which the majesty of Lanyer’s 
patroness rivals Christ’s own. Yet the final poem, “The Description of Cooke-ham,” is a 
nostalgic lament for the failure of precisely these projects: the material realities of marriage 
and property intervene in the scene of readerly intimacy between women, putting it out of 
reach – at least in this world. Lanyer nevertheless invests in the possibilities of the world to 
come, registering a deep ambivalence at the center of feminist devotion, holding in 
suspension the competing claims of worldly political economy and the eschatalogical 
promise of a divine new order. Lanyer offers, I argue, a productive means of engagement 
with Eve Sedgwick’s model of “reparative reading,” one that can account for the uneasy, 
painful elements of repair that have often been overlooked by inheritors of Sedgwick’s work. 
 A coda on Katherine Philips’ sacramental ambivalence explores the potential of this 
project for application in criticism more broadly, and confronts the limits of intimacy as a 
model for reading and for politics. Taking up Adrienne Rich’s landmark essay on 
“Compulsory Heterosexuality,” this final short chapter stakes its claim on a deliberately old-
fashioned feminism in order to gesture toward a model of queer temporality that might be 
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properly lesbian by observing the uncanny political allegiances of Lanyer and Philips through 
their shared critiques of the institution of marriage. Philips, like Lanyer, poses theological 
figures as particularly problematic for women and for intimacies between women, at once 
celebrating the semiotic challenges that attend on female friendship (broadly defined) and 
expressing a sharp anxiety about them. 
 This project thus gradually moves toward a confrontation with the limits of its own 
terms and methods, a development that coincides with its movement into increasingly 
political readings of increasingly political texts. Properly devotional readings in Southwell 
and Lock become in Lanyer an ambivalence regarding what devotional reading can 
accomplish, an ambivalence that Philips carries out of the category of both the devotional 
and of reading as such in her acknowledgement of the incapacity of faith in figure to fully 
generate a politics. I have some anxiety of my own regarding this movement’s cynical 
tendency – from a relative confidence in the possibility of repair in Southwell to the 
inevitability of loss in Philips – but I am at the same time hesitant to offer an ameliorative 
gesture to recuperate it. This dissertation is itself an artefact of dwelling in difficulty and bad 
feeling with a set of texts that at once offered themselves as means of survival and 
articulated the bleakness of the experience of such dwelling when it does not include access 
to any straightforward hope. It is, if only implicitly, a record of reading in the absence of 
faith. But it is just that: an artefact, a record. A testament to remaining. 
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II. D e s i d e r i a  D i l a t a :  Robert Southwell’s Erotic Exegesis 
 
 
(ANACHRONISM) 
 
In Rogier van der Weyden’s “Mary Magdalen Reading,” a fragment of a fifteenth-century 
altarpiece, Mary sits at a remove from the scene, comfortably reading, her jar of ointment by 
her side identifying her. 
 
Figure 1: Rogier van der Weyden, “The Magdalen Reading” (c. 1435-8), The National Gallery, London 
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Something of historical consequence is happening beyond the frame of Mary’s reading, 
presumed by art historians to be the Virgin and Child in the company of saints. In the 
original composition, Mary sits apart from this scene, in a different relationship to history 
and to the sacred, a relationship mediated by reading, rather than immediately engaged with 
what’s right next to her. Some movement is suggested in the partial figures behind her – a 
walking stick thrust forward on the right suggests an imminent stride; the figure on the left 
kneels – but Mary’s scene is a composition of incredible stillness, even the cushion she sits 
on suggesting she plans to remain there for a long time. And she is outside her own time: 
Mary Magdalen’s story does not begin, in the gospels, until the end; her presence at the early 
moment of the Incarnation is already an anachronism. The effect of friction or tension 
between the incommensurate historical modes represented in this scene (or these scenes) is 
amplified by the fragmentation of the painting, the accident of history that has literally 
removed Mary’s scene of reading from the scene of sacred history to which she is literally 
marginal, has refocused attention on her marginality, made her and her book the sole subject 
of a fragment rather than an incident to a whole.55 Even the jar of ointment doesn’t quite sit 
next to her, but in front of her, perspectivally nearer the viewer, as though awaiting its time, 
which has not yet come. Mary Magdalen will be, the painting suggests, the anointer of the 
Messiah – but not yet. Yet still she is identified by a symbol of what she has not yet become. 
Caught in a fragment of time, Mary remains with her book while history proceeds around 
her. 
 This fragmentary temporality might be described in terms of what Elizabeth Freeman 
                                                
55 At some point in its history, the fragment was painted over to reveal only the figure of 
Mary Magdalen and none of her surroundings, amplifying yet further the effect of her 
remove from the scene: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:The_Magdalen_Reading_uncleaned.jpg.  
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calls a “time bind”: the moment when “an established temporal order gets interrupted and 
new encounters consequently take place,” interruptions that constitute “points of resistance 
to [the] temporal order that, in turn, propose other possibilities for living in relation to 
indeterminately past, present, and future others: that is, of living historically.” 56 We might see 
van der Weyden’s Magdalen, in Freeman’s terms, as performing a version of “temporal drag” 
– dressed up out of time, a gospel figure in fifteenth-century clothing, a still figure exerting a 
“distorting pull” on the time of the scene, putting a kind of “necessary pressure on the 
present tense” of the altarpiece.57 This distortion is, too, an effect of the material temporality 
of reading itself. Mary’s book, like her clothes, is an anachronism, a very fifteenth-century 
volume that is not explicitly identified but that one cannot help but see as the text of 
scripture. A psalter? A book of hours? Does Mary read in her book the very scene that she 
might witness, if only she looked up from her reading? The fabric that drapes the boards, 
bound into the book itself, identifies it as a girdle book – wrapped in cloth, and attachable to 
the clothes for easy carrying, easy reference, and, for Mary Magdalen in this altarpiece, easy 
access to a moment of peculiarly private devotion in a quiet corner of a public scene. The 
text is literally an extension of Mary’s clothes – and therefore of Mary’s body, and therefore 
of her self. As Ann Rosalind Jones and Peter Stallybrass have argued, clothing as 
“investiture” was understood in the Renaissance to literally fashion subjects, to be “deeply 
worn” as “the means by which a person was given a form, a shape, a social function, a 
‘depth.’”58 This effect of deep wearing can only be amplified by a thing that is at once worn 
                                                
56 Freeman, Time Binds: Queer Temporalities, Queer Histories (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2010), xxii. 
57 Freeman, 62 and 64. 
58 Jones and Stallybrass, Renaissance Clothing and the Materials of Memory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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and read, as in the case of the Mary’s girdle-book. In her fragment of time, she is in textual, 
as well as temporal drag – dressed up, as it were, not only as belonging to the painting’s 
present, but also as the book, wearing deeply the thing she reads. The coordination of the 
material text with the material self suggests an intimate relation between text and self – that 
to “read deeply” might be, in some sense, to become the book, or at the very least, to be in 
extended time in a deep relation of mutual constitution with the book.  
 One more detail of this painting provides another dimension to the complex 
temporality of devotional reading: the brass or gold bar bookmark that rests across the top 
of the book’s pages near the spine.59 Not visible to the viewer are the cords or strings that 
hang from the bar, enabling the reader to mark several places at once, a small technological 
improvement on preserving cross-references by holding one’s fingers between the pages at 
several sites. This little piece of reading technology suggests that Mary’s reading proceeds 
cross-referentially, a procedure indispensable to the methods of Christian exegesis. Typology 
requires the reader to inhabit more than one textual site at once, and van der Weyden asks us 
to understand his Magdalen performing that multitemporal mode of interpretation. The 
bookmark confirms the painting’s interest in anachrony as a commitment to a mode of 
reading: in order to dwell with this Mary Magdalen, we too must be able to read multiply. To 
return to Freeman’s observation of the importance of putting pressure on the present tense, 
van der Weyden’s Magdalen calls into question the stability of present time itself – to what 
time are we attached, when we encounter the static anachronism of her scene of reading? In 
what syntax would it be possible to articulate that temporal indeterminacy?  
                                                
59 I am grateful to Peter Stallybrass for helping me to see the bookmark and to understand its 
significance as a technology of cross-referential reading. 
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These questions provide a way into the scene that Robert Southwell amplifies in his 
1591 Mary Magdalen’s Funeral Tears, the account in John 20 of Mary’s devastated mourning 
for Christ and her eventual commission as apostola apostolorum. According to John, following 
Christ’s resurrection, Mary Magdalen arrives at the empty tomb with John and Peter, who 
promptly flee. “But Mary stood at the sepulchre without, weeping” (20:11).60 Unlike the 
synoptic gospels, John leaves Mary alone there by the empty tomb, and leaves her there for 
some time, fixed in place by her loss and her confusion. When the angels who attend the 
tomb ask the potentially consoling question, “Woman, why weepest thou?”, she takes it 
literally, and expresses in reply her basic misconception: “Because they have taken away my 
Lord, and I know not where they have laid him” (20:13). She has failed to recognize the 
resurrection. When Christ does arrive, she still does not recognize him – he, too, asks her 
(woman) why she weeps. Taking him for the gardener, in a moment of desperate irony she 
asks if he knows where his own body might be (20:15). It is not until he says her name that 
realization dawns: “Jesus saith to her: Mary. She turning, saith to him: Rabboni (which is to 
say, Master)” (20:16). In this scene of divine interpellation, Mary turns from bereft longing 
toward the plenitude of perfect presence. As Southwell describes it in Mary Magdalen’s Funeral 
Tears, her mourning is reconstituted as intimacy, an intimacy that transforms her in what 
Southwell calls “so strange an alteration […] as if she had been wholly new made when she 
was only named.”61 But in the next verse, the prohibition of touch comes so abruptly and so 
starkly that it has disoriented centuries of commentators: “Jesus saith to her: Do not touch 
                                                
60 All citations in this chapter from the Douai-Rheims Version.  
61 Marie Magdalens Funerall Teares (London: John Wolfe for Gabriel Cawood, 1592) [second 
edition], K7r.  Further citations noted parenthetically. I have silently expanded contractions 
and regularized u/v, i/j, and the long s, but otherwise preserved original spelling and 
punctuation. 
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me, for I am not yet ascended to my Father” (20:17). There is another turn to come: he 
dispatches her to tell the other disciples of the resurrection, and she goes. The interpellative 
scene of the turn moves into her commission as apostola apostolorum – it sets her on a new 
path, directs her into a new orientation toward the community, a new relationship to the 
apparent absence of Christ from the world. 
 But Mary stood at the sepulchre without, weeping. Before that transformative turn can occur, 
she must stand there, arrested by her extremity of feeling. But: her divergence from the path 
laid out by John’s and Peter’s flight is precisely the refusal to move or be moved, this 
standing that is also an extension into her desire for the absent body of Christ. The others 
move on, but Mary stood. Lancelot Andrewes identifies this as one of the “arguments of her 
great love” in the text of John 20:  
But Mary stood (that is as much to say, as) others did not, But, shee did. […] But 
Mary went not, shee stood still. Their going away commends her staying behinde. […] Fortior 
eam figebat affectus, saith Augustine, a stronger affection fixed her, so fixed her, that shee 
had not the power to remove thence. Goe who would, shee would not, but stay still. To 
stay, while others doe soe, while company stayes, that is the worlds love: But Peter is 
gone, and Iohn too : all are gone, and we left alone; then to stay, is love.62 
 
But has at least two functions here: to signal the distinction between Mary and the others, 
and to signal the difference between going and staying. Her fixity becomes her 
exceptionality, and in turn her exemplarity. In Andrewes’ citation of Augustine, we discover 
that it happens to her: affectus is the subject of this fixity and she its object; she has no power 
against it. But to be thus overcome is her virtue: to stay still, to be unmoving and 
unmoveable, is the necessary condition of her being in the way of Christ when he arrives. It 
is this period of prolonged stasis in the cognitive obliteration of extreme feeling, in the space 
opened by the deferral of Christ’s arrival, that Southwell takes as an occasion for his dilatory 
                                                
62 XCVI Sermons (London: Richard Badger, 1631), Bbb5r. 
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meditation. The others move on, but Mary stood – and Southwell’s text invites us to stay with 
her. Like the fragmentary time of van der Weyden’s painting, Southwell’s dilation of the text 
of John resists movement, exerting a kind of temporal drag on the time of the gospel. For 
Freeman, the “bind” of queer temporality is multiple; it signifies asychronous attachment 
(willing or otherwise) to moments in history, the possibility or the danger that such 
anachronic investment might bind the subject in time, and also that the subject might create 
in her temporal resistance an effect of drag. Drag both in the sense of of dressing-up out of 
time and in the sense of kinetic resistance – the capacity, as a young Shulamith Firestone put 
it, to “catch time short, and not just drift along in it.”63 “Temporal drag,” for Freeman, 
registers the importance of “retrogression, delay, and the pull of the past” – of drag – to the 
unfinished business of queer feminism: how a return, in the present, to the stylized 
intellectual modes of an earlier moment of feminist history can constitute “a productive 
obstacle to progress, a usefully distorting pull backward, and a necessary pressure on the 
present tense.”64  
 The queer effect of the dilated temporality of Mary Magdalen’s Funeral Tears is amplified 
by its master trope, prosopopoeia, which turns the reader’s attention and investment toward 
Mary Magdalen’s own voice – or even into her voice, inviting the reader to inhabit her 
speech. At the same time, Southwell voices a narrator who contests, admonishes, instructs, 
and empathises with her – another voice that both addresses the reader and invites the 
reader’s identification. By turns voicing that narrator, as a pastoral interlocutor for Mary, and 
Mary herself, Southwell orients and reorients his readers, demanding that they occupy a 
series of subject-positions – or several at once – that condition their own interpretive and 
                                                
63 Cited in Freeman, 77. 
64 Freeman, 62 and 64, italics original. 
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affective dispositions toward the text, toward Mary and her desire, toward Christ and his 
deferred arrival. In this field of multiple modes of address, the reader is queerly oriented by, 
toward, with, in Mary’s desire: does the reader speak along with Mary, or does Mary speak to 
her? Does she adopt the narrator’s admonitory or empathetic position, or is she so 
admonished or empathised with? All of these at once, or each of these in turn: the reading 
subject of Southwell’s text must be multiple, must inhabit more than one desiring 
perspective, more than one gendered bodily disposition, more than one orientation. In the 
anachronic temporality of devotional reading, dilation and prosopopoeia collaborate in 
Southwell’s text to render his erotic exegesis into prose.  
(DILATION) 
In order to pursue his reading of John 20, Southwell locates in Mary’s wet, desiring 
femininity – in her tears – the ground of his exegetical method, mobilizing embodied affect 
for meditative and interpretive purpose. As his epistle dedicatory to Dorothy Arundell 
indicates, this project is in part a manifesto of devotional eroticism in poetry: Southwell 
makes a strong claim for the necessity of orienting erotic poetics toward divinity (a claim 
about writing) that also entails a claim for the capacity of feeling to generate meaning (a 
claim about reading).  
For as passion, and especially this of love, is in these daies the chiefe commaunder of 
moste mens actions, & the Idol to which both toonges and pennes doe sacrifice their 
ill bestowed labours: so is there nothing nowe more needefull to bee intreated, then 
how to direct these humours unto their due courses, and to draw this floud of 
affections into the right chanel. Passions I allow, and loves I approove, onely I woulde 
wishe that men would alter their object and better their intent. (A3v) 
 
This passage is one of Louis Martz’s proof-texts in his argument that the devotional poetics 
 
 
 
45 
 
of love constitutes a mere parody of conventional erotic lyric.65 Yet what Southwell suggests 
is not the replacement of erotic feeling by devotional feeling, but rather the appropriation of 
eroticism as a devotional mode. In “due course,” in the “right chanel,” desiring inclination –
 passions and loves – takes the path it was always already supposed to take: toward God. It is 
object-choice that interests Southwell here as the primary category of desire, a priority whose 
implications become clear around the problem of Mary Magdalen’s crucial mistake, which 
Southwell characterizes as an failure of faith:  
And if her weakenes of faith, (an infirmitie then common to all Christes disciples) did 
suffer her understanding to be deceived, yet was her will so setled in a most sincere 
and perfect love, that it led all her passions with the same bias, recompensing the want 
of beliefe, with the strange effectes of an excellent charitie. (A5v-6r) 
 
A superabundance of feeling – the flood of affections – that might otherwise register as 
excess is perfected by its object: Mary’s “passions,” Southwell writes, were “commaunded by 
such a love as could never exceede, because the thing loved was of infinite perfection” (A5v). 
The passive constructions throughout Southwell’s prose, his habit of positioning Mary and 
her thought as the objects of verbs whose subjects are terms of feeling – love, desire, passion 
– emphasize the agency not of Mary as a subject but of feeling itself. Passion is something 
that happens to her. That passion is enough even to overcome a serious mistake of doctrine: 
her “weakenes,” her failure to recognize the Resurrection, is less significant than the fact of 
her love. This is what sustains the long period of Mary’s dilated desire, what fixes her before 
the tomb, puts her where she needs to be in order to be in the way of Christ when he 
arrives. 
 Mary’s weeping, as the index of her error of doctrine, becomes an occasion to inhabit 
                                                
65 The Poetry of Meditation: A Study in English Religious Literature of the Seventeenth 
Century, revised edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), 184-93. 
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her extreme longing for the presence of Christ – the scriptural ground on which Southwell 
builds his investment in the affective phenomena of devotional reading. In his epistle 
dedicatory to Dorothy Arundell, Southwell declares that “among other glorious examples of 
this Saints life, I have made choise of her Funeral Tears, in which as shee most uttered the 
great vehemencie of her fervent love to Christ, so hath she given therein largest scope to 
dilate upon the same”(A3r-v). Tears speak: as utterance, they constitute the kind of exegetical 
ground usually associated with the text of scripture. Their capacity – their scope – demands 
interpretation and commentary, demands dilation. As utterance, moreover, Mary’s tears 
express not only mourning but erotic attachment – her fervent love. Desire speaks in Mary’s 
body – and thus makes itself legible, makes itself available for Southwell’s mode of 
meditative dilation. In his more sober preface “To the Reader,” Southwell situates his work 
in the context of a long exegetical tradition: “the ground therof being in scripture, and the 
form of enlarging it, an imitation of the ancient doctors” (A8v). Taken together, the two 
prefaces sketch an analogy between Mary’s capacious tears and the capacious text of 
scripture, between dilating on her love and enlarging the gospel text, between embodiment 
and interpretation. Feeling – love, desire, mourning – itself emerges as both the object and 
method of reading.  
This method turns the text of John back on itself, taking up each of its verses in turn 
in order to dwell in them, perhaps most importantly in the abiding question of affect: 
Woman, why weepest thou? Why, indeed? The question is the occasion for Southwell to meditate 
at length on the problem of Mary’s mourning – on the question of the propriety of her 
weeping (did not Christ forbid the daughters of Jerusalem to weep for him?), on her 
preference for weeping over reasoned thought, on the excessive somatic femininity of her 
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weeping.  Woman, why weepest thou? becomes the text’s major refrain in its opening 
movements. With its emphasis on woman (and “too much a woman” [E6v]), the citation 
challenges at once her mourning itself (apparently causeless) and the peculiarly feminine 
mode of her mourning (too wet, too porous, too undisciplined).66 As a result of her 
“incredulous humor” (E6v) – her unbelief coded as a somatic disorder – Mary’s “wittes are 
smoothered with too thicke a mist, to admit these unknown beames” of right belief (F1r). 
Yet the question also gestures to the most generative problem posed by this passage from 
John: we might also paraphrase why weepest thou? as why has the gospel text given us this weeping to 
think with, what importance might this weeping have, what is there to be understood in this figure of weeping? 
Southwell recreates a problem of the gendered embodiment of feeling as a problem of 
interpretation, enlivening the lifeless cultural-studies jargon of “interrogating” the text: his 
questions excavate the surface of John’s text, bringing Mary’s consciousness into the frame. 
When Mary’s reply comes at last in her own voice, she objects that “if this [weeping] be a 
fault, I will never amend it […], for my part, sith I have lost my myrth, I will make much of 
my sorrow” (C8v). As she later protests, “What needeth my answere, where the miserie 
itselfe speaketh?” (F3v). Voicing Mary’s own defense of her weeping and her static standing 
by the tomb creates the dilated space in which the importance of “making much of sorrow,” 
of dwelling in feeling, can be elaborated and understood.  
The dilation of Mary’s mournful desire is the condition of her disposition toward 
Christ upon his arrival. Southwell expands the time of that delay to include the reader in 
Mary’s longing – deferring the end that we know (though she doesn’t) must arrive in order 
                                                
66 On the excessive humoral wetness of femininity, see Gail Kern Paster, ‘Leaky Vessels: the 
Incontinent Women of City Comedy,’ in The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of 
Shame in Early Modern England (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 23-63. 
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that we might dwell in that suspension of desire. In a sixth-century homily on John 20, 
Gregory the Great likewise invests in delay, configured as dilation in the senses both of 
expansion and deferral, as he reads Mary’s “dilated desires” as the very mechanism of her 
seeking and eventual finding of Christ.  
We must consider this woman’s state of mind, that a great force of love inflamed 
her. When even the disciples departed from the sepulchre, she did not depart. She 
sought for him whom she had not found, weeping as she searched; being inflamed 
with the fire of her love, she burned with desire for him who she believed had been 
taken away. So it happened that she who stayed behind to seek him was the only one 
who saw him. 
 
Qua in re pensandum est hujus mulieris mentem quanta vis amoris accenderat, quae 
a monumento Domini, etiam discipulis recedentibus, non recedebat Exquirebat 
quem non invenerat, flebat inquirendo, et amoris sui igne succensa, ejus quem 
ablatum credidit ardebat desiderio. Unde contigit ut eum sola tunc videret, quae 
remansit ut quaereret.67  
 
What appears to be a tautology – she’s the only one who found him because the only one 
who sought him – creates in syntactic parallel (videret; quaereret) a strong relation between 
seeking and seeing. By remaining, by refusing to move on, in the paradoxical simultaneity of 
seeking and stasis, Mary gains access to the object of her desire. The condition of that 
remaining is indeed her burning desire itself – which for Gregory paradoxically generates the 
presence of its object: 
She sought a first time, and found nothing; she persevered in seeking, and so it 
happened that she found him. It came about that her unfulfilled desires increased, 
and as they increased they took possession of what they had found. (188) 
 
Quaesivit ergo prius, et minime invenit; perseveravit ut quaereret, unde et contigit ut 
                                                
67 English taken from “Homily 25,” in Forty Gospel Homilies, trans. David Hurst (Kalamazoo: 
Cistercian Publications, 1990), 188; Latin from the digital Patrologia Latina, 
http://pld.chadwyck.com, vol. 76, XL Homiliarum in Evangelia, XXV.1. Hereafter cited 
parenthetically by page and section number, respectively. 
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inveniret, actumque est ut desideria dilata crescerent, et crescentia caperent quod 
invenissent. (XXV.2) 
 
If “holy desires [… ] increase by delay [dilatione crescunt]” (189; XXV.2), that increase only 
makes possible the eventual seizure of the desired object. Crescentia caperent: the expansion of 
desire – its crescence; its dilation – is itself the mechanism of possession. In that homely 
little conventional contigit – “contigit ut eum sola tunc videret”; “contigit ut inveniret” – is 
revealed the contingency of Mary’s seeing or finding of Christ. Contingent, of course, on her 
desire – first, “ardebat desiderio,” she burns with desire, unde contigit: her sole seeing of 
Christ is predicated on her ardor. Gregory then repredicates her finding of Christ on the 
perseverent seeking that arises from that desire: unde contigit ut inveniret. From contingency 
to contingency, Mary eventually arrives at the moment of finding and of taking hold – in the 
subjunctive; the verb itself registering its own syntactic contingency. As Carolyn Dinshaw 
has observed, “contingency” as com+tangere, touching-with, has a special value for queer 
history in its emphasis on the “sensible” and the “tactile.”68 Gregory’s emphasis on 
contingency thus accrues a kind of irony, as it describes the uncertain route to a touch that is 
at first deferred and ultimately prohibited. 
It matters, too, that Gregory describes what happens as finding – contigit ut invenire t . 
As a term of rhetoric and hermeneutics, inventio invites allegoresis of Mary’s desiring 
disposition as an interpretive one. In the very first sentence of De Doctrina Christiana, Augustine 
turns the inventio of rhetoric toward scriptural hermeneutics: “There are two things on which 
all interpretation of scripture depends: the process of discovering [modus inveniendi] what we 
                                                
68 Getting Medieval, 39. 
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need to learn, and the process of presenting [modus proferendi] what we have learnt.”69 For 
Augustine, the “most hidden meanings” of scripture are “discovered” – inventa sunt – by the 
interpretation of figures and tropes (88; III.xxix.41). The term is everywhere in De Doctrina –
 but perhaps most beautifully in the famous passage on the pleasure of figurative difficulty: 
“no one disputes that it is much more pleasant to learn lessons presented through imagery, 
and much more rewarding to discover meanings that are won only with difficulty [Nunc 
tamen nemo ambigit et per similitudines libentius quaeque cognosci et cum aliqua difficultate quaesita multo 
gratius invenir i ]” (33; II.vi.8). The obscurity of the difficult text that yields pleasure in 
inventionem is analogous to the impassable difficulty Mary encounters at the empty tomb – the 
yawning absence of Christ a figure she does not (yet) know how to interpret.  
Mary’s inventio provides a model for interpretation. And it is dilation – the deferral of 
satisfaction, the expansion of desire – that motivates both Mary’s standing by the tomb and 
the reader’s remaining with the text in the space and time of interpretation. The extension of 
the scene in John 20 through interpretation prolongs the period of want, in both senses of 
lack and longing. At the moment of crisis just before Christ’s appearance, Southwell’s 
narrator asks, “To what end, O sweet Lord, doest thou thus suspend hir longinges, prolong 
hir desires, and martyr hir with these tedious delaies?” (H5v). This question likewise 
motivates Southwell’s own project, which amplifies the period of delay in order to explore 
the devotional capacity of dilated desire. For Mary Magdalen’s Funeral Tears, in the analogy 
between the dilation of desire and the dilation of the text, Mary’s desire becomes coextensive 
with Southwell’s text. 
                                                
69 On Christian Teaching, trans. R.P.H. Green (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 8; 
Patrologia Latina vol. 34, I.i.1. Hereafter cited parenthetically.  
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In an expansive body of philological work on Renaissance dilation, Patricia Parker has 
explored the richness of the term for understanding the poetics and politics of gender and 
genre. “Dilation as delay,” Parker writes, represents “a kind of semantic crossroads, a 
complex in which constructs rhetorical and narrative, philosophical and theological, judicial 
and erotic overlap as figures for the space and time of the text itself.”70 In the case of 
scriptural exegesis, dilation as the opening of a hermetic text is the condition of human 
relationship to the divine – in Southwell’s formulation of Mary’s tears as “scope to dilate” on 
John 20, as in Donne’s description of the process by which a scriptural “Text is dilated, 
diffused into a Sermon.”71 As Parker observes, dilation thus becomes in the Christian 
tradition “a synonym for temporality itself, or for the mediate as distinguished from the 
eternal, simultaneous, or immediate.”72 In the face of the divine Word, the human condition 
is to be forever proliferating words. At the same time, dilation figures the erotic suspense –
 the delay of consummation – that motivates plot in a romance tradition stretching back to 
Ovid’s Ars Amatoria; at the same time, it figures the eschatalogical suspense that romance 
depends on to hold off end-times.73 The conjunction of the theological and the amatory 
models of delay in romance should be no surprise: the mechanics of desire for god are not, 
as Southwell and Gregory have suggested, so distinct from the mechanics of earthly desire.  
Parker further argues that dilation has sinister consequences for the representation of 
women – women’s voracious bodies, women’s appetitive sexuality, women’s excessive talk. 
Under the prurient gaze of Renaissance anatomy, for example, dilation features as a signal 
                                                
70 Parker, “Dilation and Delay: Renaissance Matrices,” Poetics Today 5:3 (1984), 520. 
71 Cited in “Matrices,” 524.  
72 “Matrices,” 523. Parker cites a Latimer sermon in which God’s will, as opposed to human 
(textual) activity, is done “without dilation.” 
73 “Matrices,” 528-9; Inescapable Romance: Studies in the Poetics of a Mode (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1979). 
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trope of a “quasi-pornographic discourse […] that seeks to bring a hidden or secret place to 
light,” seeks to open female bodies in order to expose them – and ultimately, control them.74 
The femininity of Erasmian copia then begins to look less innocent. Rhetorical dilation takes 
on the same potentially disruptive characteristics of fatness that desiring female bodies do in 
the plays of Shakespeare and Jonson. Parker rightly critiques the political authority of male 
gazes and the rhetorical authority of male writers that always, ultimately, contain the dilated 
femininity that both props up and threatens their generic programmes. “Copia,” as she 
writes, “must be controlled” : rhetoric moves through “the dilation and control of a 
copiousness figured as female […] in order finally to dramatize the very process of its 
containment, the limiting structures of authority and control.”75 This drama of containment 
is likewise at stake in secular romance in dilation’s sister-trope – the error, in the senses of 
both mistake and wandering, that suspends the text at the “threshold before the promised 
end,” that, holding the narrative end at bay, becomes coextensive with the time of the text 
itself.76 It is error – a mistake of faith – that motivates the scene in John 20, and Southwell’s 
whole project in Mary Magdalen’s Funeral Tears: Mary has failed to recognize the resurrection. 
That failure creates space for her mourning desire and motivates the extensive discourse 
between her and the narrator. For Southwell, that is, error is an amenity in itself: his aim is 
not to contain but to inhabit Mary’s debilitatingly desiring femininity – and to invite his 
reader to inhabit it, too. Mary’s weeping is excessive, her faith imperfect – but it’s precisely in 
her somatic affective disorder that she offers an alternative to Parker’s reading of feminized 
textual dilation as always-already the object of a disciplinary apparatus that seeks to 
                                                
74 Parker, “Othello and Hamlet: Dilation, Spying, and the ‘Secret Place’ of Women,” 
Representations 44 (1993), 60.  
75 Fat Ladies, 31.  
76 Inescapable Romance, 4.  
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neutralize it. The most stunning feature of Southwell’s text might be that its motive is not 
containment but empathy.   
 
(PROSOPOPOEIA) 
 
Mary Magdalen’s Funeral Tears generates that empathy through a mechanics of voicing that 
seeks to bridge the historical divide between Mary and the reader – or not anything so easy 
as to bridge it, but to find a way of coping with the “time bind” that emerges in the 
simultaneity of an unbridgeable historical gulf with the reader’s affective intimacy with Mary 
and her longing. Convinced of Christ’s death, in the worldly sense, Mary can only conclude 
that his body has been stolen – “They have taken away my lord, and I know not where they 
have laid him,” reads John (20:13). This is the heart of her error of faith, so profound as to 
disarticulate her very self: “She was not there where shee was, for shee was wholly where hir 
master was, more where she loved then where she lived, and lesse in her selfe then in his 
bodie, which notwithstanding, where it was shee could not imagine” (B6v). Like the misty 
cognitive challenge posed by her weeping, this disarticulation or distension registers first as 
an impairment. “Love is as strong as death,” Southwell writes, a citation from the Song of 
Songs (8:6). But he means it not in the sense of the citation – in which love’s strength 
transcends or overcomes death – but in the sense that love induces a living death, so that 
Mary “is now in so imperfect a sort alive, that it is proved true in her […] For what could 
death have done more in Mary then Love did?” Reduced to her tears, she is deprived of even 
the basic cognitive capacity that would enable her to recognize the Resurrection, or to react 
to the pastoral empathy of Southwell’s narrator, or to answer the angels who seek to comfort 
her with anything but irrational refusal of clarity, or indeed to make any decision at all that 
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would enable her to pursue the knowledge she seeks: “Her wittes were astonied, and all her 
senses so amased, that in the end finding she did not know, seeing she could not discern, 
hearing she perceived not” (B6v). Yet Mary’s astonishment is coextensive with her 
distension, not there where she was, more where she loved than where she lived: it is a signal 
characteristic of devotional desire. Pseudo-Dionysius writes, arguing for the recuperation of 
eros as a vital theological category, “this divine yearning [eros] brings ecstasy so that the lover 
belongs not to self but to the beloved.”77 Eros is what moves between God and humanity 
and enables human access to divinity – it is by eros that the “differentiation” of divinity into 
the world and human striving toward it may happen at all. Eros is in brief “a capacity to 
effect a unity, an alliance, and a particular commingling in the Beautiful and Good.”78 
Distension is a condition of devotion: there is no investment in coherent subjectivity here.   
As Southwell argues in the epistle dedicatory, Mary’s “perfect love” repairs her “want 
of beliefe, with the strange effectes of an excellent charitie” (A5v-A6r). Mary herself echoes 
this sentiment: “as in him alone is the uttermost of my desires, so he alone is the summe of 
all my substance” (G7r-v), and from such desires, such substance, “such effectes must follow 
as are without example” (H1r). The strangeness, the unexampledness of the “effectes” of 
Mary’s love register the central paradox of Southwell’s text: that feeling both debilitates and 
enables devotional disposition toward divinity, that desire and delay, indices of radical 
absence, are at the same time the very mechanisms of presence and possession. Yet Mary’s 
disarticulated self remains the site of a fundamental impairment: she remains committed to 
the problem of the missingness of Christ’s body. Southwell in turn commits to the potential 
                                                
77 “The Divine Names,” in The Complete Works, ed. and trans. Colm Lubhéid and Paul Rorem 
(New York: Paulist Press, 1987), 82. 
78 Ibid., 81. 
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amenity of even this error, engaging his narrator in a debate with Mary on her own 
misguided terms: unable to persuade her out of the stasis of her error, he must accept her 
faulty premise in order to contend with her at all. The narrator sustains a long dispute with 
her, putting pressure on the logic of her error in order to provide an opportunity to her 
voice. 
This is the occasion for the text’s most stunning account of its own practice. 
Southwell breaks off mid-argument to make an extradiegetic observation on his practice: 
“But to feel more of their sweetness, I will pound these spices, and dwell a while in the 
peruse of thy resolute fervour” (G5v).  The material, sensory quality of meditative prose 
emerges vividly here in the relentlessness of a stylistic pestle releasing the sweet essential 
property of spiritual spice. Southwell’s spice-pounding is not consumptive – violent, 
perhaps, but the significant property of the spice is not diminished but activated by the 
pounding it receives. In the ambiguity of his sensory lexicon, the sweetness of spice is not to 
be smelled or tasted specifically but more generally – and perhaps more capaciously – felt. 
This conspicuous attention to the sensory as a figurative vehicle for a method of reading 
(and of writing – even of the movement from reading to writing) recalls Ignatius of Loyola’s 
insistence in the Spiritual Exercises on the sensory involvement of the “the whole composite self, I 
mean body and soul together,” in the process of meditation.79 Southwell’s complex figure 
may after all be more literal than it appears – extending the moment of “dwelling” by 
insisting on its activation of embodied perception. The metaleptic movement from the figure 
of spice-pounding to the figure of dwelling, itself a “strange effecte,” registers something 
almost inarticulable about what it means to spend time with a text – with an act of 
                                                
79 “Spiritual Exercises,” in Personal Writings, ed. and trans. Joseph A. Munitiz and Philip 
Endean (London: Penguin, 1996), 295. 
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meditation that is also necessarily an act of interpretation and an act of writing – as a felt 
phenomenon. The pounding of spices means internalizing the text, consuming it bodily, in 
order to generate empathy with Mary Magdalen – in order, through a meditative 
interpretation, to approach her affectively. Southwell’s figure makes clear the significance of 
the body to interpretation, to this process of turning and returning to the text that shapes the 
reader in the most material ways. Southwell, in other words, materializes the figure of 
dilation to explicitly include the circuitry that runs between affect, embodiment, and 
interpretation. The aim is to distort the time of reading – to produce in the devotional 
sensorium a means of extending that time. The figure’s own contortion registers its 
resistance to the normal order of time in reading –  the bind of dwelling like a gloss on John 
20:11, “But Mary stood without at the sepulchre, weeping.” 
Mary echoes this language of dwelling, too, as she begins to recognize the 
impossibility of moving out of her grief-stricken stasis into action: “stil I am forced to dwel 
in this answere. They have taken away my Lord, and I knowe not where they have put him” (H3v). She 
dwells in a citation of her own words in John, as Southwell dwells in his perusal. As Mary 
begins to speak in the terms of Southwell’s own method, the text’s real investments in its 
master tropes of speech and address – prosopopoeia and apostrophe – begin to emerge. 
Meanwhile, at the end of this long discourse, we remain with her in the dilemma with which 
it began, as though suspended with her in the cognitive stasis that keeps her standing and 
weeping, not there where she was, more where she loved than where she lived. Still I am 
forced to dwell in this answer: Southwell’s meditative method enacted in Mary’s cognitive stasis. 
Just as earlier she queries the angels’ response to her weeping, she here performs Southwell’s 
method of putting interpretive pressure on the text of John. At the first citation of this 
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“answer” in which she dwells, she draws the reader’s attention to the textuality of her own 
words: “They have taken away, O unfortunate word. They have taken away my Lord” (F3v). The 
typographic distinction between the conventional italics of citation and the roman type of 
Mary’s lamenting interjection creates a strange effect of its own: Mary’s speech comes to us 
as always-already citational, as though she is quoting the text of John and issuing a 
commentary on it. As though she reads the same gospel text that we do: a dizzying historical 
impossibility that recalls that of van der Weyden’s reading Magdalen. When she later 
reiterates the verse, slightly paraphrased, it is no longer italicized and thus easier to 
understand as proleptic – as historical speech awaiting its record: “And nowe (O griefe) 
because I know not where he is, I cannot imagin how to help, for they have taken him away, 
and I know not where they have put him” (F8r). But when at last she observes her enforced 
static dwelling in her answer, the verse is once more citational – in italics emphasized by her 
deixis, this answer. She dwells as we do, caught in the time of this one half-verse by 
Southwell’s spice-pounding. Southwell’s implicit argument is that understanding the gospel 
text requires the reader’s empathetic investment – in order to read John adequately, we must 
be able to think and feel as Mary Magdalen does. We must, in other words, be able to speak 
in her voice. And when we do, historical time seems to collapse.  
 This invitation to identification in feeling is a signal feature of prosopopoeia, in both 
classical and early modern understandings of its rhetorical capacities. A figure of speech that 
is also a figure of speaking, prosopopoeia of necessity demands the investment of 
identification. An early modern boy’s earliest encounters with the craft of language in 
schoolroom rhetorical exercises in personification asked him to understand language itself to 
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be nearly coextensive with prosopopoeia.80 The task of writing a speech in the voice of 
Caesar demanded that the boy, however absurd it might be, identify with Caesar – to, in 
some sense, imagine himself to be Caesar. Similarly, Cicero and Quintilian both observe that 
in order to personate feeling, and in order to evoke it in his audience, the orator must 
himself rouse his passions to his subject – in prosopopoeia.81 As Gavin Alexander puts it, 
prosopopoeia thus has an “innate tendency […] to ignore interiority and to elide 
performance with identity,” so that “personhood as it is configured and enacted in 
Renaissance fictions is built on the rhetorical idea that a self is the words it speaks.”82 Yet 
this fantasy of seamless elision cannot account for the challenges of figures of speaking, for 
the friction we encounter in them. Nor does the dismissal of “interiority” and other modes 
of depth from the alleged surface of rhetorical figure account for the movement between the 
voice ostensibly made present in figure and the irreducible absence or distance of that voice.  
 This kind of complexity is much more in evidence in the long history of rhetorical 
personification in the Christian tradition – a history richly suggested by Paul de Man in an 
otherwise archly secular essay on prosopopoeia, where the ensouled body serves as his aptest 
analogy for figurative language in general: “The language of tropes […] is indeed like the 
body, which is like its garments, the veil of the soul as the garment is the sheltering veil of 
the body.”83 But where de Man understands prosopopoeia to be therefore (only) “privative” 
– because the very purpose of the figure is to revive the voice it stages only to replace it –
                                                
80 See e.g. Lynn Enterline, Shakespeare’s Schoolroom: Rhetoric, Discipline, Emotion (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012). 
81 See Enterline, Shakespeare’s Schoolroom, 12-25; Gavin Alexander, “Prosopopoeia,” in 
Renaissance Figures of Speech, eds. Sylvia Adamson, Gavin Alexander, and Katrin Ettenhuber 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 100. 
82 “Prosopopoeia,” 102. 
83 “Autobiography as De-facement,” MLN 94:5 (1979), 929-30. 
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 the tradition on which he calls for his analogy of embodiment has a more complex 
understanding of the relationship of language to absence. And as I have argued, with Jones 
and Stallybrass, no “garment” is only a “sheltering veil” – it is also constitutive of the body 
beneath it. The Pauline lexicon at work in de Man’s analogy is the source of Origen’s 
foundational hermeneutics of the inner and outer senses of body and of text – the spiritual 
sense finding expression in the material of body and letter, just as prosopopoeia gives voice 
to what is missing, what is inapprehensible. In this tradition, figure can never be privative: it is 
to the contrary the vehicle of the ongoing process of interpretation – of what Origen called 
the transformation of “the sensible gospel into the spiritual.”84 As John Parker has argued, 
prosopopoeia was vital to the early Christian exegetical tradition precisely because it could 
accommodate the complexity of that transformation. It facilitated typology because it 
allowed, for example, Christ to speak in the voice of the prophets of the Old Testament, 
allowed the erotic drama of the Song of Songs both to make sense as drama, and to be 
understood as Christian allegory. Readers of the Psalms, too, can identify with their speaking 
voices because of what Philip Sidney called David’s “prosopopoeias.” The trope was an 
especially useful one to early Christian thinkers, Parker argues, in part because it put the 
material mediation of the masks (personae) of early theatre to theological work, “substitut[ing] 
[…] the personae of God for theater-masks.” Trinitarian doctrine according to Tertullian thus 
“sacrificed theater by providing in its place a more sublime form of acting,” of 
personification.85 The theological prosopon poeion of divinity’s address to humanity, to the 
degree that, as Parker argues, it is always already theatrical, both makes the ineffable 
                                                
84 Origen, Commentary on John, Book I in Origen, ed. and trans. Joseph W. Trigg (London: 
Routledge, 1998), 109. 
85 “Persona,” in Cultural Reformations: Medieval and Renaissance in Literary History, eds. Brian 
Cummings and James Simpson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 594. 
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accessible and remains as the irreducible sign of the limitation of that access.  
 The texture of a textual surface mediates persona as a mask does – or more, because 
we come into contact with the text, brush up against it, in an intimacy more available in 
reading than in the theatre. Reading intimately is a kind of performance, too – as the reader 
takes on the voice (the persona) of the speaking figure, she also internalizes the text. That 
interpretive performance is one piece of what is happening in the impact of a gesture like 
Southwell’s personation of Mary Magdalen quoting from a gospeller’s account of Mary 
Magdalen’s speech – amplified by its italics, it stops us short. Like Mary, still – stalled in long 
duration, unmoving in extended time – we are forced to dwell – literally arrested by the site 
where prosopopoeia meets citation, figure meets interpretation, rhetoric meets hermeneutics.  
If, as Parker wryly suggests, the mimetic personifications of poetry are themselves in some 
way “even more hollow” than the casual deceptions of theatricality,86 do they not then also, 
as Parker writes elsewhere of typological figures, “yawn for fulfillment”?87 And what might 
fulfill them but the investment of a reader’s attention – her identification with the voice that 
speaks, her inhabiting of the text she reads, filling it out?  
As Margreta de Grazia has suggested, prosopopoeia “encourages anachronism.”88 In 
voicing the past, and in asking a reader to dwell with that voicing, the figure necessarily 
stands out of ordinary time. And Southwell understands this problem of time also as a 
problem of feeling: Mary’s grief has removed her from herself in more ways than one – she’s 
not only “not there where she was,” but not, in a sense, when she was, either.  This 
challenging temporality is vital to those aspects of Southwell’s project that require the 
                                                
86 “Persona,” 605. 
87 The Aesthetics of Antichrist: From Christian Drama to Christopher Marlowe (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2007), 50. 
88 “Anachronism,” in Cultural Reformations, op. cit., 22.  
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reader’s investment in and identification with the text of Mary Magdalen’s Funeral Tears in 
order to have the affective purchase that motivates them. As the problem of Mary’s gospel-
citation makes clear, voice, too, puts pressure on the present tense. For Freeman, rhetorical 
figures of time and its order or disorder signal those sites where queer ways of being in time 
surface in literary language – hysteron proteron, prolepsis, anastrophe, asynchrony, 
anachronism, delay, repetition, all resist the ostensible linearity of historical life and register 
in reading the felt experience of time out of order. I’ll add to her list Southwell’s dilatory 
metalepsis, as well as prosopopoeia. Not conventionally understood as a figure of time, 
prosopopoeia nevertheless demonstrates its anachronic potential as it asks us to cross a 
historical divide in order to inhabit Mary Magdalen’s voice, and as it forces us to dwell in 
Mary’s stalled time of loss and longing. Southwell’s dilation of the text of John, configured as 
delay, exerts the “distorting pull” of kinetic and interpretive drag – in order to “dwell a 
while,” to persist in perusal, his text resists the ordinary progress of reading in time. In 
Southwell’s voicing of Mary’s own attitude to that “distorting pull” – her observation of 
being forced to dwell in her static astonishment, her statement of what she knows not, 
prosopopoeia reveals fully its intimate involvement in the business of time. In the language 
of “dwelling,” Southwell conjoins his own meditative method with the anachronic quality of 
Mary’s voice and with her suspension in time, her recalcitrance and refusal as well as her 
cognitive impairment. Mary’s citation of her own words in John exhibits the dangerous side 
of this – to be forced to dwell in one fixed moment, to be unable to move into a more 
promising future, is to live the discomfort of being caught in time, trapped in the 
undertow.89  
                                                
89 Freeman’s epigraph to her temporal drag chapter is a quotation from Meryl Altman on 
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(CATACHRESIS :  OR, DISASTER) 
 
The affective content of prosopopoeia is exquisitely and explicitly suggested by Thomas 
Lodge in the title of his 1596 meditation in imitation of Southwell on the weeping before the 
cross of the Virgin Mary: Prosopopeia, Containing the teares of the holy, blessed, and sanctified Marie, 
the Mother of God.90 The title-page emphasizes the capacity of figure – of prosopopoeia – to 
hold the complex of affect and meditation in its typographical arrangement, where 
“CONTAINING,” in roman capitals, is the largest word on the page. Where for Southwell, 
tears are precisely what can’t – and shouldn’t – be contained, this title page offers Lodge’s 
Virgin as though in a vessel.  
In his epistle dedicatory to the Countesses of Derby and of Cumberland, Lodge 
identifies his book with Mary’s tears by a capaciously ambiguous deixis: “Good Madames, 
accept these teares in their nature, and hold it better to weepe many times with Jesus and 
Marie, than to laugh with Belial and the world” (A3v). He reiterates the injunction to shared 
feeling – to weep with – in the epistle to the reader, promising that “in meditating with Marie, 
you shall find Jesus” (A6v). Just as Southwell analogizes Mary Magdalen’s tears to the text of 
scripture in his prefatory materials, so Lodge thus identifies weeping with meditating – and 
with “finding,” as in Gregory’s and Augustine’s interpretive inventio. So Lodge’s Virgin will 
tell us, in her odd homiletic voice, riffing on Pseudo-Dionysius: “Shall I teach you how to 
bewaile Christ? First love him, for love uniteth all things together, drawing all mans interest 
from himself, and placing it in another. […] Those that are one in affection, are one in 
passio[n], one in desires, one in teares, one in love, one in sorrow, one in mind, one in 
                                                                                                                                            
“Teaching 70’s feminism” : “Every wave has its undertow” (59). 
90 Prosopopeia (London: for Edward White, 1596). Further citations parenthetically. 
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martyrdome” (E8v). And in Lodge’s text as in Southwell’s, tears are not only text but speech 
– and the peculiar form of speech that manages to register all that is frail about humanity 
while yet remaining humanity’s best semiotic resource for coping with the burden of the felt 
experience of the loss or absence of god. As Lodge’s Virgin puts it, “yet in flesh whilest thou 
[Christ] art absent, & dwellest with death, let me bewaile thee, (for humane weaknesse 
requireth a little more weeping[)]” (G8v). Tears fill the dilated space between crucifixion and 
resurrection.  
While Lodge’s prefaces insist on the importance of imitative communion, and Mary’s 
voice insists on unity in feeling, these projects are in some degree impeded by the Virgin’s 
repeated insistence on her exceptionality – we are scolded for not being like her in grief, but 
who can imitate her whose grief is beyond the capacity of all humanity? Lodge’s text, 
however shrilly it insists on the necessity of empathy – of weeping with – in devotion, at the 
same time repulses the identification that would allow such a communion in feeling between 
the reader and the weeping Virgin. Lodge draws attention to the potential friction – the drag 
– in prosopopoeia, those elements of the figure that resist identification even as they invite it: 
why? In the chain of analogies that runs from the reader’s dim imitation of the Virgin’s 
suffering to the Virgin’s afflicted body in imitation of Christ’s suffering to the afflicted body 
of Christ, there remains some crucial difference: imitatio is not identity.   
But perhaps the most important thing about Mary’s speech in Prosopopeia is how it 
stops. Overcome with the excess of feeling that is the text’s central concern and primary 
conceit, Mary swoons and falls silent – bringing an end not only to our encounter with her 
voice, but to Lodge’s text itself. Mary’s voice ceases to speak, and a narrator takes over for 
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one final paragraph, in which speech becomes embodied performance, and then at last falls 
silent, too:  
Thus plagued in bodie and distressed in soule, sate poore Marie (a holy and happie 
virgin) enacting hir griefe with her armes, when she had overforced both her tongue 
and eies with compassion : briefely, her paine & impatience beeing so great as her 
words could not expresse it, hir desires so importunate, as they exceeded all her 
delightes. The image of her griefe before her, and the domage of her losse within 
her, she sownded on the senselesse earth, and being conveied to her oratorie by the 
holy assistance, the sacred bodie of Christ was bound up and borne to the sepulchre. 
(H7v) 
 
This abrupt termination, with its dramatic (if conventional) typographically tapering 
paragraph imitating the expiration of Mary’s capacity for discourse, is followed by an 
overdetermined FINIS – as though this really were the end. As with the enforced affective 
suspension of Southwell’s Magdalen, there is a danger here in the defeat of the Virgin’s voice 
by feeling – a danger that also encodes a problem of confessionalization and periodization.  
The Virgin’s swoon, not attested in the gospels and never legitimated by ecclesiastical 
doctrine in any church, nevertheless enjoyed a vogue in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries, especially in visual culture. By the time of Lodge’s writing, the swoon signalled 
both attachment to a moment long past and a dangerous confessional affiliation.91 In some 
sense, all Catholic iconography potentially smacks of anachronism in England in the 1590’s –
 like a campy throwback, papist or even high-church aesthetics might seem in the age of 
Uniformity to belong to a discarded or discardable past. Lodge’s text, far more than 
Southwell’s, invests in a confessional specificity that introduces another order of drag into 
the time of reading. 
                                                
91 See Gary Kuchar, ‘Aemilia Lanyer and the Virgin’s Swoon: Theology and Iconography in 
Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum,’ English Literary Renaissance 37:1 (2007), 47-73. 
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To illustrate the time of the Virgin’s swoon, I turn to another van der Weyden 
example – the crucifixion scene at the Philadelphia Museum of Art.  
 
Figure 2: Rogier van der Weyden, “Crucifixion Diptych” (c. 1460), Philadelphia Museum of Art 
Mary’s swoon here seems less a fall than a virtuoso act of suspension – in the stillness of the 
composition, she is caught permanently in an impossible stasis. John does not yet bear her 
weight; his hand does not yet press into her garments. Her arms remain raised in a pose of 
devotion, her fingers locked together, her head poised reverentially, her thighs, so articulate 
beneath her dress, suggesting at once their strength, almost still supporting her, and the 
irreducible embodied femininity of her. (This, those parted thighs declare, is the body that 
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bore the child who now hangs dead on the cross.) The division of the composition into two 
panels emphasizes the shared strange time of the suspension of Mary’s body and the 
suspension of Christ’s loincloth, drifting in midair. And in shared time, shared suffering: the 
affliction of the Virgin’s body by feeling and the more obviously afflicted body of Christ 
invite simultaneous contemplation of them both – an analogy of passion that teaches the 
viewer something about compassion.  
Lodge configures this relation explicitly as a semiotic one: to endure the interval 
between Christ’s death and resurrection, Mary tells us, “I wil symbolise thy body with mine, 
and quicken thy passion by my sufference” (G2r). In a gesture of self-interpretation, Mary 
invents her body as a textual resource, as a sign, or set of signs, that provide her and her 
audience with some access to the afflicted embodiment of Christ – that “quicken” his 
passion, that body forth, as it were, an experience of suffering and death that might 
otherwise remain a thing unknown or unknowable. Desire and imitatio grade into one 
another in this scene of shared affliction: “my wounds cannot bee hid till thy wounds be 
healed, and til thou live to rescue mee, I shall die thorough wanting thee” (G3v). The threat 
of death by “want” as both desire and lack is echoed by a subordinate reading – so wounded, 
“I shall die through wanting to be like thee,” in those wounds, that suffering. 
And after all, this is the end of the text – precisely what the Virgin’s swoon doesn’t do 
is symbolize Christ’s body with her own. Quite the contrary, it is the end of signification 
altogether: FINIS. Lodge, perhaps inadvertently, demonstrates the greatest danger of the 
identification invited by figures of speaking: that we might overinvest, that we might, in the 
end, swoon, fall silent, and stay there. Like van der Weyden’s Virgin, we might remain in a 
perpetually suspended fall.  
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A wonderful note in the errata of Lodge’s text indexes, by accident, precisely this 
danger: for “desires,” we are enjoined to read “disasters.” Perhaps appropriately, the page 
and line number provided do not lead to the site for correction – the erroneous erratum 
suggesting the possibility that for any instance of desire, we might read disaster, that any 
instance of desire might lead to disaster. Death by wanting, the speech-cancelling swoon, 
thus teeters on the fulcrum between productive imitatio and destructive overinvolvement in 
the affective scene. I began with the suggestion that figures of speaking are a response to 
places of difficulty in the gospel, sites that resist even the illusion of transparency or 
immediacy. As a reading of Southwell, Lodge’s insistence on the limits of prosopopoeia to 
promote devotional identification might be some indication that something remains 
unsettled or unsettling in the reader’s relationship with Southwell’s Magdalen. For if 
prosopopoeia and apostrophe are responses to hermeneutic friction, they also generate it, 
risking catachresis at every turn. 
  
(COLLATION, OR: REPAIR) 
 
At the climax of his work, Southwell once more invests in the pressure exerted on the 
present by dwelling in long time as a property of scriptural hermeneutics. Just before Christ 
appears at last, the narrator apostrophizes him in a desperate defense of Mary’s desire: “To 
what end, O sweet Lord, doest thou thus suspend hir longinges, prolong hir desires, and 
martyr hir with these tedious delaies?” (H5v) By now this is the reader’s own question – but 
Southwell has already answered it. Not only do holy desires increase by delay, but delay itself 
gives to desire an interpretive force, by making time and space for the process of reading. An 
analogy emerges between Southwell’s method – his own suspension and delay – and the 
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apparent belatedness of Christ’s appearance to Mary, between the sweetness of extended 
dwelling in the text of scripture and the sweetness of Christ himself. When Christ does 
finally appear to Mary, she makes, of course, one last mistake – taking him for a gardener, 
she asks him, too, whether he might know where her lord’s body has been laid. The 
outrageousness of her misprision is at first an opportunity for the narrator to excoriate her –
 how could she not recognize him for whom she has so longed? “But,” Southwell writes, 
“thy mistaking hath in it a farther mysterie” (H7v). The consonance of mistake and mysterie in 
sound contravenes their dissonance in sense – once more, Mary’s error of belief provides an 
opportunity. This time, the occasion is a more conventionally exegetical one, in which 
Southwell takes advantage of the figure of Christ as Gardener to explore his typological 
association with the first gardener, Adam – Christ who sows salvation to cancel Adam’s 
condemnation, Christ who labored in death to provide the fruits of the heavenly banquet to 
come. “For this,” Southwell writes, meaning this reading in mysterie, this interpretive 
gesture, “for this also was Mary permitted to mystake, that we might be infourmed of the 
mysterie, and see how aptlie the course of our redemption did answere the process of our 
condemnation” (H8v-I1r). 
“O woonderfull effectes of Maries love!” (H6v). Southwell can’t stop commenting on 
the strangeness, the wonder, the unexampledness, of the “effectes” of Mary’s passion for 
Christ. There is one more wonderful effect to come, of course – in the moment of 
recognition, the anagnorisis, as it were, that transforms Mary’s tragedy into a comedy of 
devotional ecstasy. The dilated desire that has yawned for fulfillment all this time at last 
reaches its climax. When Christ at last says Mary’s name, at last she turns and sees him, in the 
scene of salvific interpellation that creates in her “so strange an alteration […] as if she had 
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been wholly new made when she was only named” (K7r). Her strange alteration repeats the 
trope that characterizes the strange effectes of her love – in some sense, the affective moment 
of Southwell’s text lies just beyond language, registered in his repeated insistence on the 
inarticulable. In only the single word of Mary’s name – the little word spoken by the Word, 
as Southwell wonderingly observes (K7v) – can the full erotic potential of the prolonged 
period of Mary’s longing at last achieve some release: “And as all this while she hath sought 
without finding, wepte withoute comforte, and called without answer: so now thou satisfiest 
her seeking with thy coming, her teares with thy triumph, and all hir cries with this one 
word, Mary” (K7r). In the voice of god, interpellation becomes consummation, becomes 
erotic and literary climax. 
Or, as it turns out, not quite a climax, or not the last: after this exuberant erotic 
communion, the noli me tangere that inevitably arrives registers as tragedy, as a scene of 
devastation. Ventriloquizing the bafflement of commentators on this verse, anticipating 
perhaps the reader’s own shock, hurt, disappointment at the evident violence of Christ’s 
prohibition, Southwell’s narrator launches an indignant protest:  
O Iesu what mysterie is in this? […] If the multitude of hir tears have won that favor 
for hir eies, and hir longing to heare thee so great a recompence to hir eares, why 
doost thou not admitte her hands to touch, & hir mouth to kisse thy holy feete, sithe 
the one with many plaints and the other with their readinesse to all services, seem to 
have earned no lesse reward. (L3r-L4r) 
 
In querying the mysterie of Christ’s words, Southwell continues to make explicit the 
interpretive posture of the work – as in the mystery of Mary’s mistaking, the interpretive 
crux must be dwelled in. The answer to the question will be the conventional one of the 
commentary tradition: that Mary has failed to proceed from devotion to Christ in his 
humanity to devotion to Christ in his divinity, so that “eyes” and “ears” stand in for spiritual 
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perception whereas in “mouth” and “hands” is located the fleshly grasp that is prohibited. 
To resolve the pain of the apparent rebuff, then, Southwell first ventriloquizes Christ, 
expanding on his words in a mild chastisement of Mary’s ongoing misprision: “O Mary know 
the difference betweene a glorious and a mortall body, betweene the condition of a 
momentarie and of an eternall life” (L4r). This lesson in trinitarian spirituality may be the 
standard line on the noli me tangere – but for Southwell and others this cannot suffice, and the 
binary opposition between the glorious and the mortal, between sensible and spiritual touch, 
is not as stark as it at first appears.  
For Southwell, the interpretive crux is also an affective one. As though the 
prohibition of touch is too unbearable to sustain, Southwell looks to collation as a method 
of repair. He makes recourse to the text of Matthew in the work’s sole moment of deviation 
from the Johannine account – an act of collation far from unusual in itself, but exceptional 
in Mary Magdalen’s Funeral Tears.  
But as she was in this perplexed manner, now falling, now rising in her own 
uncertainties, shee findeth on the waie, the other holy women that first came with hir 
to the grave, whom the angels had now assured of Christes resurrection. And as they 
passed all forwardes towardes the Disciples: Behold Jesus met them, saieng: All hail. But 
they came neere, and tooke hold of his feete, and adored him. Then Jesus said to them, feare not. Go 
tell my brethren, that they goe into Galilee, there they shall see me. (M1v) 
 
Southwell sutures the events of John to those of Matthew with this brief narrative – in which 
Mary finds the other two Marys on the way. Her finding returns us to Gregory’s inventio: 
Southwell’s act of interpretive collation encoded in Mary’s discovery that repairs her solitude 
and prepares for the moment of touch that John alone prohibits. Southwell characterizes his 
act of collation – of finding on the way through scripture – as a curative gesture inherent to 
the scene itself: “But O most milde phisition,” he apostrophizes Christ, “wel knowest thou 
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that thy sharp corrosie, with bitter smart angred hir tender wound, which beeing rather 
caused, by unwitting ignorance then wilfull error, was assoone cured as knowne” (M2r). This 
touch is the source of Mary’s ultimate “satisfaction” – it precipitates the ecstatic, even 
orgasmic, climax of the whole work. This careful affective physics, in which pain is 
recompensed with perfect pleasure, the injury of absence cured by the miracle of presence, is 
for Southwell the purpose of interpretation. The exegetical gesture of collation, in which 
Matthew supplies an absent encounter, could likewise be described as a “cure” to the 
“corrosie” of John, the “requital” of John’s “refusall.” It is an act of intimate mercy on 
Southwell’s part. 
What has happened between corrosie and cure is, in some sense, a reorientation of the 
logic of embodiment itself – a transformation of the devastated space of mourning 
conditioned by Mary’s fixation on Christ’s fleshly body and by the reduction of embodiment 
to flesh alone, into a new mode of ensouled embodiment, the restoration of Ignatius’ “whole 
composite self” and the recuperation of all the senses into the interpretive frame of the 
dialectic between inner and outer, spiritual and material, figurative and literal. For Augustine, 
too, collation provides relief from the exegetical and affective difficulty of the text of John: 
“Who could be so absurd,” he writes in his homily on the passage, “as to affirm that He was 
willing indeed to be touched by the disciples before He ascended to the Father, but refused 
it in the case of women till after his ascension?”92 But it is impossible to “run into such folly” 
because of the account in Matthew: 
This was passed over by John, but declared as the truth by Matthew. It remains, 
therefore, that some sacred mystery must lie concealed in these words, and whether 
                                                
92 Augustine, Homilies on the Gospel of John, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. John Gibb and James 
Innes, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers vol. 7 (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1994), 437.  
 
 
 
72 
 
we discover it [quod sive inveniamus] or utterly fail to do so [invenire], yet we ought to be 
in no doubt as to its actual existence.93 
  
Inventio is once again at stake in the process of interpretation. For Augustine, the mystery lies 
in determining at what moment Mary Magdalene developed an adequate understanding of 
the Trinity:  
[T]he words, “Touch me not, for I am not yet ascended to my father,” had this 
meaning, […] that in this way Christ wished Himself to be believed on; in other 
words, to be touched spiritually, that He and the Father are one. For He has 
ascended to the Father, to the inward perception [intimis sensibus] of him who has 
made such progress in the knowledge of Christ that he acknowledges Him as equal 
with the Father: in any other way He is not rightly touched, that is to say, in any 
other way He is not rightly believed on. But Mary might have still so believed as to 
account Him unequal with the Father, and this certainly is forbidden her by the 
words, “Touch me not;” that is, Believe not thus on me according to thy present 
notions; let not your thoughts stretch outwards to what I have been made in thy 
behalf, without passing beyond to that whereby thou hast thyself been made.94 
 
The intimus sensus on which Augustine calls here invokes the “inner senses” of both the body 
and the text of scripture as developed by Origen – the spiritual reading of Christ’s presence 
that both depends on and supersedes Mary’s more material desire for his bodily presence. 
The “inequality with the Father” that is forbidden by the noli me tangere, according to 
Augustine, is Mary’s mistake of Christ in his humanity for Christ in his divinity – a failure, in 
other words, of Trinitarian doctrine. Augustine interprets the prohibition further as an 
injunction to transcendence – a transcendence, moreover, with a futural orientation: “believe 
not […] according to thy present notions”; “pass beyond.” Allowing her thought to “stretch 
outwards,” gesturally like touch, toward the incarnational Christ is only the first movement 
in a becoming, toward the almost apophatic “that whereby,” the demonstrative pronoun 
                                                
93 Ibid., 437-8. Latin from the Patrologia Latina online, vol. 35, Tractatus CXXI.3. 
94 Ibid., 438. 
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standing in for the threefold divinity that stands behind and before all created things. In 
going on to collate John with Matthew, Augustine suggests that Mary and the other women 
must by the time of embracing Christ’s feet have likewise embraced this Trinitarian 
extension of thought, must have passed beyond the incarnational moment to, paradoxically, 
the time of belief in which embodied touch is not only not forbidden, but commended. To 
believe and to touch “rightly,” then, is not to depart from the body but rather to return to it. 
Similarly, Lancelot Andrewes’ Easter sermons on John 20 (1620, 1621, and 1622) 
explicitly turn the problem of the nature of touch toward a problem of textual 
interpretation.95 He develops a mode of affective philology as a means of mediating an 
embodied encounter that can only be fully developed in its exegetical unfolding. Even “to 
take her as we finde her in the Text, and to looke no whither else,” Andrewes argues in the 
first of these sermons, is to discover Mary Magdalen in her entire love, which “wee cannot 
but commend” in spite of her errors of faith. As we find her: our interpretation as 
inventional as her finding of Christ, we dwell in the text as she does by the tomb. In his 
second sermon, on the single verse, Dicit ei Iesus, Noli me tangere, Andrewes makes a useful if 
overdetermined joke out of his own repetition of the word “touch.” Discussing the tradition 
of commentary on John 20, he writes that he will provide three “senses” for Christ’s 
prohibition, “and they have great Authors, all three, Chrysostom, Gregorie, Augustine. I will touch 
them all three, and you may take your choyce of them; or if you please, take them all” 
(Ccc5v). There is an echo here of Augustine’s analogy between touch and belief, which 
Andrewes expands to include the mechanics of collation and citation. The pun is a capacious 
one: the careful collation of “Authors” is an act of delicate touch, lighting on each in turn, 
                                                
95 In XCVI Sermons (London: Richard Badger, 1631), Bbb4r-Eee3r. 
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text and authority alike. Interpretive “touch” in a sermon occurs in multiple media: as the act 
of reading that generated the sermon’s argument; as the prosopopoetic act of oratory that 
communicates the preacher’s touch to his congregation; as the record in text of that touch 
and its performance. It is an act both of reception and of transmission – as he says of Mary’s 
dilectio, he means to “Commend it in her, commend it to you,” his hearers or readers (Bbb5r). 
Hence his strain to find in the noli me tangere as a “repulse” and “cold salutation for an Easter-
day morning” some greater comfort than an utterance that “marres all ; turnes all out and in” 
(Ccc4r). Against that potential damage, he balances Christ’s injunction to Mary to go and tell 
the other disciples of the resurrection, the foundational moment of her instantiation as 
apostola apostolorum: “the Text is like the time of the yeare : the morning somewhat fresh, but a 
faire day after : Noli me tangere, the Repulse, is the sharpe morning : Vade & dic, the welcome 
Message, the faire day (we spake of) that makes all well againe” (Ccc4v). Andrewes is close 
here to Southwell’s corrosie and cure: liturgical time comes into contact with the vividly felt 
experience of seasonal and diurnal time in the movement between the bracingly astringent 
prohibition, with its play of morning on mourning, and the warmth of Mary’s apostolic 
commission. Yet Andrewes hews close to his text, and is careful not to admit the possibility 
of actual touch into his meditation on it. For Andrewes, the “cure” is not in touch but in the 
apostolic commission itself. “Touch” for him is pure method, pure thought: the means by 
which he constructs his arguments, the generative conceptual matter from which he can 
produce his sense of what takes place in the transformation of flesh into spirit. Mary’s task 
of annunciation, analogous to the preacher’s task of interpretation, creates here a sweet 
moment of identification between Andrewes and the Magdalen. To read Andrewes through 
Augustine, one of his own Authors, I’d further suggest that this exegetical touch is an 
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embodied practice of the intimus sensus, at once an act of reading oriented toward the textual 
interior, and an intimate sensibility to the experience of that text in its literal materiality.  
As Debora Shuger expresses it, in early modern Magdalen narratives, “the movement 
from desire to enjoyment, from deferred longing to loving union, configures knowledge as 
an erotic praxis.”96 Not only diegetically, for the longing Magdalen, but also for the reader, 
whose procedure through interpretation – motivated by her own devotional desire – brings 
her into a queer kind of loving union with the text she reads. Reading, too, is an erotic praxis. 
Mary Carruthers, in her study of sweetness as a term of aesthetics in the middle ages, suggests 
– companionably with Shuger – that a sensibility of sweetness, as a “definable sensory 
phenomenon,” coordinates feeling with perception, with affect, bodily sense, and 
knowledge; bringing to a kind of aesthetic fruition the ambiguity that always resided in the 
Latin sentire.97 To feel and to know are not so dissimilar; to desire is not merely to lack but to 
move toward the sweetness of knowledge. If dilation implies an opening, the generation of 
space, of capacity, it’s the rhetorical maneuvers of prosopopoeia (and of apostrophe) that 
seek to fill and amplify that space and give it meaning, make it legible. Yet Southwell’s 
investment in Mary’s spatial and cognitive stasis – “But Mary stood alone at the sepulchre 
weeping” – stalls the time of Augustine’s futurity, Andrewes’ tactile interpretive repair, 
Shuger’s “movement.” Mary’s intensity of affect is her way of refusing to move, or to move 
on. This is in some way the answer to Southwell’s earlier question: the end to which Christ 
suspends Mary’s longings, prolongs her desires, martyrs her with delay. In the dilation of 
desire resides the time and space of exegesis. In the dilation of a gospel scene in meditative 
                                                
96 The Renaissance Bible: Scholarship, Sacrifice, and Subjectivity (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1994), 187. 
97 “Sweetness,” Speculum 81 (2006), 999. 
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prose, in the pounding of the spices of scripture, Southwell undertakes a mode of reading 
and of writing that assumes afflicted desire and feeling in long time as the very ground of 
both reading and writing. In the exegetical analogy between the senses of the ensouled body 
and the senses of scripture, reading is necessarily an embodied, phenomenal event – to read 
is to feel the thing read; feeling is in turn an act of interpretation. What, then, is Mary 
Magdalen’s desire for Christ but the reader’s desire for the text she reads? 
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III. Time as a Psalm: Anne Lock’s Recalcitrant Poetics 
 
The title of Anne Lock’s 1560 sonnet sequence provides two generic matrices through which 
to read it: A Meditation of a Penitent Sinner, Written in Manner of a Paraphrase Upon the 51. Psalme 
of David.98 As a meditation, it promises the kind of extended, dilatory dwelling that 
Southwell’s reading of John 20 offers; as a paraphrase, however, it takes up David’s voice in 
a way that promises a different kind of intimacy with the text, interpretive to be sure but 
close enough to be faithful to the voice it inhabits, to speak with that same voice. In contrast 
to Southwell’s interrogative mode, his dialogic excavation of the gospel text, Lock’s 
approach will keep her close to the surface, insisting on the text’s own terms, reluctant to 
define or justify them, content merely to repeat them – and repeat them, and repeat them, 
her own method of spice-pounding. Lock, too, dilates her text, but unlike Southwell’s 
copious elaboration, hers is a resistant poetics of reiteration, what I am calling 
“recalcitrance”: she digs in her heels. 
 Dilation and prosopopoeia thus produce in Lock a different kind of “time bind,” and 
consequently a different erotics of reading. Her twenty-six sonnets dilate the time of the 
psalm, rendering reading into form: following a five-sonnet preface “expressing the 
passioned mind of the penitent sinner,” she devotes to each verse one, occasionally two 
sonnets. The inarticulate utterance of these sonnets extends the time of David’s verse, 
dwelling in each of its movements at length. They seek in these procedures a way of coping 
                                                
98 In Sermons of John Calvin, upon the Songe that Ezechias Made, trans. Anne Lock (London: John 
Day, 1560), Ai-viii. 
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with despair by reorienting its laborious narcissism toward the submissive posture of faith –
 not a way out of bad feeling altogether, and certainly not a route to perfect cure. For Lock’s 
sequence never lays hold of the object of its desire. The feeling of grace for which it 
“groape[s] about” (2.11, 12) never arrives, and the sequence ends with the same desire – or 
“craving” in Lock’s favored term – with which it begins. It ends, in fact, with the fear that all 
its craving cries might be “in vaine” (26.14), its unanswered request for assurance to the 
contrary hanging in the silence that follows. The “FINIS” that closes this sequence is almost 
comical, so necessarily unfinished is its project.  
 Lock’s sequence is appended to her translations of four sermons by John Calvin, 
meditations on the relation between spiritual and bodily illness that emerge from his reading 
of Hezekiah’s illness and recovery in Isaiah 38. As the publisher’s note on the Meditation’s 
title page suggests, it shares an affinity with those sermons: “it wel agreth with the same 
argument.”99 Adapting the resources of Calvin’s thought in order to address herself to the 
dilemmas of despair through her reading of a penitential psalm, Lock offers a mode of 
reading that, like Mary Magdalen before the empty tomb of Christ, refuses to move on. In 
dwelling in her text, she makes dwelling in the body problematic: while as her dedicatory 
epistle says, “He […] that cureth the sicke minde, or preserveth it from disease, cureth or 
preserveth not onely minde, but bodye also” (A2v), her sonnets present such a cure as a 
much less certain outcome. Her reluctance to resolve her sequence, to lay a confident claim 
                                                
99 Sermons Air. Day’s note reads in full, “I have added this meditation folowyng unto the ende 
of this boke, not as a parcell of maister Calvines worke, but for that it wel agreth with the 
same argument, and was delivered me by my frend with whom I knew I might be so bolde 
to use & publishe as it pleased me.” Misreadings of this note as Lock’s rather than Day’s 
have contributed to an unnecessary degree of confusion challenges to Lock’s authorship of 
her sequence.  
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to the grace it seeks, I argue, presents us not only with a model of reading but with a way of 
understanding, of living with and in, spiritual and emotional disorder. 
 
(TIME AS A PSALM) 
 
In the eleventh book of the Confessions, Augustine gives an account of the nature of time.  
This is in part an apologia for the Confessions itself: “Lord, since eternity is yours,” Augustine 
begins, “are you ignorant of the things that I say to you, or do you see only at a certain time 
what is done in time? Why then do I set out in order before you this account of so many 
deeds?  [Cur ego tibi tot rerum narrationes digero?]”.100 (He persistently reiterates the conviction 
that no “confession” can be instructive to an omniscient god, but here he introduces the 
problem of order, and a new dimension of the problem emerges: not only, “why am I telling 
you this?” but also, specifically, “why have I arranged these things according to an order, a 
sequence in time?” What, in other words, is narrative temporality to timeless divinity? It is 
not only the phenomena of cognition in time that interest Augustine, though these will be 
his primary focus, but how that experience of time, that “setting out in order,” makes it 
possible to “rouse up toward you my own affections [affectum], and those of other men who 
read this (R 277; L 2.208). Whatever time is, whatever it is that happens when we experience 
time and put that experience into language, that is what makes it possible to direct 
“affectus,” affection, feeling, toward god. Affect, too, is an experience of time. 
 The problem is immense, and close to inexpressible: “What, then, is time? If no one 
asks me, I know; if I want to explain it to someone who does ask me, I do not know” (R 
287). Time is primarily an experience; we “know” what it is because we perceive a difference 
                                                
100 Confessions 11.1; The Confessions of Saint Augustine, trans. John K. Ryan (New York: Image 
Books, 1960), 277. Latin from the Loeb edition, ed. and trans. William Watts, 2 vols. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1912), 2.208. Further itations parenthetically. 
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between past, present, and future. But even to speak of “past, present, and future” is 
catachretic. Rather, “it might properly be said,” Augustine writes, “that there are three times: 
the present of things past, the present of things present, and the present of things future 
[praesens de praeteritis, praesens de praesentibus, praesens de futuris]. These three are present in the 
soul [anima]” (R 293, L 2.252). Time is a perceptual phenomenon (“in the soul”), and takes 
shape in, essentially, verb tenses: the teacher of rhetoric makes recourse to the protocols of 
grammar to mediate the vastness of the problem before him. 
 Reading, like narrative and grammar, is a concession to creaturely temporality: the 
uncreated Word is eternal, but becomes intimate with created time in its works of creation, 
and when it is incarnated in Christ, and when it is expressed through scripture: “Thus in the 
Gospel he speaks through the flesh, and this word sounded outwardly in the ears of men, so 
that it might be believed, and sought inwardly, and found in the eternal Truth” (R 283). Here 
Augustine comes close to conflating the incarnation of Christ with the utterance of the 
gospel: the sensory threshold of the flesh, like the interpretive threshold of the letter of the 
text, makes possible the approximation of intimacy with divinity in reading.  
 So, when Augustine requires a model to demonstrate how cognition copes with the 
passing of time, he turns to the phenomenal experience of a psalm:  
I am about to recite a psalm that I know. Before I begin, my expectation extends 
over the entire psalm. Once I have begun, my memory extends over as much of it as 
I shall separate off and assign to the past. The life of this action of mine is distended 
into memory by reason of the part I have spoken and into forethought by reason of 
the part I am about to speak. But attention is actually present and that which was to 
be is borne along by it so as to become past. The more this is done and done again, 
so much the more is memory lengthened by a shortening of expectation, until the 
entire expectation is exhausted. When this is done the whole action is completed and 
passes into memory. What takes place in the whole psalm takes place also in each of 
its parts and in each of its syllables. (R 301-2) 
 
 
 
81 
 
 
In the recitation of the psalm, reading becomes voicing; the figurative absorption of the 
reader by the prosopopoeic “I” literalized in at least one register. To experience time in the 
psalm is to approach the timeless word of god the only way it is possible to do so: from the 
catachresis-generating position of fallen cognition. Yet even in this understanding, Augustine 
remains unwilling to let go of a model in which time unfolds uniformly, and more or less in a 
straight line. What would it take to throw a wrench into the works? What would it take to 
resist the unfolding of time in the psalm?  
 
(SYLLABLE) 
 
Lock’s is a voice that halts, that hesitates, a stuttering voice whose recitation does not run 
smoothly on, absorbing the future through the present into the past in a continuous gesture. 
Augustine defines the present as a punctual moment with no extension:  
If any point of time is conceived that can no longer be divided into even the most 
minute parts of a moment, that alone it is which may be called the present. It flies 
with such speed from the future into the past that it cannot be extended by even a 
trifling amount. For if it is extended, it is divided into past and future. The present 
has no space. (R 289) 
 
Lock’s sonnets attempt to force the present to endure, reducing time to the syllable, the 
most minute semantic unit: “crye,” for example, and also “now.” Now, and now, and now, 
the repeated syllable that seeks to dwell at length in a single moment, reluctant to allow it to 
fulfill its tendency toward “non-being.” But this is at the same time a present without 
presence; the repetition of the syllable cannot effectuate and can scarcely even demand what 
it desires. 
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 Lock’s dilatory method emphasizes the way that, in Augustine’s terms, what happens 
in the whole psalm happens also in each of its parts – each verse expanding into an entire 
sonnet, which sometimes interprets the verse and sometimes departs from it, but often, and 
most interestingly to me, simply reiterates its terms, pounding out its language in a repetitive 
lexicon of hard Germanic monosyllables that exert a frictional drag on the time of the psalm. 
She performs her commitment to monosyllables in the very terms she uses to describe the 
sonnets’ mode of utterance: the “oft-repeted grone,” or, frequently, a “crye,” repeated over 
and over, “crye and crye againe.” If it is a “confused crye” (5.3), that may be all to the good 
– the real fear is that it may turn out to be “vaine,” a “not availyng crye” (4.11), as a despair-
infected conscience argues it is. Yet in the continuous present of the soul’s peril, the cry 
continues – “in present perill to be lost” (4.8), in the seventh sonnet the “crye” extends its 
now across a line-break and between quatrains, seeking to sustain the radical present of the 
voicing of desperation: “now in peril and in present fere, / I crye” (7.4-5).  
 This desire to sustain the present of a single utterance extends itself into the poems” 
mode of reading, as they pound out single words of the psalm, sounding them again and 
again – often as monosyllables, as in the relentless repetition of “wash” in the eighth sonnet, 
on the verse, “Washe me yet more from my wickednes, and clense me from my sinne”:  
So foule is sinne and lothesome in thy sighte, 
So foule with sinne I see my selfe to be,  
That till from sinne I may be washed white,  
So foule I dare not, Lorde, approche to thee.  
Ofte hath thy mercie washed me before,  
Thou madest me cleane: but I am foule againe.  
Yet washe me Lorde againe, and washe me more,  
Washe me, O Lord, and do away the staine 
Of vggly sinnes that in my soule appere.  
Let flow thy ple[n]tuous streames of clensing grace.  
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Washe me againe, yea washe me euery where,  
Both leprous bodie and defiled face.  
Yea washe me all, for I am all vncleane.  
And from my sin, Lord, cleanse me ones againe.  
 
The poem begins by situating itself in time – a subjunctive anticipation of a possible future 
in the third line, an assured present perfect in the fifth – but then it invests in the imperatives 
of the present, repeating again and again the psalm’s own plea and adding little of 
interpretive or glossatory value, and nothing like resolution or forward movement. The 
poem wants to stay in the little now of the syllable, the minutest unit. (Read it aloud: it is 
overwhelmingly composed of monosyllables.) Rather than seek to explicate or comprehend 
the sense of “wash” in this context, the sonnet registers in repetition a desire to sustain the 
present of a single utterance. The same could be said for “foule,” for “sinne,” for the 
relation between all three of these terms. Pounding out the single word of the psalm both 
seeks to release its full significance and threatens to unmake meaning altogether, washing the 
word clean out of its proper sense, so that it becomes mere sound – or perhaps not mere at 
all. Reiteration materializes wash, sounds it out so fully that it becomes more like action than 
a word, onomatopoetically imitating the cleansing it articulates as the object of desire. And 
more: the gentleness of “wash” becomes abrasive in anxious repetition, an obsessive kind of 
excoriation. That mimetic rendering is itself a way of understanding desire – the pleasure 
here, if you can call it that, is not in the washing but the wanting of it. 
 
(SONNET) 
 
The sixth sonnet, which opens the sequence proper following the five prefatory poems, 
theorizes this mode of repetition as a means of registering the mechanics of despairing 
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desire: on the first verse of David’s psalm, “Have mercie upon me (O my God) after thy 
great mercy,” Lock writes:  
Have mercy, God, for thy great mercies sake,    
O God: my God, unto my shame I say, 
Beynge fled from thee, so as I dred to take 
Thy name in wretched mouth, and feare to pray 
    Or aske the mercy that I have abused. 
But, God of mercy, let me come to thee: 
Not for justice, that justly am accusde:  
Which selfe word Justice so amaseth me, 
That scarce I dare thy mercy sound againe, 
But mercie, Lord, yet suffer me to crave. 
Mercie is thine: Let me not crye in vaine, 
Thy great mercie for my great fault to have. 
Have mercie, God, pitie my penitence 
With greater mercie than my great offence. 
 
It reads like an account of an approach-avoidance conflict. The plea for mercy, then the 
retreat from it into dread and fear of that very plea. Then the approach again – “let me come 
to thee” – and again retreat: “scarce I dare thy mercy sound againe.” Yet however scarcely 
daring, the sonnet repeats the word “mercy” ten times – sounding it again and again, in both 
senses of speaking it aloud and testing its depth. As in the eighth sonnet, repetition 
materializes the word while always rendering it as a kind of fearful reticence that expresses a 
desire to remain at the threshold of desire: “mercie, lord, yet suffer me to crave.” Not to have, 
but to crave – seeking not presence or possession but craving, desire itself, so that the poem is 
an account not of desire’s progression toward seizure of its object, but of the continuous 
experience of a crying that is also a craving. Craving and crying are bound together by 
alliteration and by formal and syntactic parallel: “yet suffer me to crave” / “let me not crye in 
vaine.” The inarticulate monosyllabic voicing of want registers the relationship between 
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“sounding” and “scarcely daring” as the entire subject of the poem. The reluctance to sound 
remains in tension with the refusal to stop sounding – the “oft-repeted grone” that re-
renders David’s prosopopeias (as Sidney calls the Psalms)101 as a voice at once insistent and 
incoherent in its repeated emphasis on a limited bank of terms.  
 Meanwhile, the logic of the poem disregards the formal divisions of its rhyme 
scheme. While it concludes with a syntactically discrete couplet that more or less restates the 
verse, providing a kind of summation, the poem’s movement of approach and retreat, 
approach and retreat, is out of sync with the units of quatrain, octave, and sestet. Like many 
of the poems in the sequence, it defies the kind of reading we’ve been taught to perform 
(and teach our students to perform) in our inheritance of the sonnet tradition. This  logical 
disobedience to form performs the tension it describes, the speaker’s reluctance to lay claim 
to utterance competing with the irreducible necessity of prayer. This sonnet’s expression of a 
wholly submissive mode of desire thus encodes itself as a poetics of recalcitrance not only in 
the single word but in the logical mechanics of the poem as a whole. What takes place in 
each of the sonnet’s parts takes place also in the whole sonnet, to paraphrase Augustine.  
 Dwelling in the monosyllable, and resisting in retreating logic the propulsive force of 
form, become acts of recalcitrant reading that resist the ordinary unfolding of time. 
Demonstrating that neither time nor reading can be measured as a linear or continuous 
forward movement, Lock’s sonnets prefer to stand still rather than move on. The sonnet and 
the psalm are in a tense temporal relationship in this regard, the sonnet producing a formal 
alternative to the psalm’s continuity. Or rather, the sonnet proposes a method of reading the 
psalm that acknowledges the inadequacy of a model of continuity to devotional reading.  
                                                
101 Philip Sidney, The Defence of Poesy (London: William Ponsonby, 1595), B4v. 
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(SEQUENCE) 
 
The sequence is broken out of its retrenchment in the present of reading by an interpretive 
crisis: the purging hyssop of the seventh verse cannot be left to its material literalism; it 
requires the interpretive gesture of typology to make adequate use of it. So, in the fourteenth 
sonnet, for the first time the sequence must cope with time on a grand scale: 
With swete Hysope besprinkle thou my sprite:  
Not such hysope, nor so besprinkle me, 
As law unperfect shade of perfect lyght 
Did use as an apointed signe to be 
Foreshewing figure of thy grace behight.  
With death and bloodshed of thine only sonne, 
The swete hysope, cleanse me defyled wyght.  
Sprinkle my soule. And when thou so haste done, 
Bedeawd with droppes of mercy and of grace, 
I shalbe cleane as cleansed of my synne. 
Ah wash me, Lord: for I am foule alas:  
That only canst, Lord, wash me well within, 
Wash me, O Lord: when I am washed soe, 
I shalbe whiter than the whitest snowe. 
 
Suddenly, impelled by the necessity of the text, this poem introduces movement in multiple 
tenses. “Not such hyssop” : abjuring the literal past of the law along with the literal sense of 
the verse, the sequence’s characteristic present-tense imperatives (as well as those of the 
psalm itself) are reimagined as the figurative fulfillment of the old letter in the call for 
purification in Christ’s sacrifice (6-8). And at last, a future comes into view: the I shall be of 
the psalm becomes an even more radical future in the terms of Christian soteriology, a 
homely little auxiliary calling on nothing less than salvation. Of course, this future is also 
provisional, even grammatically: the future tenses that close out the poem are mainly 
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perfects, and when they are simple they are heavily predicated. The complex clausal 
subordination of the sonnet’s final sentence reveals the contingency of any projection of a 
purified future. If this sequence has a turning point, it is here. This sonnet and the ensuing 
ones depart from the text of the psalm in their interpretive maneuvers, creating new 
possibilities and reaching toward not only their own futures but a complete conception of 
salvational history. And it is perhaps this turn that enables the sequence to invest in the 
eloquence required of the voice that emerges in the psalm’s promise to teach, to preach and 
to praise. From its early reticence, reluctance, and retrenchment, the sequence opens into 
scenes of potential in a newly empowered voice. “Lo,” reads sonnet 20, “I shall preach the 
justice of thy law: / By mercy saved, thy mercy I shall tell”; the 21st concludes, “God of my 
health, from bloud I saved so, / Shall spred thy prayse for all the word to know.” The self-
excoriation of the early poems in which “despair before my ruthefull eye / Spredes forth my 
sinne & shame” (3.3-4) is transformed into an outwardly-oriented eloquence that “spreads 
praise,” punning on a relation between praise as gospel, as the preaching of good news, and 
praise as epideixis, the rhetorical mode inherited through a long poetic tradition. The present 
of the utterance and its salvific future are sutured together in the time of the voicing of these 
promises. Not insignificantly in poems by a woman, they also lay a powerful claim to the 
prerogative of preaching. 
 Yet the final poems retreat into a renewed sense of incapacity: “My speache doth 
faile to utter thee my smart” (22.4). Even the pangs of despair cannot be spoken, let alone 
discarded in favor of a more graceful utterance. “I can not pray … Ne can I rise” (22.9-10). 
Not, in any case, without the prevenient “movyng ayde” of God (22.9). Throughout, the 
sonnets’ refusal to move has been configured as a need to be moved. Even the final sonnets, 
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with their eschatological reach (25) and typological reimagining of sacrifice (26), return at last 
to the craven, craving place of the prefatory sonnets in the sequence’s very last lines: 
“Restore my feling of thy grace againe: / Assure my soule, I crave it not in vaine” (26.13-14). 
This terminal couplet insists one last time on the reiterative structure of feelings of grace –
 againe, again. Closing on the lingering possibility of vanity, it remains unassured, either 
content to remain or by necessity remaining in the submissive pose of desire. “Restore … 
again”: and again, and again. The psalm, after all, will not be read only once. The poems, like 
the psalm, anticipate their own revoicing, the reiteration of their acts of reading, and in 
reading the continual reenactment of their recalcitrance in hermeneutic and soteriological 
time.  
 
(INARTICULACY, OR: SPEECH IN THE FLESH PRISON) 
 
The resistance to the unfolding of time encoded in Lock’s repetitive monosyllables and the 
recursive disobedient logical procedure of her sonnets is also a resistance to the protocols of 
rhetoric. Lock’s attitude toward eloquence is that of Calvin in the sermons she translates –
 one dimension of how the sequence “well agreth,” in Day’s terms, with the “argument” of 
the sermons. In his sermon on Hezekiah’s confused cries, Calvin observes with delicious 
irony that “to make an arte of Rhethorick of the praiers of the faithful, it is a great abuse” 
(D2r): abusio, a term proper to rhetoric, turned against rhetoric. Calvin urges that the devout 
resist the temptation to believe that because they cannot pray eloquently, they are alienated 
from god: “When [we] shall fele [ourselves] in suche troble that [we] can not bring forth one 
worde to pray to God … at the least, let us chatter, that is to say, let us cast forth grones and 
sighes.” Grone, sigh: Lock adapts Calvin’s mellifluous French lexicon (gémissement, soupir) to her 
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so-English monosyllables, the grone that characterizes the recalcitrant repetitive utterance of 
her sequence.102 Though we be “so wrapped in, and tangled,” her translation of Calvin 
assures us, “that we cannot bring forth one perfect sentence, so that men also understand 
not what we would say, yet God will hear us well enough” (D2r-v). (Let that comfort you in 
dark hours of writing.) 
 Characterized as inarticulate, however ironic that may be in such wrought utterances 
as these sonnets, they thus call on this special amenity of disabled speech to devotional 
feeling. And Lock makes clear that the inarticulate is not only the domain of speech, but an 
interpretive method. Her cries and grones describe not only the sonnets” mode of utterance, 
but their means of approach to the psalm – not glossing or excavating its meaning, but 
repeating its key words again and again, a chattering kind of reading. Time in the psalm on 
Augustine’s model is broken open, the “perfect sentence” of his grammar of temporality 
fractured, by Lock’s oft-repeted groan, in an activity that presents itself as passivity, a 
technical acuity that presents itself as inarticulate, incapable, confused (her term and Calvin's).  
 It is this acuity that enables Lock to find her way through the central problem of 
despair: that it is a feeling – and so is grace. For Calvin (in the Institutes), the confidence of 
true faith is a “peasable quietnesse,” yet even “the faythfull have a perpetuall stryfe with their 
owne distrustfulnesse, far from setlynge their consciences.” At the same time, “the reprobate 
are sometime moved with the same feeling that the elect are, so that in their own judgment they 
are nothing different from the electe” (my emphasis).103 The problem ensues that if despair is 
a feeling, it poses an irresolvable dilemma of discernment: how to transmute feeling into 
                                                
102 Sermons de Jehan Calvin sur le cantique que fait le bon roy Ezechias (Geneva: François 
Estienne for Estienne Robinet, 1562), c.iiii. 
103 Institutes 3.2.17; all citations from The Institution of Christian Religion, trans. Thomas Norton 
(London: Reinolde Wolfe and Richard Harison, 1561). 
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knowledge. How is the troubled soul to know the source of her trouble? Is she in that 
“epitome of hell,” as Robert Burton calls it, the spiritual death that creeps backward into the 
living body, or is she merely stranded in the doubtful prison of the flesh?104 
For Calvin, the incoherent language of prayer that is incomprehensible to men but 
fully available to God emerges from a broader investment in Pauline models of the body and 
of language. In the Hezekiah sermons, the business of utterance is intimately bound up with 
the problems of illness and death, both of the mortal body, in some sense always ill, and 
concerning the more urgent matter of afflictions of the soul. The inarticulate utterance is 
located at a site where problems of interpretation and expression meet problems of 
embodiment: the imminence of death emerges as the immanence of mortality in language. 
Calvin’s citation of Romans 8 begins to make this clear: “For we knowe that everie creature 
groneth with us also, and travaileth in paine together unto this present. And not onely the 
creature, but we also which have the first frutes of the Spirit, even we do sigh in our selves, 
waiting for the adopcion, even the redemption of our bodie” (Rom. 8:22-3 [Geneva]). For 
Paul, to be intimate with bodily death as the condition of faith in life in the spirit – to 
“mortifie the dedes of the bodie by the Spirit” (Rom. 8:13) – is to be available to the 
inspiration that results in this groaning and sighing: “we knowe not what to praie as we oght: 
but the Spirit it self maketh request for us with sighs, which can not be expressed” (Rom 
8:26). In Hezekiah’s anguished affliction, Calvin confronts this central problem of dwelling 
in a body that is always dying, always marked by death: that “we know what is our true being: 
not to dwel in this world,” in this body (B3v). For the believer, being in the body is always an 
experience of alienation: “while we live by faith we are as it were absent from God” (B4r). 
                                                
104 Anatomy of Melancholy (New York: New York Review Books, 2001), 1242. 
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Calvin here cites one of the key texts of the sermons, 2 Corinthians 5, in which Paul 
acknowledges that we “love rather to remove out of the bodie, and to dwell with the Lord” 
(2 Cor. 5:8). Another of Calvin’s pet texts, Romans 7, describes “the bodie of this death” 
(Rom 7:24) as a prison from which we long for release. 
 This longing for escape from the prison of the flesh poses a serious problem: “we 
have occasion to desire it,” Calvin writes, and “to lament our life, not in way of despeir, but 
bicause we ought to hate and abhore sin. We ought also to desire God to draw us out of this 
so miserable captivitie wherein we ar, as s. Paul sheweth us his example” (B3v, with marginal 
citation of Rom. 7). Not in way of despeir: Calvin simultaneously acknowledges and declines to 
resolve the central dilemma: what is the difference between faithful yearning toward God 
and sinful despairing suicidality? The difficulty posed here by living in the body is that the 
opposite of despair is not tranquility; grace too is a condition of “miserable captivitie.” If, to 
the degree that faith entails the expectation of an eventual return home to dwelling with god, 
such yearning might be termed “hope,” from within the body of death hope in such a form 
will still feel like the desolation of exile, alienation, absence.  
 Lock’s poems find their way through this problem of knowledge, discernment, true 
faith, and grace through acts of reading characterized as self-excoriation. In the third sonnet, 
“despeir before my ruthefull eye / Spredes forth my sinne & shame” (3.3-4), performing the 
same work of disclosure that conscience does in the tenth sonnet, where “with sharpned 
knife” it “Doth splat my ripped hert, and jayes abrode / The lothesome secretes of my filthy 
life” (10.9-11). The difference is that conscience displays the filth of the soul’s interior 
“before the face of God” (10.12) while the circuit of despair is wholly narcissistic – despair 
speaks in its own voice, but the circle of address is limited to the self-involved consciousness 
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of the speaker. This is the trap that the sonnets seek to escape, and the only way out of the 
self-involved bind of desperate thinking is through submission to the text of scripture. In 
Lock’s sequence, reading rendered into form does the work of the knife of conscience: in 
intimate collaboration, hermeneutics and poetics become the sharp instruments that lay the 
despairing heart open in the movement of penitential desire toward not fulfillment but 
exposure. What’s especially striking about the image of the knife that lays the heart open is 
that it is superficially indistinguishable from suicide; to dismiss the resemblance as merely 
metaphorical would be to avoid confronting the dilemma of discernment posed by the 
relation between the feeling of despair and the feeling of true faith. 
 For Calvin, “the knowledge of fayth standeth rather in certaintie than in 
comprehending,” that is, confidence in discernment (3.2.14). But to the degree that there is 
any confidence in Lock’s sequence, it is not so much a firm assurance as a total giving over, 
not passive but submissive – not only to god but to his text, to the text of the psalm that 
exerts all the apparent agency of the sequence.  Erotic abjection, coded through self-
excoriation, is the devotional posture that makes it possible to cope with the loathesomeness 
of dwelling in the flesh. And it is also a theory of reading: what it feels like to be topped by 
scripture. 
 
(LITERARY HISTORY) 
 
In one of the most serious critical treatments Lock has received, Roland Greene argues that 
Lock’s mode of dilating the psalm is both a specifically Calvinist and a specifically feminine 
approach that “refuses invention,” in the modern sense of creativity and originality, to the 
degree that her poems become “virtually illegible” on the terms of literary history, and 
indeed demand redefining the terms of that history in order to recognize her as a point of 
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origin of English devotional poetics.105  Yet he nevertheless produces a reading that depends 
to an astonishing degree on two intimately related sets of assumptions: one straightforwardly 
misogynist, the other literary-historical. I hope this claim will be obviously outrageous in its 
casual misogyny: “[Lock’s] is a poetics of female-gendered textual reproduction more than 
male-gendered creation, of enlargement more than originality, and provides an alternative to 
the dominant tradition of poetic writing in English” (155). Got it? Women reproduce; men 
create. With no wish to excuse Greene from responsibility for such an antediluvian gesture, I 
do want to call attention to how easily it emerges from any account of the “dominant 
tradition” to which Greene offers Lock as a counterexample. 
Greene writes that Lock’s sequence “refuses invention,” by which he means that 
“this poem [sic] expands its model [the psalm] twelvefold while struggling to say almost 
nothing new,” rather than innovating on the psalm, as Wyatt or Mary Sidney creates “an 
adaptation that is original in some way” (158). That is, he equates “invention” with at least 
some degree of “originality.” This refusal of originality is explicitly gendered: “Working with 
a scriptural original, one of the first female poets to be published in English will likely have a 
much less proprietary hold on invention than these secular male poets [Wyatt, Gascoigne, et 
al.] – and of course, they are the real precursors of the double-edged view propounded by 
Herbert,” in which invention accompanies fidelity to divinity (161). (He appears to have 
forgotten by now his own gesture to Mary Sidney.) The gendered view of the female author 
who is – naturally, unremarkably – incapable of the work a set of male poets spanning a 
                                                
105 “Anne Lock’s Meditation : Invention Versus Dilation and the Founding of Puritan 
Poetics,” in Form and Reform in Renaissance England: Essays in Honor of Barbara Kiefer Lewalski, 
eds. Amy Boesky and Mary Thomas Crane (London: Associated University Presses, 2000), 
153-171. Further citations parenthetically. A lightly adapted version of this essay also appears 
in the chapter on “Invention” in Greene’s recent Five Words: Critical Semantics in the Age of 
Shakespeare and Cervantes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 15-40. 
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hundred years are heirs to thus lightly assumes a given developmental narrative of English 
poetics. Yet Greene begs the question, assuming first that his definition of invention as 
roughly equivalent to originality is appropriate to the period and the poetics under 
consideration, and further assuming the givenness of a trajectory of literary history that is in 
fact contingent, conditioned by five hundred years of reception, scholarship, and academic 
institutionalization. His premises are in fact back-formations: invention becomes originality 
when viewed from the vantage of modernity, the same vantage that allows us to assume that 
a developmental narrative that runs easily from Wyatt to Herbert is in the first place accurate 
and in the second place was always inevitable. The gendered claim thus emerges as heavily 
overdetermined. Greene is not saying something true about Anne Lock; he is recapitulating a 
prefabricated literary historiography.  
Greene characterizes Lock as an exception to literary history, as a curious and 
curiously feminized anomaly lying outside it; at the end of his essay he then suggests a means 
of reinscribing her into a different lineage: citing Milton and Taylor, he observes that “every 
reformed poet who thinks of poems as material to be disposed for penitence or praise, 
rather than as the tokens of individual experience, owes something to her astonishingly early 
encounter with these alternatives,” and Lock becomes “an important episode in the incipient 
history of Protestant poetics” (167). In a similarly recuperative vein, Kim Coles’ reading of 
Lock confronts the misogynist critical tradition that seeks to exclude her, that is, confronts 
the misogynist claims that undergird the logic of exceptionality, by insisting on Lock’s 
influence within the existing tradition.106 That is, in an intently feminist project, Coles 
reproduces the very literary history that makes such a recuperative project necessary to begin 
                                                
106 Religion, Reform, and Women’s Writing in Early Modern England (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008).  
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with. In this structural sense, if only in this sense, her feminist literary history is identical to 
Greene’s misogynist one. But what is important about these sonnets lies not in their 
influence but something like their failure to influence: in their habits of figuration and argument, 
they point away from the sonnet tradition as we know it. Lock’s approach in the Meditation is 
precisely inventional, in the properly historicized sense of the word: she “finds” her matter 
in the psalm itself. Greene’s reluctance to see such invention as a “creative” act neglects the 
central irony of the sonnets’ art: the highly wrought utterance that characterizes itself as 
inarticulate, the procedure in reading that would prefer not to proceed. Lock’s recalcitrance 
provides a productive friction not only to the temporality of reading, in which it slows down 
and dilates Augustine’s inexorable temporal mechanics, but to the narrative of literary 
history. She interrupts the easy unfolding of the genealogical line from Wyatt to Herbert, and 
to take her seriously requires that we reconsider our received ideas about the tradition we in 
turn have inherited. Such a reconsideration would not revise the canon by resituating Lock 
within that genealogical line, positing her as a progenitor for Donne and Herbert or for 
Milton and Taylor (another kind of reproductivity), but rather might require the imagining of 
an alternative history that isn’t, the genealogy that failed to unfold. I am interested in what 
that alternative history might have to teach us about our reading practices.  
 
(IMPASSE // CREATIVITY) 
 
 
It may require Aemilia Lanyer, the subject of my next chapter, to demonstrate what might be 
particularly feminist about recalcitrance, what makes it a productive model for women in 
particular, critiques of (hetero)patriarchy in particular. For now I’d like to turn to what Lock 
offers to reading in the contemporary academy. Lock’s recalcitrant poetics might have any 
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number of things to teach us: about how we read poetry, about how we think about the 
relation between form and feeling, about how we encode our encounters with the texts we 
read in our own rhetorical gestures and formal maneuvers. I’d like to turn these possibilities 
toward another: what Lock’s wrangling with the problems of spiritual disorder might have to 
offer to thinking through, or with, emotional disorder.  
Ann Cvetkovich’s recent book, Depression: A Public Feeling, half memoir and half 
cultural studies essay, makes an affirming case for bringing the emotional experiences of 
what I’ll call (though she, importantly, doesn’t) mental illness into the sphere of intellectual 
labor. As she describes it, her book is “about how to live a better live by embracing rather 
than glossing over bad feelings. […] It asks how it might be possible to tarry with the 
negative as a part of daily practice, cultural production, and political activism.”107 Where I 
find her especially useful in thinking about depression as not only the object but the subject 
of that labor is in her construction of depression as an “impasse” through which the only 
path is what she calls “creativity.” But what she means by creativity is not its usual sense of 
original, individual artistic inspiration and genius, but the banal movement through the 
everyday: doing the dishes as an act of self-repair (or, as it is in my own life, more often an 
act of rebellion). “Creativity,” that is, in a sense much closer to that of inventio as “finding”:  
With its spatial connotations of being at a “dead end”or “no exit,”impasse captures 
the notion of depression as a state of being “stuck,”of not being able to figure out 
what to do or why to do it.  […] Defined in relation to notions of blockage or 
impasse, creativity can be thought of as a form of movement, movement that 
maneuvers the mind inside or around an impasse, even if that movement sometimes 
seems backward or like a form of retreat. […] My goal in exploring the relation 
between depression and academic careers is thus to create more space for creative 
thought, for whatever it is that provides more pleasure or happiness, even if its 
                                                
107 Depression: A Public Feeling (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012), 3.  
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immediate professional or social gains are not obvious. More space for “creativity” 
also means a higher tolerance for “impasse,” which is sometimes the only route to 
new thinking […]. If we can come to know each other through our depression, then 
perhaps we can use it to make forms of sociability that not only move us forward 
past our moments of impasse but understand impasse itself to be a state that has 
productive potential.108 
 
Cvetkovich’s turn to the language of “cure,” “happiness,” “productivity,” and “movement” 
seems to be at least as much an index of the poverty of our vocabulary for surviving in bad 
feeling as it is the naïve optimism it resembles. As my reading of Lock and Calvin perhaps 
indicates, I am much more hesitant to use such terms, even as placeholders, than Cvetkovich 
is here. If the opposite of despair is not hope but a means of coping with the condition of 
alienation that is dwelling in the body, I might say that the opposite of depression is not 
happiness but a means of coping with the condition of stuckness. (I think Cvetkovich would 
agree with that, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding.) To see what the consequences 
of such coping might be for reading, I’d like to take up her suggestion of “impasse” as its 
own model of thought, one that carries a kind of radical alternative to the interpretive and 
institutional procedures in which we have all been brought up. I have described how for 
Lock, inarticulacy and repetition are the mechanisms by which reading and writing might lay 
the soul open before god, not move toward grace but provide the means of dwelling in the 
craving space anterior to it; in its ironic rhetorical investment in reluctance and incapacity to 
speak, it has an intimate resonance with Cvetkovich’s “creativity.”  
A much more contemporary sonnet, Isabel Cole’s “sonnet, which unfortunately will 
not fit on a post-it note,” more explicitly renders this daily kind of creativity into form:  
                                                
108 Cvetkovich, 20-23. 
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Wash every dish and empty out the rack. 
Fold or hang each garment with the care 
that it prefers. Tell yourself the air 
is sweet to your skin. Exercise the knack 
which you attempted to abandon. Crack 
an egg and eat what it becomes. Wear 
a pendant. Clean the bathtub. Wash your hair. 
Drink water. Leave your bed. Do not go back. 
 
Remember all the soggy, blurred-out days. 
Remember what you know: this is such stuff 
as life is made on, which could pass you by 
again, which has devised so many ways 
to leave you. Make that memory be enough. 
It won’t be. It may never be. Try.109 
 
Like Lock’s readings of the psalm, Cole’s poem is designed to be repeated, the imperatives 
registering an iterative kind of daily list-making. It won’t fit on a post-it, so say it to yourself 
to remember (“Remember … Remember”) how to move through your home, because 
though theoretically “you know,” you do forget, and then having remembered, forget again. 
Its imperatives flirt with the risk of trite advice, but held back by heavy enjambment – verbs 
in the octave creeping ever closer to the end of the line – they become a kind of tired self-
talk, the work of hauling oneself into the small acts of a day rendered as the work of hauling 
oneself across a line-break. Their monosyllables recall Lock’s; the three sentences of the 
eighth line especially measuring out a movement that can scarcely be called that – if leaving 
the bed and not going back is a monumental act of will, the measure of these monosyllables 
belies it. And desire, as such, never even enters in – unless it is in the self-cancelling longing 
to go back to bed. 
                                                
109 Like Day, I’ll say that this sonnet was delivered me by a friend with whom I knew I might 
be so bolde to use & publishe as it pleased me. 
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This is not quite the knife of conscience, but it is a depression poem that does not 
believe in cure: the terminal “Try,” with its understanding of the never-enoughness of the 
sestet’s reminders, comes in an unknowable tone. Or rather a variable one: its mood depends 
on the reader’s.  I have repeated this sonnet, in any case, on many soggy, blurred-out days. 
Every time I fold my laundry: a deep breath, and “fold or hang each garment,” I say to 
myself, or wryly to the cat, knowing I’m being too literal but needing the act of folding 
laundry to stand in for figuration. When life devises ways to leave you, the poem suggests, 
the only response is to remain in the present of a self-talking not-quite-movement through 
the most banal kind of creativity.  
It strikes me that Lock, Cvetkovich, and Cole between them gesture to a space in 
which it might become more possible to be honest about the conditions under which our 
work proceeds, in terms of our attachments to the texts we read, our procedures in reading 
them, and our relationships to the historical time in which we are with them. In the first 
chapter of her book, following the memoir, Cvetkovich seeks in early Christian acedia an 
analogue to modern depression; I would like to follow her in this maneuver, taking up her 
suggestion that the “resources of history might be at least as generative as new pills and 
medical diagnoses.’110 Cvetkovich suggests that Cassian’s fourth-century monastic writing on 
acedia “might be relevant for understanding contemporary depression, not necessarily 
because acedia and depression are the same, but because their unexpected juxtaposition 
produces insights about contemporary practices of contemplation and action that unsettle 
received wisdom about depression as a medical condition.’111 While I have a different – less 
openly hostile, more compromised, more contradictory – relation to the medical model of 
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mental illness than Cvetkovich does, not least in being willing to call it illness, I value her 
commitment to seeking in the past ways of being in emotional disorder. Isabel’s sonnet is 
one such investment in the resources of (literary) history: writing in a deep poetic tradition in 
order to address herself to the present, a present that like Lock’s has a sensibility of a future 
without being willing to project anything into it, her crisp imperative articulations are a little 
haunted, a little ironized, archaized, by the formal maneuvers of the sonnet. 
If I have a correction to offer to Cvetkovich’s reading, it’s in her dismissal of early 
modernity as a generative site: “The Renaissance construction of melancholy as creative is 
accompanied by its secularization. […] Even alteritist models that embrace melancholy’s 
negativity tend to be secular, and one potential value of turning to acedia rather than 
melancholy to historicize depression and political feelings is to explore whether its sacred 
and religious dimensions can be useful rather than a liability.’112 Not entirely her fault: she 
accepts the conventional “continuist histories” of melancholy offered by scholars since at 
least Panofsky, in which melancholy takes on a positive gloss as the figure of male creative 
genius—creativity on an order that would exclude Cvetkovich’s (and, I’d argue, Lock’s) 
model. But when we understand the early modern period as the halcyon moment of 
secularization, we risk losing the resources of its sacred traditions. This is another way of 
accounting for the way Lock’s sequence is constantly at risk of slipping out of view or being 
denied its place in our reading: it defies any easy secularization narrative that would evacuate 
god from the sonnet tradition. (To account for why Donne’s or Milton’s devotional sonnets 
have not encountered this problem, we need only return to the casual assumptions of 
Greene’s essay.) And when we understand melancholy as the sine qua non of Renaissance 
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understandings of emotional disorder, we risk losing models like Lock’s that sit uneasily with 
that much earlier medical model. 
Cvetkovich also offers an alternative to the usual understanding of the relation 
between early theology and our critical present, in which the sacred and the premodern are 
always a prehistory of something else, instructive to the degree that they help us to 
understand “secular” “modernity.” I want to ask, what other ways of being with the past 
than imagining ourselves as its unfolded future might emerge from a study of a work like 
Lock’s? In the era of surface reading and big data, what might we learn about our own 
critical practice from her readerly recalcitrance? What might her self-excoriating way of 
suturing reading to writing provide us toward recuperating the features of reparative reading 
that are neither nice nor comfortable? And what politics does she offer? What kind of a 
wrench might she help us to throw into the works of a profession that conditions our 
reading to be as forward-moving as are the institutional protocols of productivity? These 
questions will, I imagine, remain open for some time. For now what I know is that Lock has 
borne me company in my own impasse, has encouraged me to be more submissive in my 
interpretive gestures, less concerned with mastery, and perhaps most importantly, as another 
friend who is currently at work on a depression sonnet sequence put it, awed by her first 
reading of Lock, “She gives me permission to be still.” 
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IV. Precarious Typology:  
Aemilia Lanyer and the Poetics of Failure 
 
 
For some time it has been a central tenet of queer literay historiography that an investment 
in the pleasure of the past, in the affects associated with attachment to, desire for, love of 
past objects, with touching those objects, produces a queer relationship to time. Carla 
Freccero and Aranye Fradenburg argued in their watershed introduction to Premodern 
Sexualities in 1996 “both that contemporary thinking has enormous relevance to the study of 
past pleasures and that study of past pleasures can in some cases powerfully address or reframe 
contemporary practices and problems.” The circuit of pleasure between past and present 
works to produce a second-order pleasure in the very temporality of this study: “The past 
may not be the present, but it is sometimes in the present, haunting, even if only through our 
uncertain knowledges of it, our hopes of surviving and living well.” The future-orientation of 
“hope” – the claim we can make on the future by means of the past that haunts us in the 
present – secures Fradenburg and Freccero’s method as “work to affirm the pleasures of 
mortal creatures.” 113 Carolyn Dinshaw, most prominently, has continued this line of 
thought, first in Getting Medieval (1999) and quite recently in How Soon Is Now? (2012), where 
she commits to the “queer potential” of “time itself” in a study of medievalist amateurism, 
                                                
113 ‘Introduction: Caxton, Foucault, and the Pleasures of History,’ in Premodern Sexualities, eds. 
Fradenburg and Freccero (New York: Routledge, 1996), xxi. Emphases on ‘pleasure’ mine. 
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with emphasis on amare. Love of the past object is what secures it in the now; what 
motivates the “wondrous, marvelous” queerness of time.114 
But what if the past is not a site of pleasure, or if past pleasure itself registers as loss?  
The concluding poem of Aemilia Lanyer’s 1611 volume Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum, “The 
Description of Cooke-ham” is, most basically, a lament. The interest of its unusual feminized 
pastoral and its interest in women’s readership, not to mention the intensity of its eroticism, 
sometimes occlude the simple availability of its nostalgic sorrow for a lost world. Its most 
frequent terms are injunctions to memory to preserve what cannot come again; its refrain is 
“pleasures past,” insisting not only on the pleasure that has passed, but on the irreducible 
pastness of pleasure. The poem’s nostalgic mode registers loss and failure in a way that 
remains obscure to us so long as we train our focus on sites of positive agency and positive 
affect. As Heather Love has observed in a beautiful revision of Stephen Greenblatt’s 
infamous declaration of desire, “The effort to recapture the past is doomed from the start. 
To reconstruct the past, we build on ruins; to bring it to life, we chase after the fugitive 
dead.’115 For Love, the disposition of the queer literary historian is one of doomed longing, 
doubly doomed by the gulf of time and by cultural impediments to queer desire of all kinds: 
“While contact with the dead is impossible, queer history is marked by a double 
impossibility: we will never possess the dead; our longing for them is also marked by the 
historical impossibility of same-sex desire.’116 
                                                
114 How Soon Is Now? : Medieval Texts, Amateur Readers, and the Queerness of Time 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2012), 4. 
115 Love, Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics of Queer History (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2007), 8. 
116 Ibid., 21.  
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With Love, I identify loss and failure as necessary sites for queer reading. Loss is a 
problem likewise proper to the study of premodern women’s writing – as Jennifer Summit 
has argued, the place of the woman writer in the English canon has been constituted in and 
through figures of loss since the canon’s very inception.117 I suggest that our task is less to 
resuscitate or recuperate the lost or the failed than it is to develop a mode of reading that can 
sustain investment in those devastated sites themselves. In this chapter I return to the 
questions I posed to Sedgwick’s essay on the reparative in my introduction: what is the status 
of the reparative when its object is loss or failure, when it can be neither ameliorative nor, in 
the most straightforward sense, pleasurable? What happens when the reparative encounters 
the irreparable?  
Love approaches the problem by addressing herself to the queer poetics of loss in 
those moments when “texts […] resist our advances.’118 Her concern is with queer literary 
figures who refuse – to be brought into the fold of a narrative of progress, to be used as 
exempla, even to cooperate with critical desires to understand them in the modern terms of 
queerness at all. Aemilia Lanyer does not turn her back on the critic who approaches her –
 quite to the contrary, she strenuously reaches for a congenial interpretive audience, most 
notably in the intimate imperatives of her several dedicatory poems. Yet her own interest in 
the irrecuperable brings her into a vexed and generative space, in which she is both aligned 
with the modern critic who wants to attend to and dwell with the problems of loss, and in 
which she and her poetry remain beyond our reach. My reading of “Cooke-ham” here 
attempts both to make space for Lanyer’s queer poetics of failure, and to begin to grapple 
                                                
117 Lost Property: The Woman Writer and English Literary History, 1380-1589 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000). 
118 Feeling Backward 8.  
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with the problem – political as much as it is methodological – of how to relate to her poem 
across the ruined landscape of four hundred years of history. 
In order to address “Cooke-ham,” I read Aemilia Lanyer’s Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum, 
in which Lanyer undertakes a feminist exegesis on the Passion of Christ in the context of a 
projection of female devotional community – and the loss of that community under the 
pressures of the heteropatriarchal class and property structures of her culture. The 
movement of Lanyer’s volume between a radical feminist eschatalogical vision and a 
proleptic lament for its failure, I argue, articulates an uneasy cohabitation of competing 
claims: one of resistance to the impossibility of female community in this world, and the 
other a theological investment in the political potential of the apocalyptic world to come. 
Salve Deus appeared in a single quarto edition of 1611, which exists in nine copies that display 
differences indicative of deliberate tailoring for specific patrons.119 Those differences are 
symptomatic of the volume’s most heavily-commented feature: the conspicuousness of its 
bids for the attention and patronage of a range of the English court’s most socially and 
literarily powerful women.120 Of its eleven prefatory addresses, nine are dedicated to 
individual women including Queen Anne, Lucy Russell, and Mary Sidney, the most notable 
and most prolific patrons of the arts in the Jacobean court. The 1,800-line “Salve Deus Rex 
                                                
119 See Susanne Woods’ “Texutal Introduction” to her edition of Lanyer’s book for the 
Oxford Women Writers series: The Poems of Aemilia Lanyer: Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993), xlvii-li. Unless otherwise indicated, all of my own citations 
of Lanyer in this essay are taken from this edition. 
120 See e.g. Barbara Lewalski, “Of God and Good Women: The Poems of Aemilia Lanyer,” 
in Silent but for the Word: Tudor Women as Patrons, Translators, and Writers of Religious Works, ed. 
Margaret P. Hannay (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1985), 203-224; Kari Boyd McBride, 
“Sacred Celebration: The Patronage Poems,” in Aemilia Lanyer: Gender, Genre, and the Canon, 
ed. Marshall Grossman (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1998), 60-82; Mary Ellen 
Lamb, “Patronage and Class in Aemilia Lanyer’s Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum,” in Women, Writing, 
and the Reproduction of Culture in Tudor and Stuart Britain, eds. Mary E. Burke et al. (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 2000), 38-57. 
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Judaeorum,” the volume’s centerpiece, dedicates significant space to encomia to Margaret 
Clifford, Countess of Cumberland, and the final poem, two hundred lines of a “Description 
of Cooke-ham,” extols the Countess and her daughter Anne in a nostalgic meditation on a 
brief season that Lanyer spent with them on the eponymous country estate.121 In addition to 
the obviously mercenary intent of such claims on the readerly and material resources of its 
addressees, Salve Deus projects and even seeks to enact a community of devout reading 
women that stands in stark contrast to the overwhelmingly male-dominated world of 
English letters in the early seventeenth century. Two further prefatory addresses, one “To all 
vertuous Ladies in generall,” and the other “To the vertuous Reader,” implicitly feminine, 
broaden the volume’s remit beyond the highest echelons of society and stake explicit claims 
for the priority of women’s readership when it comes to scripture.  
It’s worth taking a moment to remark on the simple radicalism of the volume’s 
endeavor. The coordination of Lanyer’s feminist exegetical mission in “Salve Deus” itself 
with the book’s projection of a community of committed women readers of scripture marks 
a claim-staking both for a theology of femininity and for the readerly capacity of women that 
is entirely unique in its own cultural moment, and rare enough in any other. The project 
seems doomed to failure from the start – and indeed, its final poem’s lament for the loss of a 
community of reading women, its protest against the social, economic, and political barriers 
that stand between women, appear to be keenly conscious of precisely such a failure. Yet 
that failure itself motivates Lanyer’s poetics of feminist futurity – her book’s project is in 
part to resist the damaging forces of material exigency in the present world in order to put 
aesthetic and political stock in the feminist potential of the next.  
                                                
121 I distinguish the volume and its central poem by referring to the titles of the former in 
italics and the latter in quotation marks.  
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In addition to material support, Lanyer’s volume calls for a hermeneutics of intimacy, 
issues an invitation to bring her book into relationship with a broader economy – material, 
intellectual, and spiritual – of women’s reading. Here, Sedgwick’s reparative reading provides 
a valuable resource in its implicit understanding of reading as relationship. What does it 
mean, for example, to cohabit with loss and failure, or with the dangerous capacities of 
language? The title of this chapter is one way of naming the difficulty of cohabitation: the 
precarity of being in relationship with damage, of a cathexis whose object may cause more 
pain than pleasure. Sara Ahmed, in her feminist critique of the discourse of happiness, 
provides an idiom in which to think this problem through the figure of the “feminist killjoy” 
whose failure or refusal to find prescribed objects of happiness fulfilling exposes her to the 
accusation of being a destroyer of happiness.122 In an exfoliation of the figure of finding 
resonant with this project’s interests in both repetition and inventio, Ahmed observes how 
feminism by refusing to go along with public displays of happiness can participate in 
the widening of horizons in which it is possible to find things. Feminism does not 
guarantee what we will find […]. It simply opens up the places where we can look. 
[…] The public investment in happiness is an investment in a very particular and 
narrow model of the good; being happy requires a commitment to find what 
[Shulamith] Firestone brilliantly describes as a “narrow difficult-to-find alley” of 
human experience.123  
 
Lanyer’s project in Salve Deus is to pursue just such a discontented feminist inventio: to 
respond to dissatisfaction with available models of devotion and community among women 
by first prying open the horizon of possibility, and then insisting on remaining in expressions 
of lament, grief, and nostalgia when those possibilities turn out to be foreclosed.  
 
                                                
122 “Feminist Killjoys,” in The Promise of Happiness (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).  
123 Ibid., 69-70, emphases mine. 
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(RITUALS OF INTIMATE READING) 
 
Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum persistently poses the question of what it might really take to 
engage in intimate readerly relationships, what the hermeneutics of such textual intimacy 
might demand from a reader. The volume’s dedicatory poems address themselves directly to 
the development of an idiom of embodied, often erotic interpretive gesture. Lanyer’s 
frequent imperatives urge her dedicatees not only to “behold,” “viewe,” and “look,” but also 
to reach for, touch, embrace, and receive her book – and with it, metonymically, Christ 
himself. She instructs Queen Anne to see that her daughter read Salve Deus, “Desiring that 
this Booke Her hands may kisse,” and “her blessed thoghts this book imbrace” (Queen 142, 
144). Lanyer’s characteristic flair for ambiguous syntax here holds in suspension the relation 
between subject and object: does the book kiss the Princess Elizabeth’s hands (as in a 
gesture of fealty by textual proxy), or do her hands kiss the book (as in a gesture of 
benediction)? Do her thoughts embrace the book, or the book her thoughts? The poem is 
uninterested in resolving these questions. Instead, these lines’ suspended ambiguity describes 
a desire for intensely proximate intimacy between the reader and the text she reads, the book 
she holds in her hands in all its materiality – an intimacy in which she is both subject and 
object of her own reading. 
Elsewhere, Lanyer exhorts the Countess Dowager of Kent to “Take this faire 
Bridegroome in your soules pure bed” (42), the Countess of Suffolk to “feede” on “heavenly 
food” (51), and Anne Clifford to “infold” the figure of Christ in the “armes” of her “soule” 
(118), to “lodge him in the closet of your heart” (143) – a collection of imperatives that 
simultaneously underline the eroticism of readerly intimacy and bring it into contact with the 
eucharistic doctrines of presence that make a figure of internalizing Christ so readily 
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available. The erotics of these invitations remind us that everything in these dedicatory 
poems turns on a question of desire. Like all dedications, they perform the speech-act of 
giving – but they also demand a gesture in return, one that the poet-as-celebrant cannot 
guarantee. Lanyer asks for acts of intimate, embodied exegesis that alone can make the 
reading of a poem analogous to the reception of the body and blood of Christ. The ritual of 
reading, in these poems, is always in their future – uncertain, not yet apprehended, like any 
object of desire. Their future-orientation will develop into a more fully articulated poetics of 
typology and eschatology in “Salve Deus” and in “The Description of Cooke-ham,” where 
the book’s hermeneutic commitments begin to move more strenuously from staking a claim 
for women’s readerly relationships in the present, material world, toward staking one for a 
feminist hereafter.  
In order to open an interpretive field for Lanyer’s radical exegetics, I return to 
Origen, for whom the coordination of the senses of the body and the senses of scripture is 
much more than a felicitously available pun. In making recourse to figures of interiority like 
“the armes of your soule” and “the closet of your heart,” Lanyer avails herself of a 
conception of the ensouled body that the Christian tradition owes largely to Origen’s model 
of a spiritual interiority, in which the soul’s disposition toward divinity operates by a 
language of bodily disposition: “Let us,” he writes, “stretch forth the hands of our soul as of 
our body to God, that the Lord […] may also give us the Word with His power, by whom 
we may be enabled to make clear from our treatise a sound understanding of the name and 
nature of love” (219-20). Lanyer’s prefatory poems take ample advantage of this potential of 
scriptural hermeneutics to generate embodied intimacy. In her long allegorical poem in 
praise of Mary Sidney, Lanyer implores her to “Receive him here by my unworthy hand” 
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(221), marking once more her investment in reading as an act of embodied reception as well 
as, and at the same time as, an intellectual act of interpretation figured as sacrament. Like so 
many of her pronouns and deictics, the object of “receive” here is capacious in its 
metonymic movement: by this gesture, she offers her book as a material object (one 
referent); the book serves as a vehicle for her exegesis on the Passion (a second referent), 
which through interpretation reveals the presence of Christ (a third). This textual figure of 
the eucharist depends on the attention Lanyer calls to the gesture by which it takes place –
 the imperative reach of the author that anticipates but cannot guarantee the reciprocal reach 
of the reader, the embodied act that seeks to provoke but cannot secure an interpretive one. 
“And reade his paths of faire humility,” the poem continues, with the echo in “reade” of 
“tread” registering the tense intimacy between readerly reception and embodied enactment 
(222). As when Lanyer instructs Lucy Russell that her “soule may reade / Salvation” (13-14), 
in the senses both of reading about salvation and reading as salvation (ambiguity hanging on 
the line-break), in the poem to Sidney, “reading” itself constitutes a devout act, an imitatio 
Christi that in turn calls attention to the mimetic impulse at the heart both of all poetry and 
of all devotion. Is this what Origen means when he asks, in the commentary on the Gospel 
of John, “what kind of intelligence we must have to understand fully the discourse stored in 
the earthen treasure of ordinary speech,” the figure within the vessel of the literal text?124 
Answering his own question, Origen cites Saint Paul’s pronouncement that “We have the 
intelligence of Christ” (1 Cor. 2:16). As in the English translation – the Geneva reads 
                                                
124 Origen, Commentary on John, Book I in Origen, ed. and trans. Joseph W. Trigg (London: 
Routledge, 1998), 109. For Origen’s “earthen treasure” figure, see 2 Cor. 4:1-7, where Paul 
conflates in the figure of “treasure in earthen vessels” both the capacity of gospel as text and 
the capacity of the base material of humanity to exceed itself in preaching that gospel – that 
is, for Paul here as elsewhere, the body and spirit of scripture and of human being are so 
nearly analogous as to be almost identical. 
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“minde” for intelligence – Paul’s syntax in Greek (noun christou echomen) introduces its own 
ambiguity: to have “mind of Christ” might mean either to share some intellectual capacity 
with Christ (to be of Christ’s mind), or more conventionally, to have Christ in mind, to have 
a mind disposed toward Christ. The point, of course, is in that ambiguity: a mind disposed 
toward Christ, in the act of interpretation, reveals the presence of Christ, the figure within 
the letter, the spirit within the body of scripture. The Christological poetics of Lanyer’s 
imperatives in the dedicatory poems takes up the potential of a discourse of the “promise of 
presence” that defines gospel for Origen – the embodied reach encoded in Lanyer’s 
eucharistic gestures operates to motivate the movement of reading in time that is so crucial 
to Origen’s understanding of gospel. For the Christian hermeneutics in which these poems 
are engaged, desire functions on the play not only between presence and absence, but 
between presence and futurity. In the encounter of the desiring ensouled body with the 
movement of a text’s own dialectic of interiority and exteriority, figure and letter, in this 
temporal frame, reading becomes a mechanics not only of signification but of temporality. 
 
(FEMINIST TYPOLOGY) 
 
In a temporal play that aims to capture some of the immanence of futurity in the 
present time of reading, “Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum” begins with the end: the encomium to 
the Countess of Cumberland that serves as its incipit grades quickly into a hundred-line 
vision of Christ in Majesty that situates the Countess’s own personal apocalypse in the more 
general doom. Already in its second stanza anticipating the flight of the Countess’s soul to 
heaven, the poem locates itself squarely in the world: “These lines on earth record thy 
reverend name: / And to this taske I mean my Muse to tie” (12-13). But “of the world,” 
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Lanyer writes to the Countess, “thou seem’st to have no part” (44). Inscribing her patroness 
in the same metaphysical orbit with Christ, she lends the epideictic mode a distinctly 
eschatalogical cast:  
Tis He that doth behold thy inward cares, 
And will regard the sorrowes of thy Soule; 
Tis He that guides thy feet from Sathan’s snares, 
And in his Wisedome, doth thy waies controule: 
He through afflictions, still thy Minde prepares, 
And all thy glorious Trialls will enroule: 
   That when the darke daies of terror shall appeare, 
   Thou as the Sunne shalt shine; or much more cleare. (49-56) 
 
The final pun on “sun” and “son” yokes together the beholding, guiding figure of Christ 
with the Countess beheld and guided; literally inscribed (“enrouled”) in the book of 
judgement, the Countess is transformed by apocalypse into a beacon to rival Christ’s own. 
This union of the two subjects of her address permits the operation of the dilatory time of 
Lanyer’s poem – in the stanza following, she tells the Countess that “thou from him shalt 
never be estrang’d, / When he shall come in glory, that was solde / For all our sinnes; we 
happily are chang’d” (60-62). Here the perpetuity of communion with Christ rubs up against 
the fundamental change – change so radical as to be unspeakable – of apocalypse.125 The 
collision of the final clause’s present tense with the futurity of the preceding lines enacts that 
paradox of end-times – not yet, not yet, but so close and so longed-for that it emerges in the 
poem’s very grammar.  
 What, then, ties Lanyer’s earthly lines to the radical futurity of the apocalypse she 
envisions? “Salve Deus” comes with its own guide to figurative reading, in its intimations 
                                                
125 See, for example, 1 Cor. 15, with its litany of typological analogies and oppositions 
between the fallen world and the new heaven and earth of apocalypse. 
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that its reader’s – and especially the Countess’s – exegetical capacity will fulfill its meaning, 
and in its warnings of the dangers of an excess of literalism.  The marginal notes throughout 
the poem – six in all – that call attention to its moments of direct address to the Countess 
serve to punctuate Lanyer’s meditations on scripture with the conspicuousness of their 
audience. It’s in her reading mind that the poem will be fulfilled:  
This with the eie of Faith thou maist behold, 
Deere Spouse of Christ, and more than I can write; 
And here both Griefe and Joy thou maist unfold, 
To viewe thy Love in this most heavy plight[.] (1169-72) 
 
Origen’s inner senses are in demand here, disguised as a humility topos that apologizes for 
the poverty of Lanyer’s verse, its incapacity to register adequately the presence of Christ 
without the reader’s faithful eye. The Countess’s interpretive faith fulfills what the words on 
the page alone cannot accomplish. Casting the Countess as “Spouse” in the hermeneutic role 
of the Church, Lanyer calls on the embodied senses to expand the sense of her poem, and 
anticipates the mystical marriage of the Countess with Christ in the meditation on the Song 
of Songs (1289-1336). There, near the end of her poem, Lanyer returns to the register of 
readerly offering and interiority that governs the volume’s prefatory poems: 
Ah! Give me leave (good Lady) now to leave 
This taske of Beauty which I tooke in hand, 
I cannot wade so deepe, I may deceave 
My selfe, before I can attaine the land;  
Therefore (good Madame) in your heart I leave 
His perfect picture, where it still shall stand, 
   Deepely engraved in that holy shrine 
   Environed with love and thoughts divine. (1321-8) 
 
The picture of Christ – Lanyer’s famously feminizing blazon “upon the Canticles” executed 
in the preceding stanzas – attains “perfection” only in and by its shrine in the Countess’s 
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heart. Its deep engraving is an act of inscription that is, perhaps paradoxically, also an act of 
reading. This interiorizing mode stands in stark contrast to the stupid literalism of Christ’s 
captors, who “tell his Words, though farre from his intent, / And what his Speeches were, 
not what he meant” (655-6). The mark of the infidel is an incapacity to interpret figure, a 
failure to move through the literal sense into the more capacious – and salvific – domain of 
exegesis.126 The “eye of Faith,” by contrast, in its powerful readerly capacity, analogizes the 
body of the reader with the Church, that “holy shrine” where love and thought are of a 
piece, and which is capable of holding presence perfectly.  
 This interiorizing mode of reading motivates the poem’s sweeping final gesture of a 
feminist typology that posits the Countess as the fulfillment of the Old Testament figures of 
Deborah, Judith, Esther, Susannah, and the Queen of Sheba. First bestowing a radical form 
of female sacerdotal authority on the Countess by way of analogy to Saint Peter and his keys, 
the “Spirituall powre […] giv’n to thee” (1369-70), Lanyer imagines the Countess as having 
the power to “heale the soules” of sinners and “all griefes” generally (1371, 1382), to cast out 
evil spirits (1377-80), to “convert” (1392) the masses to be saved at the end of days: 
That by this meanes thou mai’st in time recover  
                                                
126 This complaint depends on a deep anti-Semitism – a tendency toward the literal is just 
one more bestial feature of the “Jewes” (used pejoratively at 545), violent refusers of the 
savior who are described as “Monsters” (497), “Jewish Wolves” (684), and “Hel-hounds” 
(689). Lanyer is drawing on a long Christian tradition of understanding the alleged Jewish 
overemphasis on the literal sense of scripture as, in Lanyer’s words, a “learned Ignorance” 
that can “apprehend / No light of grace” but only “Zeale, Lawes, Religion,” where religion 
stands in for an excess of arbitrary legalism (546-8). The Pauline typological system from 
which all exegesis descends guarantees that this supercessionary hermeneutic bigotry will be 
central to Christian approaches to scriptural interpretation. The cultural and theological 
implications of this are as complicated as they are disturbing – especially as inherited by the 
contemporary “Pauline turn” in early modern studies and political philosophy alike, as 
theorists such as Alain Badiou and literary critics including Julia Reinhard Lupton take up 
Pauline “universalism” as a political good with too little care for the damage that inheres in 
the very concept.   
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Those weake lost sheepe that did so long transgresse,  
Presenting them unto thy dearest Lover;  
   That when he brings them backe unto his fold, 
   In their conversion then he may behold 
 
Thy beauty shining brighter than the Sunne[.] (1396-1401) 
 
By this astonishing subordination, Lanyer creates the final judgement of the saved as a figure 
for the virtues of the Countess. This eschatalogical gesture fulfills the one that opened the 
poem; the Countess’s apocalypse bookends the Passion of Christ. The time of the poem 
thus dilates between its persistent, distended “now” – the suffering of Christ is constantly 
beginning, in the present tense, throughout “Salve Deus” – and this sweeping futurity of the 
Countess’s end-time enthronement.  
It’s this temporal mechanism that enables Lanyer’s feminist typology: casting 
backward, now, she collects out of scripture types for the Countess to fulfill. Deborah and 
Judith waged worldly war, but “thou farre greater warre do’st still maintaine / Against that 
many headed monster Sinne” (1489-90); for Deborah’s “one worthy deed,” the Countess has 
performed uncountable (1497-8); for Judith’s “one Conquest,” the Countess has “the 
Conquest of all Conquests wonne, / When to thy Conscience Hell can lay no crime” (1499-
1502). Lanyer counterposes the Countess against Esther by means of the stock distinctions 
in Christian exegesis between the New and Old testaments in the supercession of heart over 
body, “Love” over “Feare” (1521), moral allegory over literal narrative (1511-1528). 
Susannah is “not to be compar’d to thee,” so far does the Countess’s chastity outshine that 
of her antetype (1541). Finally and most stunningly, the Queen of Sheba, “this faire map of 
majestie and might, / Was but a figure of thy deerest Love, / Borne t’expresse that true and 
heavenly light / That doth all other joyes imperfect prove” (1609-12). The Countess is the 
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figurative fulfillment of a reading of the Song of Songs. To return to my discussion of 
Origen on love and the Song of Songs, Lanyer here invests in an exegetical discourse of 
figure and expression in order to orient her address to the Countess. Or, to see it from 
another angle, she invests her intimacy (or her desire for intimacy) with the Countess in her 
intimacy with the interpretive maneuvers of typology. An act of reading becomes a mode of 
generating a poetics of intimate address. 
The narrow focus of Lanyer’s poem on the female figures of scripture is a radical 
one in its own right – she performs in exegesis the community of women’s readership that 
she projects in the prefatory poems. Yet as the volume moves from the dedicatory poems’ 
calls for radical, metaphysical intimacy, through the feminist typology and eschatology of 
“Salve Deus,” and finally into the nostalgic lament of “The Description of Cooke-ham,” it 
develops an uneasy coordination of contradictory affects and temporalities. That is, the 
future of communal female readership toward which the dedications look forward is the 
lamented past of “Cooke-ham,” a poem constituted in a catalogue of losses and motivated 
by a different poetics of typology, one far less certain of its capacity to secure in the material 
world the metaphysical vision of intimacy it promotes. 
 
(PLEASURES PAST) 
 
“Salve Deus” closes with a pair of gestures in the rhymed couplets of its two final 
stanzas that urge the present-tense intimacy of poet, poem, and patron:  
But my weake Muse desireth now to rest, 
Folding up all their Beauties in your breast. (1831-2) 
 
You are the Articke Starre that guides my hand, 
All what I am, I rest at your command. (1839-40) 
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In the first couplet, the speaker imagines her reader literally internalizing not merely the 
poem, but her poetic imagination itself; the final tender gesture of personal fealty in the 
second orients that imagination by the reader as polestar. Taken together, they evoke a kind 
of intersubjective feedback loop – a textual intimacy in which the movement of poetic 
imagination is secured by the “all-reviving beautie” of Christ that is the poem’s touchstone 
throughout. But even as “Salve Deus” ends with this affectionate intimacy, “The 
Description of Cooke-ham” begins, across the page, with Farewell.127 The cohabitation of 
confiding explicit and valedictory lament in a single page-opening produces an affective and 
interpretive tension; the synoptic availability of both to the reader indicates an instability at 
the center of the book she holds in her hands.  
 I’d like to articulate this movement in Lanyer’s volume between claims on intimacy 
and voicings of loss in terms of the tension in the developing field of queer affect theory 
between calls for attention to a reparative now, and calls for acknowledgement of loss and 
failure, with their tendency to stick recalcitrantly in the past. Sedgwick calls on the 
disposition of reparative reading as a means of rejecting – or simply surviving – the 
undifferentiated unfolding of patrilineal time proper to the hermeneutics of paranoia, with 
its imperatives to beyond. She further suggests that the reparative is congenial to a queer time 
and space in which lives – and, perhaps, texts – “slide up more intimately alongside one 
another than can any lives that are moving forward according to the regular schedule of the 
generations,” in the “present fullness of a becoming whose arc may extend no further.”128 
The reparative depends, too – and this, as we have seen, is crucial for Lanyer – on the close 
                                                
127 Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum (London: Valentine Simmes for Richard Bonian, 1611), sigs. 
H1v-H2r. 
128 Touching Feeling 149.  
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coordination of affect with touch and texture that Touching Feeling in its very title insists on. 
As Sedgwick puts it, what “texture and affect, touching and feeling […] have in common is 
that […] both are irreducibly phenomenological.”129 In associating this embodied, affective 
phenomenology with close-reading, Sedgwick is close here to Elizabeth Freeman’s reading 
of Dipesh Chakrabarty on close-reading as a “grasp of detail [that] produces affective 
histories,” an embodied affective reach toward text (rather than perception through it). 
Lanyer’s prefatory poems call strongly on a language of what Freeman calls “bodily motion 
(a grasp, a clutch, a refusal to let go),” the almost outrageous intimate attachment that 
Freeman signals queer.130 In Carolyn Dinshaw’s now-commonplace “touch across time,” the 
queerness of an intimate relation structured by anachronism activates the possibility that in 
our felt encounters with the texts of the past, time and difference might collapse.131 Yet these 
approaches to readerly attachment threaten to fall into an undifferentiated now that cannot 
account for the movement of history and its losses, a now that overemphasizes plenitude 
and presence, and at the same time forecloses possibilities for an ethics of the future.  
 Modern readers of Lanyer who have viewed her and her book as, at best, in need of 
recuperation into a narrative of feminist progress or, at worst, unamenable to such a 
progress narrative and thus in need of suspicious critique, have tended to require of Salve 
Deus both a transparency and a uniformity of affect and investment that it quite simply does 
not exhibit. As Jonathan Goldberg has argued, one of the failures of the feminist 
                                                
129 Ibid., 21 
130 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 18. Freeman, Time Binds: Queer Temporalities, 
Queer Histories (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), xx. 
131 Dinshaw, Getting Medieval: Sexualities and Communities, Pre- and Postmodern 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1999); ‘Temporalities,’ in Oxford Twenty-first Century 
Approaches to Literature: Middle English, ed. Paul Strohm (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007). 
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recuperation projects of the 1980’s and 90’s was an excess of investment in, precisely, 
recuperation: in discoveries of premodern female agency, of what Goldberg derisively calls 
“good women” who frictionlessly slide into narratives of progress, of “proto-bourgeois 
individualism” that too often comes packaged in a tacit assumption of heteronormativity.132 I 
have said that Lanyer strenuously reaches for a congenial audience, and she does, to such an 
extent that it would be almost cruel to refuse to hear that call. Yet to think we know what it 
means when we hear it is at best naïve, at worst a form of historical and interpretive 
violence. One way of more attentively approaching Lanyer would be to circumvent 
recuperation by the path of repair – in the uneasy, capacious sense in which Sedgwick uses 
the term. As Sedgwick writes of Melanie Klein’s “depressive position” – the infant’s defense 
posture against unassimilable anxieties – the repaired object of reading would be “something 
like a whole – though, I would emphasize, not necessarily like any preexisting whole.”133 The task 
at hand, for Sedgwick as for Love, is to step out of the pernicious binary between presence 
and absence that inheres in the suspicions of deconstruction, and to find a new means of 
addressing ourselves to the gulfs and fissures of texts that remain, in some degree, 
irrecuperable.  
It is in this sense that I want to read Lanyer as a feminist killjoy, in Ahmed’s 
definition, which also entails the necessity of killing joy to feminism, that is, a resistance to 
the “good women” logic of recuperative feminist readings. Beginning with the superficially 
banal observation that “consciousness-raising” – first tool of feminist work – is “raising 
consciousness of unhappiness,” she further notes that “Feminism involves political 
                                                
132 Desiring Women Writing: English Renaissance Examples (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1997), 11. 
133 Touching Feeling 128, emphasis original. 
 
 
 
120 
 
consciousness of what women are asked to give up for consciousness.”134 That is, to 
recognize what one has been deprived of by the orientation of “happy” life toward, for 
example, marriage, property, and reproduction, to develop awareness as a feminist, is to 
acknowledge a loss. “To even recognize such loss is to mourn,” Ahmed writes, “which is 
why it can be easier to avoid recognition. Feminist subjects in refusing to be well-adjusted 
not only mourn the losses but in mourning open up other possibilities for living, as openings 
that we inherit over generations.”135 Throughout her essay, Ahmed uses the language of 
“inheritance” to describe a particularly non-reproductive, non-genealogical transmission of 
thought among women through history: we “inherit” feminist thought along different lines 
than biological lineality; when we find our feminism, we are enfolded into a different 
relationship to history than the one we were born into. And it hurts. This is what Lanyer 
pursues in Salve Deus: a way of sustaining a model of feminist time by sustaining what feels 
bad about it. 
 The Farewell with which “The Description of Cooke-ham” begins is one such gulf. 
The object of that initial valediction is, most literally, the country estate – but the poem 
begins with a string of ambiguously subordinated clauses in which the space of Cooke-ham 
is contiguous, if not coterminous, with the Countess of Cumberland’s pun-amenable grace:  
Farewell (sweet Cooke-ham) where I first obtain’d 
Grace from that Grace where perfit Grace remain’d; 
And where the Muses gave their full consent, 
I should have powre the virtuous to content:  
Where princely Palace will’d me to indite, 
The sacred Storie of the Soules delight. (1-6) 
 
                                                
134 Promise, 70. 
135 Ibid., 79. 
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The repetition of relative where – four times in these lines – spatializes the relationship of 
poet and patron, grounding it in place. Cooke-ham and her “Grace” the Countess occupy 
parallel positions, in the first two lines, as its antecedent. The pursuit of that parallel as 
ambiguity further unites place and patron in their capacity to generate sacred writing: the 
readiest reading of “where” in the third and fifth lines is by reference to the estate, yet the 
more immediate antecedent for both is the capacious grace of the Countess. The awkward 
pun on “Palace” – the estate of Cooke-ham; the Countess as Pallas Athena – further secures 
the union, now volitional (“will’d me”), between place and person, environment and 
relationship. It’s from this volitional environment that Lanyer’s poetry emerges: “Yet you 
(great Lady) Mistris of that Place, / From whose desires did spring this work of Grace, / 
Vouchsafe to think upon those pleasures past” (11-12). The metonymic movement of the 
poem’s opening lines from “where” to “whose” – from place to person – secures the logic 
of the pathetic fallacy to follow, in which the very land genuflects to the presiding influence 
of the Countess. Yet unlike Ben Jonson’s “To Penshurst,” the poem to which it is most 
often compared, “Cooke-ham” persistently draws attention to the speaker’s consciousness as 
the motor of its dominant figure: “Oh how (me thought) against you thither came, / Each part 
did seeme some new delight to frame!” (17-18, emphasis mine). Lanyer reads the land like a 
poem – or, indeed, like a presence-generating gospel. 
The significance of that reading emerges in the tension between worldly and eternal 
temporalities that structures Lanyer’s injunction to the Countess to “Vouchsafe to think 
upon those pleasures past.” The line encapsulates the paradox of the entire volume, with its 
imperative demanding the presence, if only in thought, of a pleasure that in the same gesture 
is relegated to an irrecoverable past. (Typically, the syntax is ambiguous: in vouchsafe an 
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indicative possibility, subordinate but suggestive, too tentative to be expressed outright, 
haunts that imperative as those pleasures past haunt the poem.) The lines continue as a 
lament in the terms of typology: “As fleeting worldly Joyes that could not last: / Or, as 
dimme shadowes of celestiall pleasures, / Which are desir’d above all earthly treasures” (14-
16). So much turns on that or. To think on past pleasure might be to dwell on it, in it, to 
occupy in the present the space of memory and sustain that occupation – to inhabit the 
paradox that memory can entertain sustainedly what is fleeting, what cannot last. But the 
status of joy – the status, for that matter, of thought and of memory; the status of 
worldliness, of the pastness of pleasure – all are balanced, on that or, between nostalgia and 
futurity, between loss and promise. The dimme shadowes of life lived in this world will be 
fulfilled, in the world to come, as another order of pleasure entirely. The language of 
typology – figure and its forecast fulfillment – seeks to repair the damage of the material 
world by making recourse to the world to come. It is difficult, however, to believe in that 
desultorily passive subordinate clause: are desir’d? By whom? It reads like a tired catechistic 
ventriloquy, limp by comparison to the pleading imperative that opens the passage. Just as 
Farewell stands in stark, irresolvable contrast to the final lines of “Salve Deus,” this nostalgic 
typology is a far cry from that poem’s bold eschatalogical vision.  
 In Lanyer’s case, to the impossibility of desire for an erotics of reading in a female 
community is added the problem of class – every woman she addresses by name in Salve 
Deus belongs to an echelon of society whose firmly-guarded boundaries will always thwart 
the poet’s desire for intimate proximity to them. To paraphrase Sedgwick’s spatial language, 
there is no beside, for Lanyer – only below. But in Lanyer’s own words, “Why not?” (Cooke-
ham 113). In the middle of “The Description of Cooke-ham” comes an impassioned 
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objection to the barriers posed by social class to intimate friendship, hinged on that 
startlingly radical Why not?. Killjoy Lanyer won’t accept the commonplace. “Parters in 
honor,” social equals, she counterintuitively writes, are “Neerer in show, yet farther off in 
love” than in the potential affective bond between a woman of lower status and one of 
higher. For, Lanyer contends, when it comes to love, “the lowest always are above” (108-
110).136 That paradox depends on a figure of orientation in which the view of the heavens –
 as both cosmos and salvation – from the vantage of a lowly creature embraces a greater 
scope than from that of an exalted one:  
But whither am I carried in conceit?  
My wit too weake to conster of the great.  
Why not? although we are but borne of earth, 
We may behold the Heavens, despising death;  
And loving heaven that is so farre above, 
May in the end vouchsafe us entire love. (111-16) 
 
The end-time orientation of these lines projects the view from below as simultaneously a 
view of the end. Though “cast […] downe into so lowe a frame” by “Unconstant Fortune,” 
though “our great friends we cannot dayly see” (103-5), Lanyer argues, lowly lovers of the 
great have the double advantage of, first, being enforced to a holy humility, and, second, 
being oriented toward the heavens. That orientation grants the worldly creature – “but borne 
of earth” – the capacity to embrace both her social betters and divinity, the former on the 
way to the latter, to envision the new world of love in the creator. The promise of reciprocity 
– the “entire love” of Christian salvation – likewise runs down the heavenly hierarchy in a 
                                                
136 Amy Greenstadt likewise reads this passage as a radical moment that calls attention to the 
incommensurability of the social hierarchy and Lanyer’s imagination of a devotional-
affective one: “Aemilia Lanyer’s Pathetic Phallacy,” Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies 8:1 
(2000), 70. 
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levelling gesture toward the perfect equality of “the end,” the apocalyptic future of celestial 
pleasures in which the intimacies yearned for by “Cooke-ham” will be realized. 
 These lines are followed by a surprising logical turn : “Therefore sweet Memorie doe 
thou retaine / Those pleasures past, which will not turne againe” (117-18, emphasis mine). 
How is it that an injunction to memory, another invocation of the irreducible pastness of 
pleasure, follows logically from the class-critique’s soteriological vision of futurity? The 
poem wants to feel backward – memory is tasked with dwelling in a lost past in order to secure 
its permanence, sustain those things “Whereof depriv’d, I evermore must grieve, / Hating 
blind Fortune, careless to relieve” (125-6). The endurance of grief – grief as the affective 
instantiation of the past in the present – is not set against, but rather necessary to the poem’s 
erotic eschatology, its only means of imagining futurity at all.  
 As the capaciously ambiguous invocation of “Fortune” suggests, however, there is 
more to the problem than social status as such – the poem also launches a more implicit 
critique of the heteropatriarchal economies of marriage and property that stand in the way of 
women’s community. The intimacy with Anne Clifford that is the subject of some of the 
poem’s most passionate moments is, like the other pleasures of Cooke-ham’s feminist 
pastoral, periodized in an irrecuperable past, cordoned off from the present by the event of 
Anne’s marriage to the Earl of Dorset:  
And that sweet Lady sprung from Cliffords race, 
Of noble Bedfords blood, faire st[r]eame of Grace;  
To honorable Dorset now espows’d, 
In whose faire breast true virtue then was hous’d:  
Oh what delight did my weake spirits find 
In those pure parts of her well framed mind:  
And yet it grieves me that I cannot be 
Neere unto her […] (93-100) 
 
 
 
 
125 
 
In this encomium lurks the grief of the temporality of intimacy cut short: the then of virtue 
counterposed against the now of espousal limns delight’s pastness with nostalgia for a social 
order conceivable only outside, only before, the exiling fact of marriage that makes proximity 
– neereness – impossible between women. As Katherine Philips will write in a letter fifty years 
later, “I find too there are few friendships in the world Marriage-proof.”137 It is the 
coincidence of marriage and property law, moreover, that makes Cooke-ham an illusory 
space – while Lanyer goes to great lengths to paint the Countess of Cumberland as the 
sovereign figure of its landscape, which genuflects to her presence and from which she can 
see “A Prospect fit to please the eyes of Kings” (72), the basic reality is that Lanyer and her 
patrons are living on borrowed time. Cooke-ham is a crown estate, leased to the Countess’s 
brother, where she is permitted to stay during her estrangement from her husband (and thus 
from the property ties granted her by marriage), and which does not belong in any real or 
legal sense to the women who inhabit it in the idealized world that Lanyer’s poem reaches 
toward.  
 The figurative registers of the poem acknowledge the impossibility of that reach, the 
unreality of that world. The ostensibly comfortable pastoral of Lanyer’s pathetic fallacy is 
haunted by the incapacity of figure to adequately secure the precarious world to which it is 
addressed. In “Cooke-ham,” she performs a critique of the very power of figurative language 
on which “Salve Deus” depends. In the gradual breakdown of the poem’s figurative 
economy, it becomes clear how necessary, after all, is a mode of reading that can incorporate 
a sense of latent dangers – that is, to prevent a reparative mode from devolving into simple 
                                                
137 Philips, Letters from Orinda to Poliarchus (London: W. B. for Bernard Lintott, 1705), 57. I 
owe this citation to Harriette Andreadis, “Re-Configuring Early Modern Friendship: 
Katherine Philips and Homoerotic Desire,” SEL 46:3 (2006), 532. 
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naïveté, we require some degree of suspicion. To the degree that figure has the power to 
disguise potential sites of loss, discomfort, pain, and even violence, Lanyer’s argument in 
“Cooke-ham” insinuates, it poses a threat to any project that seeks to resist or repair those 
things.  
This precarity can be observed in the gradual breakdown of the pathetic fallacy that 
is the poem’s primary figurative resource. The key figure of that pathetic fallacy is the 
Christological oak tree that stands at the metonymic center of the landscape of Cooke-ham, 
overseeing the devotional reading of the three women and the illusory sovereignty of the 
Countess. Incongruously compared to both a cedar (57) and a palm (61), catch-all scriptural 
tree-figures, the oak would, like Christ crucified, “spread his armes abroad, / Desirous that 
you there should make abode” (61-2), a protective dwelling “Joying his happinesse” to be so 
(66). The vantage from beneath the tree grants to the Countess the sweeping gaze of 
sovereignty:  
[T]here being seated, you might plainely see, 
Hills, vales, and woods, as if on bended knee 
They had appeard, your honour to salute, 
Or to preferre some strange unlook’d for sute:  
All interlac’d with brookes and christall springs, 
A prospect fit to please the eyes of Kings:  
And thirteene shires appear’d all in your sight, 
Europe could not affoard much more delight. (67-74) 
 
The poem’s vexed relationship with heteropatriarchal property law surfaces in the deep irony 
of this claim to a form of sovereignty entirely unavailable to any woman of the period, and 
locally unavailable to the Countess. Yet Lanyer’s characteristically counterfactual syntax – as 
if – works hard to imagine the genuflecting landscape all the same. It is crucially this ground 
of illusory sovereignty in which the practice of devotional reading comes avidly to life:  
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What was there then but gave you all content,  
While you the time in meditation spent, 
Of their Creators powre, which there you saw,  
In all his Creatures held a perfit Law;  
                           […] 
In these sweet woods how often did you walke,  
With Christ and his Apostles there to talke;  
Placing his holy Writ in some faire tree, 
To meditate what you therein did see:  (75-84) 
 
The emphasis on meditation recalls Southwell’s Ignatian craft, drawing out of the experience 
of reading a phenomenal experience of the events of scripture – the Countess not only walks 
with Christ (recalling Mary Sidney’s reading or treading the paths of salvation), but receives 
the Law with Moses, sings psalms with David, and feeds the impoverished with Joseph (85-
92). The dilatory time of that meditation, in which the Countess and these Old and New 
Testament figures become contemporaneous, dwelling together in the gardens of Cooke-
ham, suspends the scene in an expansive now – but a now that finds resistance in the past 
tenses of the passage. In the governing figure of reading, the metonymic intimacy of “holy 
Writ” with the tree still further consolidates the environmental relation among women, 
scripture, and landscape. It is this figure that collapses under the weight of its own 
impossibility in the poem’s climactic affective emergency.  
 The poem’s most overtly reparative gesture is also its most notoriously difficult 
moment, its clearest index of failure, and its most dangerously overburdened figure. In the 
course of taking leave of the estate, Lanyer, or rather the figure of her whom I will call 
Aemilia by way of distinguishing persona from poet, experiences a moment of radical 
affective disorientation, centered on the oak tree:  
But specially the love of that faire tree,  
That first and last you did vouchsafe to see:  
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In which it pleas’d you oft to take the ayre,  
With noble Dorset, then a virgin faire:  
Where many a learned Booke was read and skand 
To this faire tree, taking me by the hand, 
You did repeat the pleasures which had past, 
Seeming to grieve they could no longer last.  
And with a chaste, yet loving kisse tooke leave, 
Of which sweet kisse I did it soone bereave:  
Scorning a sencelesse creature should possesse 
So rare a favour, so great happinesse. (157-68) 
 
The first time I taught “Cooke-ham,” in the moment of difficulty that characterizes 
encounters with this challenging passage, one of my students made the astute observation 
that Aemilia’s outrage at the Countess’s bestowal of her kiss is outrage at the discovery that 
the Countess’s relation to the land differs from Aemilia’s. That is, for Aemilia, Cooke-ham is 
a composite: landscape, female community, and devotional reading are one single 
environment. That’s the point of the pathetic fallacy. The moment of the kiss, however, calls 
attention to the incapacity of figure to genuinely create or guarantee environment. The 
Countess’s affection, directed to the “senceless creature” rather than the sensible one, 
excludes Aemilia from the scene of erotic attachment. It is to the tree as a tree – or perhaps at 
most as overseer of her illusory sovereignty – that the Countess is attached, not to the tree as 
Aemilia understands it: as the figure that secures the feminist-exegetical world of Cooke-
ham. In retrieving the phenomenal trace of the kiss from the tree, and in the affects of scorn 
(167), fear (170), ingratitude (171), and vengeful spite (174-5) that ensue from that act, 
Aemilia collapses into the failure of the imagined world of Cooke-ham, the stark fact that 
“nothing’s free from Fortune’s scorn” (176). Temporarily – and ineffectually – appropriating 
to herself the agency of Fortune, she reenacts on the tree the act of deprivation that the 
Countess has just inflicted on her. In this moment of pain and failure, the tree has ceased to 
 
 
 
129 
 
be the Christological guarantor of spiritual communion among women, as well as of the 
Countess’s sovereign prospect over the estate and its environs – it has, in other words, lost 
its capacity as figure. And Aemilia’s attempted gesture of repair proves an excruciating one.  
The potential for violence in the instability of figurative language becomes vividly 
available in the figure of Philomela, the nightingale who “with her sundry leyes” appears 
early in the poem to “praise” the Countess and Cooke-ham, “that delightfull place” (31-2). 
She is, at first glance, merely a slim piece of poetic diction. But she appears again in the 
second, valedictory half of the pathetic fallacy, where “Faire Philomela leaves her mournefull 
Ditty, / Drownd in dead sleepe, yet can procure no pittie” (189-90). Silenced, Philomela here 
more strongly recalls the violence of her Ovidian origin, reminds us that she is not merely a 
stock pastoral trope but also a memorial to rape and dismemberment. In the context of the 
poem’s explicit challenge to class hierarchies and its implicit one to the marriage economy, 
the slightest pressure on such a figure detonates a latent horror. The precarity of undertaking 
life and reading in women’s community becomes starkly clear in the silenced, anaesthetized, 
unpitied figure of Philomela that serves as a reminder that even in these apparently 
innocuous country gardens, a woman’s tongue might be being ripped out beneath the thin 
veneer of a cliché. Her silence in Lanyer’s figure suspends her story at the point of its most 
heightened violence, where not only is she tongueless, but her relation to her sister has been 
brutally ruptured – reunion and revenge remain suspended in a tentative future that lies 
outside the figurative limits of “Cooke-ham.”  
As Ahmed observes, “Feminist archives are full of scenes of domesticity in which 
domestic objects, happy objects, become alien, even menacing.”138 Cooke-ham is in a strange 
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way not a domestic space in this poem: the house is scarcely mentioned, in preference for the 
land, a cultivated landscape disguised as a wilderness. The poem’s primary figures 
conspicuously avoid the categories of domicile and of property to a degree that brings them 
apophatically into the frame; when they cannot sustain avoidance any longer, they break 
down. The beloved tree becomes a despised enemy; sweet Philomel becomes an awful 
warning. The poem concludes with a less obviously precarious figure. The foregrounding of 
the speaker’s imagination in the poem’s opening, as well as the problematic affect that 
accompanies the tree-kiss’s failed gesture of repair, finds an echo in the unsatisfying final 
lines of the poem:  
This last farewell to Cooke-ham here I give, 
When I am dead thy name in this may live, 
Wherein I have perform’d her noble hest, 
Whose virtues lodge in my unworthy breast, 
And ever shall, so long as life remaines, 
Tying my heart to her by those rich chaines. (205-10) 
 
These lines attempt to preserve the coordination of the figure of the Countess with the space 
of the estate – encoded in the pronomial shift in the abrupt transition from apostrophe of 
the manor-house to third-person declaration of devotion to its sometime mistress. The 
“chaines” of virtue here recall the “golden chaine” by which, in the eschatalogical dream-
vision of Mary Sidney in majesty, Sidney is “Fast ti’d” to the Graces (“The Authors Dreame” 
7).139 Yet following the loss and social violence of the lines that precede it, the final claim to 
                                                
139 Marie Loughlin sensitively reads this coordination of apocalyptic figures as one way of 
circumventing Lanyer criticism’s “tendency to construct a rigid opposition between the 
poems’ spiritual and material concerns, between the values of the world and the ethics of 
Christianity” in an essay that richly understands Lanyer’s project as a collaboration between 
worldliness and transcendence. Yet Loughlin’s reading is so optimistic, so invested in the 
radical future toward which Lanyer’s book gestures, that it cannot quite observe those places 
where her poetry encounters insurmountable difficulty or irrecuperable loss. To that degree, 
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perpetual intimacy, with its weak figure, rings false. In the course of the poem, Lanyer has 
launched a critique of just such figures as the one she closes with – these lines thus attempt 
to disguise the permanence of their own loss as once more, the imaginative gestures of 
Lanyer’s sad typology resist her material reality. So far as any record can tell, her patronage 
relationship with the Countess of Cumberland and her daughter ended with or around the 
publication of Salve Deus. She never published again, and no other verse of hers is extant. But 
in the very friction of resistance, in the unresolved tension between one movement of her 
poem and another, the Christological poetics of typology and eschatology enable her to 
imagine another order – for all its losses, her book projects beyond itself a possible future, 
inapprehensible but anticipated, secured not by the material economies of life in this world 
but by faith in the next. Failure and futurity cohabit in Lanyer’s book – uneasily, like 
Sedgwick’s warring siblings – holding in suspension the competing claims of worldly political 
economy and the divine new order to come. Salve Deus responds to loss and failure with the 
gestures of a typology that can both hold and sustain losses in the present and promise a 
future in which repair may become possible.  
Salve Deus is a site where the problems of “feeling backward” and those of reparative 
reading productively collide.  The readiest site for seeking language for a poetics of 
emergency, especially given its recent ascendancy in early modern studies, is political 
theology.140 Yet the likes of Carl Schmitt prove distinctly unfriendly to this endeavor, and not 
                                                                                                                                            
she merely replaces the patrilineal time of paranoia with a matrilineal genealogy. “‘Fast ti’d 
unto them in a Golden Chaine’ : Typology, Apocalypse, and Women’s Genealogy in Aemilia 
Lanyer’s Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum,” Renaissance Quarterly 53:1 (2000), 133-79. 
140 See especially Julia Reinhard Lupton, Citizen-Saints: Shakespeare and Political Theology 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003). Lupton’s self-identification as a political 
“moderate” with serious investments in the universalist potential of the modern liberal 
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only because an autocratic theory of sovereignty quickly begins to look absurd in the context 
of early modern women’s relationships to state authority – as for Lanyer’s community of 
women at Cooke-ham, sovereignty for all early modern women is at best illusory, and at 
worst violently disempowering. Like the seductively pastoral figure of Philomela, discourses 
of sovereignty in this context too easily disguise the threats of damage, loss, and failure that 
they carry with them as their political condition. But there is a further problem with political 
theology’s reliance on a narrative of secularization – divine authority transmuted in 
modernity into temporal political authority, to put it crudely – that prohibits the modern 
critic access to a theological program like Lanyer’s, except to view it as an obsolete relic of a 
culture whose ethical and hermeneutic tools are no longer relevant. For Lanyer, theology is 
an alternative to politics as she knows it. Far from being “innocuous” (Valerie Traub) or 
“unexceptionable” (Erica Longfellow), Lanyer’s casting of her desire for female 
relationships, for a community of reading women, within the hermeneutic fields central to 
theology is politically, theologically, and poetically radical.141 So much so, perhaps, that it not 
only met no known friendly audience in her own time, but has gone largely unremarked by 
most modern criticism. 
If Lanyer does not, in Love’s sense, refuse our advances, her trajectory does take a 
path that runs counter to the narratives of progress and secularization that lead from her 
cultural moment to our own. But to treat Lanyer’s book as merely a testament to that 
                                                                                                                                            
nation-state as our last best political hope is perhaps case in point for my reluctance to 
pursue this line of thought. 
141 Traub uses the charge of “innocuousness” (innocuous because theological) to exclude 
Lanyer from her survey of early modern lesbian eroticism, while Longfellow declares 
Lanyer’s Calvinist theology “unexceptionable” as a function of her volume’s mercenary 
qualities. Traub, The Renaissance of Lesbianism in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 26; Longfellow, Women and Religious Writing in Early Modern England 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 6. 
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abandoned past, indeed to address any body of texts of the past as merely historical 
documents, denies them agency in the present – and tells a pernicious lie about the felt 
phenomena of our lives with them, the affective activity of our scenes of reading. Her future 
is not our present; we are not, in Sedgwick’s terms, aligned in the unfolding time of 
patrilineality. Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum does, however, provoke the question: what politics of 
feminist poetics might emerge from a feeling backward that could tolerate these disjunctures, 
that could seek in the alienation of the past the intimacy of an uneasily-reassembled now? In 
the passage of her essay from which this dissertation takes its epigraph, Sara Ahmed reads 
the Sophy of Rousseau’s Émile as a cautionary tale for feminists: Sophy’s curiosity and 
imagination and above all her reading are targeted for reprogramming because, according to 
Rousseau, they make her unhappy. Or rather, they are so targeted because her unhappiness 
disrupts the marriage plot for which she is destined. As Ahmed observes, “If Sophy were to 
become too imaginative, we would not get our happy ending, premised on Sophy being 
given to Émile.” Rousseau explicitly strips her of imagination in favor of happiness. What 
Lanyer has done in “Cooke-ham” is to refuse such a resolution: her feminist finding is that 
the only way forward is a look backward; a holding on to dissatisfaction and grief that alone 
can expose the structures that impede her project. I’ll let Ahmed conclude for me: 
Feminist readers might want to challenge this association between unhappiness and 
female imagination, which in the moral economy of happiness, makes female 
imagination a bad thing. But if we do not operate in this economy – that is, if we do 
not assume that happiness is what is good – then we can read the link between 
female imagination and unhappiness differently. We might explore how imagination 
is what allows women to be liberated from happiness and the narrowness of its 
horizons. We might want the girls to read the books that enable them to be 
overwhelmed with grief.142
                                                
142 Promise, 62. 
 
 
 
134 
 
 
V. Coda: Katherine Philips and the Limits of Intimacy 
 
These essays in devotional feeling have been developing toward an investment in a kind of 
bad affect that belongs specifically to women, toward a specifically feminist investment in 
refusal and recalcitrance, standing still and turning back, and they have also, more implicitly 
and less straightforwardly, been developing toward that feminist attitude as a specifically 
lesbian one. I mean “lesbian” in an old-fashioned sense, in Adrienne Rich’s sense in her 
essay on “Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence.”143 For Rich, “lesbian 
existence” includes a broad range of “primary intensity between and among women, 
including the sharing of a rich inner life, the bonding against male tyranny, the giving and 
receiving of practical and political support,” including “such associations as marriage 
resistance” (51). Such “intensities” between women become responses to and ways of living 
under heteropatriarchy as “survival relationships” in which “women provide the ongoing 
fascination and sustenance of life,” in which “women make life endurable for each other” 
(56, 62). Rich’s “lesbian continuum” remains a vital resource in that it resists the ostensible 
stability of categories of sexual orientation or identity, insisting instead on attachment 
between women – that is, a social relation rather than an individual identity – as the 
significant political category. “Lesbian existence” on this model becomes “a source of 
knowledge and power” to the degree that it both resists and exposes the “social forces,” 
including marriage, property law, and – yes – literary history, which “wrench women’s 
                                                
143 In Blood, Bread, and Poetry: Selected Prose 1979-1985 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1994 
[1986]), 23-75. 
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emotional and erotic energies away from themselves and other women and from woman-
identified values” (28, 35). My reading of Aemilia Lanyer has demonstrated her investment 
in just such a critique: Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum is a bid for the sustenance of attachment 
between women as a social, devotional, and literary practice, and it is also an incisive critique 
of the structures – including marriage, property law, and literary history – that threaten such 
attachments.  
I suggest that such resistant lesbian attachments, such survival relationships, might 
develop not only between women in their own presents, but between women across time. 
They might be necessarily anachronistic. The germ of the reading this final brief chapter will 
conduct was a simple question: why have Aemilia Lanyer and Katherine Philips never been read 
together? As the seventeenth century’s most powerful poets – and, I would argue, theorists –
 of intimacy between women, with their shared concerns in political economy, intimate 
circles of readership, and the place where a poetry of religion meets a poetry of love, their 
shared interest in clawing out space for the unprotected category of female friendship, their 
shared critiques of the institution of marriage, they seem so clearly to belong together. So I 
wanted to know why they have never been read together in contemporary criticism. This 
question quickly proves uninteresting: we already know why. The protocols of literary 
history prevent it: narrative and hermeneutic modes that still depend on categories of either 
influence and development in diachronic time or shared engagement in synchronic time 
prevent Lanyer and Philips from sharing the same frame, as two women who never met, 
whose lives barely overlapped, whose historical and cultural milieux are sharply distinct, who 
did not read each other, who are not locatable in relation to each other on a developmental 
trajectory of a literary tradition. But another interest this project has been developing is in 
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seeking modes of resisting and proposing alternatives to those protocols of literary history –
 not least because they interfere with the formation of intimacies between women.  
* * *  
Paula Loscocco has argued that Philips’ “Donnean” poetics fails when the specularity of 
homoeroticism – the sameness in “homo” – encounters the Donnean ideal of neoplatonic 
transcendence.144 It’s a strange argument in its evaluative orientation, and in characterizing a 
poetics of marriage as successful and a poetics of intimacy between women as failed, 
Loscocco at least leaves herself open to a charge of lesbophobia, even if that is not actually 
the premise of or hidden ideology behind her argument. I genuinely can’t tell. What she is 
right about, however, is that Philips’ lyrics to Lucasia are conspicuously interested in the 
limits of figure and syntax, and at the same time interested in the problem of how to turn 
into poetry an attachment that either cannot or should not be spoken: the limits, in other 
words, of the utterable.  
“Friendship’s Mystery, to my dearest Lucasia” is in my reading a knowing 
experiment with outrageous figures and extremes of paradox, the point of which is both to 
showcase a kind of ostentatious virtuosity and to strain the limits of representation, exposing 
the fractures in the very intimacy it celebrates.145 “Mystery” has, of course, a number of 
senses both sacred and secular, and many of them are operative in Philips’ title: as mystical 
meaning, as ritual or sacrament, as a term for the significant events of the life of Christ, as 
equivalent to “miracle,” as artisanal craft or similar practice, as a secret practice, or, in the 
OED’s most beautiful definition, succinct and encapsulating all the others: “a hidden or 
                                                
144 “Inventing the English Sappho: Katherine Philips’s Donnean Poetry,” The Journal of 
English and Germanic Philology 102:1 (2003): 59-87. 
145 I read from the Folio text: Poems (London: J.M. for H. Herringman, 1667), G1r-v. 
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secret thing.”146 And it has, too, a particular relationship to Pauline epistemology, as an index 
of the fundamental inadequacy of human language to divine things: “We speak the wisdom 
of God in a mystery,” reads 1 Corinthians 2:7, “even the hidden wisdom” (KJV). To speak 
of the Gospel is to “make known” its “mystery” (Ephesians 6:19). Yet to “speak mysteries” 
is also to speak in tongues: “For he that speaketh in an unknown tongue speaketh not unto 
men, but unto God: for no man understandeth him; howbeit in the spirit he speaketh 
mysteries. But he that prophesieth speaketh unto men to edification […]. He that speaketh in 
an unknown tongue edifieth himself; but he that prophesieth edifieth the church” (1 Cor. 
14:2-4). To speak of the gospel is to make a mystery known; to speak in tongues is to speak 
mysteriously, incomprehensibly. In this confessionally incoherent poem in which Calvinist 
predestinarianism in the second stanza shares space with a ritual that out-transubstantiates 
the Catholic mass in the final one, the mysterious properties of “mystery” are all the more in 
demand: not only do the hidden elements of articles of faith remain necessarily unuttered, 
but no doctrine can be articulated either.  
The poem begins with several glosses on “Mystery” – miracle, wonder, prodigy, 
religion, love – in an enticing apostrophic invitation that is also a kind of dare:  
Come, my Lucasia, since we see 
   That Miracles Mens faith do move, 
By wonder and by prodigy 
   To the dull angry world let’s prove 
   There’s a Religion in our Love. 
 
                                                
146 See the Oxford English Dictionary, “mystery, n.1.” The OED divides its categories into 
“Theological” and “Non-theological” uses, but they are not so easily divided along sacred 
and secular lines – in the most obvious example, the OED perplexingly places “=miracle” 
(9) in the latter category. 
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We might understand “Religion” and “Love” as generic categories – a comment on the 
poetic interest that lies at the intersection of the devotional and the erotic, and an insistence 
that the two categories belong together, an anticipatory defiance of the modern critical 
tradition’s tendency to draw firm lines between religion and love. This self-consciousness is 
one of the poem’s great pleasures, as it proceeds in each stanza rendering a figuratively and 
logically ostentatious paradox, as though simply to prove it can. Apparently paratactic, 
apparently so different in register, what they all share, these paradoxes, is an erotics of 
constriction – from the temptingly kinky ornamental display of bondage and fetters to the 
flirtation of “greedy” angelic sensuality with the starkness of predestinarian election. The 
abiding concern with freedom in captivity again could be as much a remark on poetry, on 
the enabling constrictions of form and logic, as on intimacy.  
The poem’s syntactic and logical pyrotechnics both obscure and reveal the precarity 
of that intimacy. For example, the third stanza’s alchemy confounds the mechanics of 
neoplatonic spiritual intimacy:  
Our hearts are doubled by the loss, 
   Here Mixture is Addition grown; 
We both diffuse, and both ingross:  
   And we whose minds are so much one,  
   Never, yet ever are alone. 
 
The delicious dizziness of its figures of diffusion and engrossment, mixture and addition, 
that enable an account of astonishing closeness over distance, in spite of “loss,” also risks a 
kind of frightening loss of self. The liquid sexiness of the figures recalls Montaigne’s account 
of the “entire jouissance” of friendship: “It is I wot not what kind of quintessence of all this 
commixture, which having seized all my will, induced the same to plunge and loose it selfe in 
his, which likewise having seized all his will, brought it to loose and plunge it selfe in mine, 
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with a mutual greedinesse, and with a semblable concurrence.”147 This passage alone, I think, 
would be enough to demonstrate Philips’ attentive reading of Florio’s Montaigne. 
“Semblable concurrence” might describe the specular mutuality of the figures of 
“Friendship’s Mystery,” whose aim is not least resistance to Montaigne’s misogynist 
program, as a claim that women too are capable of friendship on this order. That resistance 
is of course the orientation of the defiance of Philips’ opening stanza; she goes on to enact it 
in the rest of the poem.  
But she also introduces significant anxiety into her figures of “commixture”: “And 
we whose minds are so much one, / Never, yet ever are alone.” The couplet feels like a relief 
after the challenge of the alchemical figure, with its gesture to the neat little neoplatonic 
conceit of a spiritual intimacy that transcends bodies and space. But these lines can be 
paraphrased in at least two contradictory ways:  
1. We have such a spiritual intimacy that neither of us is ever alone by herself, and 
we are, together, always alone as one being.  
 
2. We have such a spiritual intimacy that we are always together, yet in some degree 
always irreducibly alienated from each other.   
 
The radical claim of the first reading is interrupted by the anxiety of the second; communion 
and alienation cohabit the paradox. Joined minds confront the boundaries of the body: 
intimacy entails a kind of exile in the flesh.  
As the poem proceeds, accumulating these compacted performances, it begins to 
look more and more like they are the “wonders and prodigies” called for by the poem’s 
opening invitation, a promise that culminates in the final sacramental figure: 
                                                
147 The essayes or morall, politike and millitarie discourses of Lo: Michaell de Montaigne, 
trans. John Florio (London: Valentine Simmes for Edward Blount, 1603), I4r, I5r. 
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Our Hearts are mutual Victims laid,  
   While they (such power in Friendship lies) 
Are Altars, Priests, and Off’rings made :  
   And each Heart which thus kindly dies,  
   Grows deathless by the Sacrifice. 
 
The “power” in friendship is its capacity to make more of the sacrifice than simply an 
offering of hearts – Orinda and Lucasia are both simultaneously subject and object of the 
sacrifice, and not only that, but each is every element of the ritual and the whole 
environment that sustains it, too. Intimacy becomes a whole ecclesiology. But there is 
something suicidal in this figure: deathlessness requires death; victimhood brings the 
violence of sacrifice to the surface. Without explicitly engaging the goriness of a figure like 
Anne Lock’s knife of conscience that splats the ripped heart, the stanza is nevertheless 
haunted by just such a sharp instrument.  
Yet despite its claims on transcendence and its declared ambition to express it to the 
world, the poem remains fully within its constricted little world of two – indeed, its most 
straightforward articulation of friendship defines it as a closed loop of mutual reference: 
“We are our selves but by rebound.” Self-referentiality risks compromising meaning: the 
poem may never manage to express anything to the “dull angry world” that should witness 
these “miracles.” The poem at once celebrates this opacity and poses it as a problem. The 
definitions of “Friendship” found throughout Philips’ oeuvre share that opacity, vacillating 
between apophasis and a kind of semiotic overflow – “that abstracted flame / Which 
groveling Mortals know not how to name,” elusive, capacious, “the name that doth all others 
comprehend.” 
The “peculiar Miracles of love” described in “Wiston Vault” both evoke the 
transubstantial quality of friendship that secures Orinda’s inscription in Lucasia’s heart and 
 
 
 
141 
 
acknowledge how difficult it is to render into language, its peculiarity indexing both singularity 
and ineffability, perhaps even perversity – queerness – to the modern reader who finds a 
kind of kinship in recognizing such an articulation of love told slant. And the “temple of 
Divinity” projected by the poem on the naming of Anne Owen, imagined as a site of 
pilgrimage, makes a kind of reliquary of the poem, asks that it be understood to contain 
something numinous. The sensuous doctrinal riskiness of these figures is part of their 
ambition and part of their pleasure, yet these wonders and prodigies, these peculiar miracles, 
remain in their figurative renderings remarkably fragile. The virtuosic discursiveness of 
Philips’ paradoxes itself points to the possibility that they may turn out to be completely 
hollow. And “Friendship’s Mystery,” like so many of her Lucasia lyrics, depends on an 
apostrophic intensity that always raises the possibility that her speaker’s invitations will never 
receive the reciprocity they need from their addressees. (Consider the “Defense of Declared 
Friendship,” in which the insistence on speaking must go perpetually unanswered.)  
In light of Lanyer’s poetics of precarity, “Friendship’s Mystery” might be read as a 
poem about the impossibility of its own conditions, its increasingly radical paradoxes 
gesturing toward their own incommensurability with the material conditions of friendship in 
the world. Its very title suggests as much: the theological valence of mystery reminds us that 
spiritual things may not be articulable in worldly terms – that this is friendship, in other 
words, per speculum in aenigmate. That worldliness that proves an obstacle to friendship is not 
merely conceptual, but – as for Lanyer – embodied in the institutional structures that govern 
social relationships. While the poem doesn’t address them explicitly, Philips’ letters to 
Charles Cotterell indicate a keen awareness and incisive critique of marriage as both an 
institutional and a social phenomenon. On Anne Owen’s impending marriage – which 
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would, among other things, take her literally away, out of Wales to permanent residence in 
Dublin – Philips writes: 
I find too there are few Friendships in the World Marriage-proof; especially when 
the Person our Friend marries has not a Soul particularly capable of the Tenderness 
of that Endearment […]: And such a Temper is so rarely found, that we may 
generally conclude the Marriage of a Friend to be the Funeral of a Friendship; for 
then all former Endearments run naturally into the Gulf of that new and strict 
Relation, and there, like Rivers in the Sea, they lose themselves for ever.148 
 
The Montaignean fantasy of intimate coliquefaction is recharacterized as dissolution under 
social pressure, the bias that tends toward marriage necessarily tending away from friendship. 
Philips’ understanding of the capacity of theology to provide a language for intimacy butts 
up against the material conditions of institutional religion that abrogate the range of intimate 
relationship: one of the obstacles posed to friendship by marriage is in the latter’s 
“Plausibility of more Duty and Religion.”149 Institutional religion as plausibility – a relation 
that can be put into language, an intimacy that comes packaged with a robust social code and 
enjoys political and social recognition – enforces a “certain secret Meanness in our Souls, 
which mercenarily inclines our Affections to those with whom we must necessarily be 
oblig’d for the most part to converse, and from whom we expect the chiefest outward 
Conveniencies.”150 
The letter makes clear Philips’ keen sense of how her losses are conditioned by 
marriage as an institution, one produced and enforced by institutional religion. Returning to 
“Friendship’s Mystery” with that institutional critique in mind, the figures of wonder and 
prodigy that open the poem begin to look like visions of an alternative not to but within 
                                                
148 Letter XIII, in Letters from Orinda to Poliarchus (London: W.B. for Bernard Lintott, 1705), 
57-8. 
149 Ibid., 58. 
150 Ibid., 59. 
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theology – a reframing of the terms of faith for their radical potential to assert an intimacy 
always at risk of being rendered invisible, or annihilated altogether. Yet at the same time it 
reveals the precarity of that very assertion: the sacrificial altar of female intimacy is a mode of 
“religion in love” inconceivable within the bounds of actual, institutional religion. The 
poem’s sacramental imagination, its wonders and prodigies, falter on the ground of the “dull 
angry world” it cannot ever quite escape from. 
Katherine Philips died of smallpox within a year of Anne Owen’s marriage, at just 
thirty-two years old. Aemilia Lanyer’s career ended with her relationship with the Countess 
of Cumberland and her daughter; a few failures aside – a school she tried to found, a 
property lawsuit that went nowhere – nothing is known of the rest of her life. Their projects 
invoke their own failures at the very moments when they seem most strenuously to resist 
and reach beyond the heteropatriarchal protocols that threaten them. Where Lanyer 
demonstrates the collapse of figure under those pressures in the same gesture in which she 
clings to the threadbare “golden chains” that might sustain women’s intimacy, for Philips the 
tension of a sacramental paradox articulates the fragile site where desire encounters the limits 
of politics, religion, and language. 
 
* * *  
Behind this reading lurks the sorrow of a thirtysomething queer, lesbian, feminist, graduate 
student, whatever you want to call me. The sorrow of the not-quite-any-longer-young, of 
watching my friends marry one by one, experiencing again and again the disappointment of 
witnessing the union of an incandescent woman to an unsatisfactory or dangerous man, 
knowing too well how marriage may be the funeral of a friendship, and with a broader view 
watching the advent of gay marriage erode even queer circles of intimacy under the 
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protocols of neoliberal political economy. It’s a tedious, expected kind of sorrow, but a 
sorrow all the same. And sometimes it is a sorrow only redoubled by recognizing it in the 
work and thought of women three and a half centuries dead, watching the failures of the 
present recapitulate their ancient failures. 
And yet sometimes there is in this feeling backward something intimate in its own 
precious way. I wrote the conference paper that was this essay’s first draft in the rare book 
room of the British Library, with the Philips folio open on my desk next to the BL’s single 
copy of Salve Deus. The latter bears a bookseller’s inscriptions that date from a period when 
only four copies of it were known. On the flyleaf, in pencil, he has written: “Exceedingly 
rare.” Lanyer’s book and its project do remain “exceedingly rare,” that which is indeed 
seldom seen – not only a woman’s writing of divinest things, but the peculiar miracle of its 
witness to the community of reading women her writing sought to call into being. I have 
said that Lanyer’s project failed, and in many important ways it did. Yet there in the reading 
room was this book. Despite all its losses, and against the odds, it has survived these four 
hundred years – exceedingly rare, a miracle indeed. And as miracles are meant to do, it 
inspires faith. 
Despite her subsequent fame, Katherine Philips’ poems and letters remain as a 
testament to her own sensibilities of precarity and failure in the face of the same structures 
that Salve Deus feels shaking its unstable ground. But in some inarticulable way, that faith 
manifests in the reading room as what Adrienne Rich calls “female bonding, which in a more 
conscious form might reintegrate love and power.”151 Lanyer and Philips come into view 
together not on the terms of disciplinary protocol, but in the phenomenal event of an 
                                                
151 “Compulsory Heterosexuality,” 63. 
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afternoon in a reading room; a materially bibliographic intimacy of books literally touching 
and literally being touched; their frustrations become shared in a literary-historical survival 
relationship, in the way their volumes speak to each other, and they involve me, too. In the 
reading room we were, and now still are, in some way bound together. 
If critical consciousness has anything to recommend it, it is in this: this dwelling with 
these books that refuse to be towed under by the ravages of time, the fragile projects of 
these poets that despite their failures persist into the present, this dwelling in relation to their 
pasts, their forestalled futures, and with each other in our present, that I can only call a 
necessary kind of survival relationship. What feminists used to call, and I think still should 
call, sisterhood – which is one way of naming the ethical center of this work we do. A place 
to begin. 
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